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Specific processes for supporting self-management, as prioritised in contemporary 
Western healthcare policy, generally focus on biomedical aspects of managing a condition 
that is constructed as a separate entity from the rest of a person’s life. However, 
uncertainties in supporting self-management for long term conditions like traumatic brain 
injury (TBI) persist, including a mismatch between patient and professional contexts, and 
under-theorisation of the concepts ‘self’ and ‘agency’. To better grasp these issues, I 
gathered accounts of TBI-related experiences since hospital discharge, using a qualitative 
longitudinal design. I specifically relied on narrative interviews with ten dyads, consisting 
of one person who had recently sustained a TBI and their chosen ‘significant other’ person, 
at two time intervals. I undertook iterative narrative analyses, initially identifying 
discourses portrayed by participants and tensions, conflicts or emotional connections 
across our interactions. I drew upon insights from Michael Bamberg’s positioning analysis 
of the self in brief moments of talk-in-interaction, and Judith Butler’s work on 
performativity, to explore how people are bound by positions or create possibilities within 
socially instituted and maintained norms and expectations. The findings illustrate how the 
subject position ‘you are your brain injury’ brings an agentive gap. The self is made and 
remade through co-constructed narrative scaffolds that shift in collaborative storytelling, 
enabling the (re)claiming of a desired sense of self. This research offers insights into 
dynamics of consistency and change, rather than the assumed disruption to the self, when 
cognitive and communicative functions alter following TBI. In conclusion, I suggest 
implications for healthcare professionals’ conceptualisation of supported self-
management interactions. Rather than ‘having’ individualistic agency that is bolstered by 
the clinical intervention, agency is understood as a relational co-construction, offering a 
shift away from positioning of the ‘clinician as expert’ and opening possibilities to reaffirm 
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“Much of Medicine is bluff” said a colleague, as we stood in the doorway of the ward 
doctors’ office. These words exerted an effect, at once exposing fragility in our professional 
identities and heightening incoherence in my own sense of self. The apparently confident 
clinician, somehow sustained by ‘bluff’ in the abstract system of medicine, sits particularly 
awkwardly within the contemporary rhetoric of people as equal partners in ‘patient-
centred care’. This escalating patient-centred discourse continues to situate the patient 
within interactions where medical privilege allows or disallows what will be known and 
what will be told. 
 
Toolkits and technical approaches to supporting ‘self-management’ have proliferated 
within the ascendance of patient-centred care research and practice. Without considered 
reflection, these approaches may paradoxically constrain rather than support patients’ 
ways of managing. Beyond the service that intends to support self-management, the 
patient-as-person continues to live with health conditions, with or without mutually 
supportive others, managing the complexities of the everyday, within the countless 
inequalities that exist beyond the scope of medicine. To assimilate intentions of patient-
centred care, the clinical ‘bluff’ must shift to acknowledge that self-managing entails 
unknown complexities, which exist beyond the familiar props and scripts of clinical 
performance.  
 
In telling the story about a colleague’s proclamation on medical bluff, I positioned myself 
as the passive recipient of an uncomfortable insight, yet one which I recognised and 
accepted. At the same time, I implied that there might be personal conflict in the 
interaction between my professional identity and my desired sense of self. The problem, 
which I would like to bring to the fore in this thesis, relates to taken-for-granted 
expectations that both enable and constrain us, as we create them again and again within 
our interactions. I am interested in Judith Butler’s question, asking how we “become 
available to a transformation of who we are, a contestation which compels us to rethink 
ourselves, a reconﬁguration of our ‘place’ and our ‘ground’” (1995, p. 131). 
 
I aim to explore how storytelling is ‘put to work’ as a collaborative activity within everyday 
interactions, where subjects are positioned by who they are and who they are expected to 
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be. Personal stories, created in the present moment of interaction, bring together fluid 
temporal and social contexts. By contrast, the story that is ‘obtained’ and transformed into 
a recognisable clinical product - a ’patient history’ – becomes disjointed from the context 
of its telling. The generative potential of the telling is then extinguished, as the content of 
people’s stories becomes categorised against foreclosed outcomes. Similarly, the 
professional performance may become fixed, if identity is rigidly embedded in taken-for-
granted norms. 
 
I start by introducing the broad topics of traumatic brain injury and support for self-
management, whose interaction is central to this research. I then situate myself in the 
research by considering aspects of my background and how these might influence my 
changing perspectives.  
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction 
 
In recent decades, the shift from disease-focussed medical paternalism to a more inclusive, 
holistic ‘patient-centred’ form of care has characterised a moral necessity in Western 
healthcare (Duggan et al., 2006; May and Mead, 1999; Yun and Choi, 2019). For advocates 
of patient-centred care, the concern is to ensure that patients are treated ‘appropriately’, 
respected and enabled as moral agents, and that understanding of their unique experience 
of illness is incorporated into clinical interaction (Entwistle and Watt, 2013; Mead and 
Bower, 2000). Some notion of identity is at the core of patient-centred care intentions, yet 
the concept remains underdeveloped in this context (Horton and Horton, 2018).  The 
health system construct of ‘self-management’ forms a key part of person-centred care 
operationalisation, delivered through the support that healthcare professionals offer 
people using services to assist their own ways of managing.  
 
Unlike many other long-term conditions, self-management as a framework for support is 
rarely considered for people after traumatic brain injury (TBI). Here, the focus on acute 
care at the time of the abrupt injury can obscure clinical understandings of longer-term 
challenges, which are rendered invisible if they escape a biomedical framing (Sointu, 2016). 
When used as a diagnostic label, ‘traumatic’ distinguishes an injury to the brain that has 
resulted from an external force, contrasted with causative mechanisms such as 
inflammatory, vascular or neurodegenerative pathologies (Menon et al., 2010). As an 
everyday term, ‘traumatic’ identifies events that are highly stressful, when “the resources 
of the person are overwhelmed” (Quosh and Gergen, 2008, p. 97). The trauma in the 
clinical label invokes a predictable set of time-limited treatment responses, while the 
trauma in the personal event brings unknowable sets of individual, family and social 
implications, often continuing throughout the lives of those involved. Considerations of 
identity, interpersonal relationships and “understanding the social world after brain 
injury” (Cassel et al., 2019, p. 43)  highlight the need for a more-than-biomedical gaze in 
the conceptualisation of support for self-management after TBI. 
 
I commence by considering consequences of TBI, as determined by neuroscience research 
and clinical practice. I consider implications of Western healthcare responses to TBI, their 
limitations, and the move toward person-centred intentions within service responses for 
the longer-term consequences of TBI. I explore intentions of support for self-management 
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in the broader context of long-term condition management. In Chapter 2, I bring literature 
together on supporting self-management specifically for people living with brain injury, 
as the research field the current study is situated in. 
 
 
Traumatic brain injury 
 
“The patient has a wild look, an eye much like that of a person who has long 
watched through apprehension and anxiety, talks much and very 
inconsistently…” 
(Pott, 1768, p. 255) 
 
In Pott’s description of a person who has suffered a blow to the head, three centuries ago, 
he conveys change and incoherence. This individual’s “wild look” is no longer in 
accordance with social expectations, and there is a sense of difficulty understanding talk 
that is incessant and “inconsistent”.  These impressions prevail within contemporary 
framings of TBI, where the gaze of neuroscience upholds that “trauma to the brain can 
change the core of a person's being—their thinking, memory, personality, and behavior” 
(Chen and D’Esposito, 2010, p. 11).  
 
Early neuropsychological research on recovery after brain  injury  focused on 
understanding the “disordered mind” and mechanisms for its restoration (Luria and 
Solotaroff, 1987; Prigatano et al., 1984). Tyerman and Humphrey, in an influential study, 
reported changes in self-concept after TBI, or changes “as a person” (Tyerman and 
Humphrey, 1984, p. 16). Increasingly, the research field focussed on subjective experiences 
and mechanisms by which personality might interact with the neuropathology of brain 
injury. Tools and approaches were developed with the intention of supporting people to 
achieve ‘personally-meaningful’ activities, and social participation in roles that were 
considered central to their identity (Baddeley, 1992; Wilson, 1987).  Cognitive and 
communicative rehabilitation research began to acknowledge the role of family and 
significant others, emphasising their role in helping to ‘reconstruct’ an identity for the 
person with brain injury (Ylvisaker and Feeney, 1998). 
 
Within clinical practice, the severity of TBI is traditionally categorised using the Glasgow 
Coma Scale (GCS), ranging from ‘mild’, where there may have been a brief change in 
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consciousness, to ‘severe’, indicating extended coma or amnesia following the injury 
(Teasdale et al., 2014). Although the majority of traumatic brain injuries are categorised in 
the ‘mild’ range according to the GCS, individuals can go on to experience cognitive effects 
(for example, changes in attention, memory, information processing speed, and executive 
processes such as cognitive flexibility), fatigue, and emotional effects (Stocchetti and 
Zanier, 2016). These changes are frequently considered to lead to ‘hidden disability’ 
(Heinemann et al., 2002; Seeley et al., 2009) in contrast to changes that may be ‘visible’ to 
others, such as limb or facial weakness, and reduced balance. These changes may be 
associated with alterations in relationships, vocation, financial and social functioning in 
the long term (Mansour and Lajiness-O’Neill, 2015).  
 
Over 40 years ago, the Glasgow Outcome Scale (GOS) was devised to assess independence 
in the community and provide an overview of outcome that included ‘social recovery’ 
(Jennett and Bond, 1975). The original five GOS categories were: (1) dead; (2) vegetative 
(unresponsive), (3) severely disabled (following commands but cannot live 
independently); (4) moderately disabled (can live independently but with reduced 
capacity to work), and (5) good recovery (independent and can work). The GOS has 
become “the most highly cited outcome measure in studies on brain injury” (McMillan et 
al., 2016, p. 2) despite inadequacies  relating to its simplicity and its insensitivity to small 
but important changes (Nichol et al., 2011). 
 
Other scales tend to be favoured in rehabilitation settings, which intend to provide finer-
grained assessments. Within the NHS in England, a dominant assessment used for 
monitoring progress during inpatient rehabilitation, and relied upon for rehabilitation 
service commissioning, is the Functional Independence Measure (FIM) and its adjuvant 
Functional Assessment Measure (FAM) (Turner-Stokes et al., 2016). The FIM measures 
domains including sphincter control, mobility, communication, and cognitive function, 
while the FAM was designed to assess areas insufficiently addressed by the FIM for people 
with brain injury, assessing cognition, behaviour, communication and community 
function (Turner-Stokes et al., 1999; Turner-Stokes and Siegert, 2013).  However, the ‘FIM 
+ FAM’ is considered to be of limited use in detecting changes after patients are discharged 
from rehabilitation, in the longer term (Nichol et al., 2011). 
 
At twelve months following TBI, cognitive consequences have been proposed to herald 
“potentially devastating social implications” (Cloute et al., 2008, p. 652). People living with 
TBI face paradoxical expectations based upon their usually intact physical appearance. 
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‘Indirect’ effects of TBI therefore result from responses of others (Bowen et al., 2009) and 
include attributions made by the public that, following brain injury, people are “less 
mature, intelligent, flexible, polite, and employable” (McLellan et al., 2010, p. 708). 
Speculation about ‘malingering’ also persists in medical discourse when persisting 
symptoms are deemed clinically inconsistent with the severity of the injury as assessed by 
measures and neuroimaging (Eames, 1992; Snell et al., 2014). 
 
Standardised outcome measurements used by services may demonstrate the most obvious 
evidence of functional improvement following healthcare interventions (Levack et al, 
2010) while failing to assess personally meaningful roles or activities (Cott, 2007). Changes 
that people after TBI perceive to be important have been found to be under-represented 
in outcome measures for TBI (Kean and Malec, 2014), for example changes in relationships, 
feeling alone, or feeling overwhelmed (Mäkelä et al., 2019). Individuals themselves 
describe a more complex response than that captured through standardised measures 
(Price-Lackey and Cashman, 1996). Alterations to self-identity have been attributed to 
depression, anxiety, and “a reduction in hope for a positive future” (Levack et al., 2014, p. 
2). Although interventions to address ‘self-identity’  in the clinical environment are 
debated (Cantor et al., 2005; Muenchberger et al., 2008), research into the influence of 
approaches to support self-identity after TBI are limited. Conceptualisations of self-
identity are generally related to factors such as changes in discrete functional abilities, or 
social roles and status after TBI (Conneeley, 2012; Kim and Colantonio, 2010). 
 
Healthcare service responses to TBI 
Acute-phase management, monitoring, physiological support and neurosurgical 
intervention may be life-saving following brain injury (Honeybul and Ho, 2011). Although 
advances in emergency management of TBI in the last two decades have resulted in 
significantly increased survival rates (Korbakis and Bleck, 2014), this has not been 
accompanied by evidence for improvement of overall outcome for survivors (Roozenbeek 
et al., 2013). In the UK, acute and longer-term effects of TBI are clinically managed within 
a treatment philosophy that focuses on physical needs and favours the management of a 
discrete illness episode. The acute trauma stage, of neurosurgical management, is then 
planned and delivered separately from long-term rehabilitation services, intending to 
address recovery from the acute injury and adaptation to consequences.   
 
Patients’ and family members’ accounts of support after TBI typically characterise health 
and social care services as fragmented and difficult to access (Gladman et al., 2008). The 
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complex, unpredictable, longer-term experiences of patients and families are not 
prioritised within subsequent clinical encounters (Mansour and Lajiness-O’Neill, 2015; 
Seeley et al., 2009). Research on patients’ and their visitors’ experiences in TBI inpatient 
rehabilitation settings suggests they can feel avoided by professionals or have a sense of 
being controlled by professionals’ authority (Jumisko et al., 2007). Further, when clinical 
interventions have been completed, people with TBI and their families frequently report a 
feeling of abandonment in coping with ongoing symptoms, challenges and impact on 
quality of life (Shneerson and Gale, 2015) due to limited provision of specialist 
rehabilitation services in the community (Cloute et al., 2008; Pickard et al., 2004; Turner-
Stokes et al., 2015). 
 
In the context of limited professional support for dealing with longer-term challenges after 
TBI, people continue in their daily lives largely away from clinical services or encounters 
with healthcare professionals (Cameron et al., 2018). Informal social contexts and 
relationships become critical to individuals’ approach to adapting to daily life (Boger et 
al., 2015; Levack et al., 2010). However, changing relationships and routines in life after TBI 
may alter the “equilibrium” of the family system (Whiffin et al., 2017, p. 3), for example 
increased intensity of time spent with close family may become “constricting” for the 
individual or the family (Krahn, 2015).  
 
A focus on social contexts after TBI aligns with the broad person‐centred care discourse, 
seeking understanding of mechanisms through which changes in existing interrelations 
are negotiated (Vassilev et al., 2019). Although a need to establish a ‘patient-centred’ 
approach to partnership between people living with TBI, families and healthcare 
professionals has been advocated (Oyesanya, 2017), evidence for its enactment remains 
limited. Alternatively, the mechansim becomes one of “training family members as 
facilitators in the rehabilitation process…to reduce dependency on the service system” 
(Fisher et al., 2019, p. 854). 
 
In England, National Clinical Guidelines on Rehabilitation Following Acquired Brain 
Injury (Turner-Strokes, 2003) suggest that patients should be given the opportunity to talk 
about the impact of brain injury in their lives with someone experienced in managing the 
emotional impact of brain injury. Other national guidance is similarly vague in asserting, 
without consideration of how it might be enacted, that: 
“A good clinician is able to assist the person in the process of undertaking this work 
[of narrative construction] in such a way that the narrative is supportive of recovery”  
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(RCPsych, 2015, p. 24) 
 
In neurorehabilitation settings, consideration of communication practices between 
clinicians and patients increasingly highlight ‘engagement’; considered to be an important 
predictor of disability outcomes after brain injury, “even after accounting for education, 
comorbid health conditions, emotional distress, apathy, and baseline functional ability” 
(Williams et al., 2019, p. 1). The notion of engagement between patients and clinicians is 
gaining popularity in healthcare more generally, where it is commonly conceptualised as 
“a patient behaviour and responsibility”  (Bright et al., 2018, p. 35). Where limited patient 
engagement is noted by clinicians, it is often attributed to cognitive impairment.  
 
The notion of ‘therapeutic alliance’ offers a possible extension of the notion of 
‘engagement’, indicating that there may be more to consider than identification of  a 
patient’s deficits. However, limited research exists on how professionals “might develop a 
more positive therapeutic alliance with patients” (Kayes and McPherson, 2012, p. 1907). 
Studies seeking to conceptualise the nature of interaction with people with brain injury 
typically centre on a unidirectional professional-to-patient model. Here, clinicians’ 
expertise is assumed to be the key factor, for example delivered in: “well communicated 
information about rehabilitation potential”, or “a structured meeting where…bad news 
would be formally broken” (Peel et al., 2019, p. 3).  
 
In recent years, Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) has been used within 
neurorehabilitation approaches for people with TBI. This approach deals with themes that 
dominate Buddhist thought: using mindfulness strategies to enhance one’s ability to 
undertake meaningful activity in the presence of distress, through a focus on valued 
behaviours (Graham et al., 2016; Hayes, 2002; Hayes et al., 2006). ACT views psychological 
inflexibility as a central feature of emotional disturbance, where psychological flexibility 
is considered through core processes that include “self-as-context” (Hayes et al., 2006).  
This idea imagines the self as a stable and enduring place that hosts a variety of emotions 
and thoughts and is “not dependent on the nature of the content that comprises one’s 
ongoing flow of psychological experience” (Hayes & Gregg, 2001, as cited in Myles, 2004, 
p. 494). The self-as-context process within ACT intends to teach individuals how to 
distinguish between physical and psychological experiences relative to the ‘self’. It has 
been considered particularly relevant in “complex psychosocial adjustment” (Roddy et al., 
2018, p. 1) including assumed disruption to, or loss of, sense-of-self after TBI (Nochi, 1998; 
Tyerman and Humphrey, 1984). In proposing that ACT will facilitate people with TBI to 
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‘regain’ their lost sense-of-self, Kangas and McDonald suggest this will mean they will be 
"moving forward in terms of regaining sense-of-self and values by living in the present; 
rather than being fixated on the past" (2011, p.266). Intrinsic assumptions include that a 
sense of self can be identified, that the pre-TBI self will be problematic in the present and 
that agency underpins an individual’s ability to ‘move forward’ in life. These notions are 
central to my inquiry in this research. 
 
In the following section, I consider the emergence of ‘supported self-management’ as 
strategy to meet healthcare policy aspirations of ‘patient-centred care’, before exploring 
potential relevance and challenges when applying the concept to support for people and 




Long term conditions, defined as “conditions that cannot, at present, be cured but can be 
controlled by medication and/or other treatment/therapies” (Department of Health, 2012, 
p. 3) place expensive demands on health and social care services internationally (Hedlund 
et al., 2019). The interconnection between long term conditions (LTCs) and self-
management has become central in contemporary healthcare policy where drivers for 
efficiency savings implicate self-management as a means for health improvement within 
constrained budgets (de Silva, 2011a; World Health Organization, 2013), where “the 
ultimate aim is that people with LTCs feel they are confident and able to manage their 
condition(s)” (Department of Health, 2012, p. 10).  
 
Definitions and approaches 
Although the terms ‘self-care’ and ‘self-management’ are often used interchangeably, and 
both are applied in broad and varied ways (Kendrick et al., 2012), ‘self-management’ 
typically refers to mitigation of the effects of a long-term condition to maintain quality of 
life. Underpinning principles include efforts to increase patients’ knowledge of health 
conditions, their recognition of symptoms and when to take action recommended by 
professionals, and correctly identifying when to seek help. Interventions typically target 
individuals’ health-related behaviours (Burrell et al., 2019; de Silva, 2011b) or technical 
tasks of self-managing a disease (Owens et al, 2017). By contrast, ‘self-care’ generally refers 
to a wider set of behaviours which both the healthy and those with conditions may 
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undertake to prevent the onset of illness or disability, again to maintain quality of life 
(Thomas et al., 2014). 
 
An emphasis on the ‘disease control’ approach to self-management reinforces the 
positioning of health professionals as ‘experts’ with  “proficiency and judgment…through 
clinical experience and clinical practice” (Sackett, 1996, p. 71). These definitions arise from 
a recognition that people with long-term conditions have to manage by some means, and 
the purpose of support then seems to be that they will be able to manage more effectively. 
Medically driven approaches to long term condition self-management continue to 
predominate in Western healthcare (Hibbard and Gilburt, 2014) as: ‘systematic provision 
of education and supportive interventions by health care staff to increase patients’ skills 
and confidence in managing their health problems’ (Institute of Medicine, 2003).  
 
An early use of the term self-management support, over 40 years ago, intended to position 
the patient as an ‘active participant’ in their medical treatment (Creer et al, 1976). Research 
into self-management originated in the context of long term conditions such as arthritis 
(Lorig et al., 1999; Lorig and Holman, 2003). Support for self-management generally 
comprised group education, in which problem-solving skills were ‘taught’ through 
structured programmes. The educational course, developed in the USA, comprises weekly 
face-to-face, lay-led small group meetings (Lorig et al., 1999; Lorig et al., 2001, Lorig and 
Holman, 2003). In the UK, the model that subsequently became most well established is 
known as the ‘Expert Patients Programme’ (EPP), with an expectation that the “expertise 
of patients could be harnessed for the challenge of increasing burden for the healthcare 
system of chronic disease” (Donaldson, 2003, p. 326).  
 
The idea of supporting self-management may implicitly threaten conventional power 
relations in professionals’ expertise-dominated interactions with patients. Mudge at al 
proposed a need for a “paradigm shift” if clinicians are to share or let go of control (2015, 
pp. 9–10). In the NHS in England, supported self-management is considered to be a core 
part of the implementation of policy intentions for personalised care, set out in the NHS 
England ‘Five Year Forward View’ and ‘Long Term Plan’, (NHS England, 2019, 2014). The 
Long Term Plan understands a basis of personalised care in “what matters" to patients and 
highlights “their individual strengths, needs and preferences” (NHS England, p. 6). 
Personalised care is operationalised through a “Comprehensive Model” in which 
supported self-management is one of six components alongside shared decision making, 
support planning, enabling choice, social prescribing and community-based support, and 
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personal health budgets. NHS England proposes that all six components should be 
embedded into health and social care, as “personalised care should be business as usual 
for everyone, not a bolt on for some” (NHS England, 2019, p. 34).  
 
The personalised care agenda is considered to represent “a new relationship” between 
people, professionals and the health and social care system (NHS England, 2019, p, 14). 
Within the Long Term Plan, the proposed mechanism for the new relationship is that of 
co-production: “a fundamental shift towards recognising that people who use health 
services can also help solve problems and take control” (de Longh et al, 2019, p. 1). 
Concepts of coproduction and codesign, already incorporated in healthcare quality 
improvement research and practice (Locock and Boaz, 2019), draw attention to social 
dimensions of decision-making by inclusion of practicalities as understood by those for 
whom services are intended (Jasanoff, 2004). However, critiques have questioned whether 
the shift to ‘co-‘ terminology  heralds a fundamental change in attitudes and power 
relations, or instead whether co-production is in danger of becoming “a buzzword” 
deployed by services (Flinders et al., 2016, p. 262). Nevertheless, in the area of social 
prescribing, ‘link workers’ spend time with people referred to the scheme, “to assess their 
needs, support them, coproduce solutions and to see an improvement in wellbeing” 
(Polley et al., 2017, p. 41). This represents a new area for the study of coproduction, as a 
potential mechanism underpinning successful ‘linkage’ between people living with long 
term conditions and available community resources (Husk et al., 2016; Wildman et al., 
2019). 
 
The Long Term Plan considers that, for many conditions, people are already taking control 
themselves. The plan sets out an intention to support for people to manage their own 
health, specifying discrete conditions that include diabetes and asthma (King’s Fund, 
2018). Self-management is open to many interpretations and will not be constituted 
through one form of support. However, dominant approaches that have been derived from 
the Expert Patient Programme continue the biomedical discourse of “health-status 
monitoring, provider-recommended diet and/or exercise regimens, and/or other self-
treatments (e.g., injections, inhalers, breathing machines)” (Eton et al., 2017, p. 118).  
Qualitative studies suggest that practitioners, reflecting on their role in supported self-
management interventions, appear to lack the confidence necessary to support 
participants beyond a biomedical paradigm (Bossy et al., 2018; Ungar et al., 2018). Entwistle 
considers that clinicians may anticipate that patients might perceive their competence is 
doubted, risking damage to their confidence (Entwistle et al., 2018). Conversely, challenges 
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in implementation have been described in association with professionals’ dismissal of 
supported self-management as “irrelevant or even problematic, especially when not 
consistent with, or contradicting, professional agendas” (Jones et al, 2016, p.4).  
 
Consistent among the various interpretations of self-management is an implicit 
assumption that valuing of the self is linked to one’s ability to continue to manage in the 
face of long-term health adversity. Self-management support programmes frequently 
target self-efficacy, defined as ‘‘the belief in one’s capabilities to organize and execute the 
courses of action required to produce given attainments’’ (Bandura, 1997, p.3). Self-efficacy 
is a core concept of Bandura’s social cognitive theory (Bandura, 1997), described as a 
person’s self-perceived ability to perform a set of actions to successfully cope with the 
demands of a situation, continue activities and achieve a desired outcome. It has been 
considered to influence how people feel, think, and find motivation, it is task-specific, and 
amenable to change over time. Self-efficacy has been proposed as a key mechanism 
through which self-management operates, offering operationalisation of the concept of 




Neoliberal states dissociate from the costs of care through individualising and privatising 
care duties (Cain, 2019). Commentators argue that the turn to ‘self-management’ broadly 
fits with a shifting of responsibility to cope with long-term health conditions onto 
individuals and their families, away from healthcare systems (Lemke 2001; Carter, 2015, 
Brijnath and Antoniades, 2016). ‘Empowerment’ and ‘consumerism’ are embedded in the 
narrative of personal responsibility (Wyatt et al., 2010, p. 2), and the idea of the rational, 
self-interested individual is central (Prainsack, 2018).  A fundamental principle of 
neoliberal policies is the need for individuals  govern themselves and  be entrepreneurial 
in making choices, assuming they will always try to advance themselves by making the 
‘right’ choices, which will result in personal successes, while faltering choices may result 
in social decline (McGregor, 2001; Salecl, 2010). The normative assumption in healthcare 
policy underpinned by neoliberal principles encompasses (unacknowledged) assumptions 
that patients (consumers) will hold responsibility for decisions, actions, ‘successes’ and 
‘failures’,  rather than being passive recipients of healthcare (Brijnath and Antoniades, 
2016; Henwood et al., 2003; Kendall and Rogers, 2007). High value is given to individual 




Neoliberal healthcare affords power to knowledge that is measurable and can be 
evidenced, associated with a privileging of ‘evidence-based practice’ (Komporozos-
Athanasiou et al., 2019; Martin, 2008). Supported self-management practices, when 
underpinned by a neoliberal philosophy of self-governance (Vassilev et al., 2017), assume 
that people can control their health through rational conduct. They imply responsibility 
for making choices and working on skills for sustaining health and wellbeing (Lemke, 
2001). Neoliberal approaches can result in a moralising discourse of blame for ineffective 
self‐management (Moore et al., 2015; Potter et al., 2018). Individualistic approaches to self-
management generate the basis for systemic structural violence: “structural because they 
are embedded in the political and economic organization of our social world … violent 
because they cause injury to people”. If individuals are expected to function as the primary 
agents in the creation of their own health and wellbeing (Sointu, 2005), the notion of self-
management is open to interpretation as a question of how a patient is to manage on their 
own, fend for themselves (Demain et al, 2013), ‘get on with it’ or ‘do it yourself’ (Boger et 
al., 2015; Satink et al., 2014), exacerbating a sense of abandonment by health services 
(Thirsk and Clark, 2014). The degree to which the more vulnerable are able to meet their 
needs is lowered, and inequalities widen (Farmer et al., 2006, p. 1686). 
 
Over the last decade, supported self-management has increasingly been used to refer to 
those behaviours that might influence an individual's ability to cope with their condition 
and achieve optimal quality of life (de Silva, 2011b; Entwistle et al., 2016; Morgan et al., 
2017). Processes typically include activities such as goal-setting, self-reflection,  self-
evaluation, and managing thoughts and behaviours in response to change (Ryan and 
Sawin, 2009). Professionals providing support for self-management seek to enhance 
people’s confidence to self-manage conditions and to reduce “unwanted or unnecessary 
dependence” on healthcare services (Owens et al., 2017, p. 8). Here, self-management uses 
personal and social resources as a means of enhancing control over that which health 
services prioritise (Kendall et al., 2011). For example, the practice of goal-setting may be 
used “to prioritise the most important problems and motivate the patient” (Verdoorn et 
al., 2019, p. 98).  
 
Terms such as ‘responsibility’ or ‘accountability’ frame supported self-management 
interventions’ intended behaviour change as a choice that can be determined by the 
willingness, motivation and ‘correct’ attitude of those to whom support is provided.  Here, 
“being responsible” involves the demonstration of “adherence to institutionalized 
obligations and moral norms” (Heavey et al., 2019, p. 2). Clinicians’ perceptions of 
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‘activated participants’ as partners in healthcare entwine with perceptions of positive 
moral character (Sointu, 2017, p. 68). ‘Good’ patients are characterised by motivation to 
control their condition, while ‘bad’ patients fail to act according to clinicians’ expectations 
of patients, challenging the ideal of self-responsibility and signifying ‘deficient’ 
personhood (Rose, 1999).  
 
Broader interpretations of supported self-management encompass challenges to 
inappropriate service provision and finding new ways of sharing both professional-based 
and patient-held expertise (Entwistle et al., 2010; Hinder and Greenhalgh, 2012; Jones et 
al., 2013, 2016b, 2016b; Kennedy et al., 2013; Mäkelä et al., 2019; Vassilev et al., 2019). The 
social context of managing is also receiving increasing attention within supported self-
management intentions:  
“actions with family, community and the appropriate healthcare professionals, to 
manage the symptoms, treatment, physical, psychosocial, cultural, and spiritual 
consequences and inherent lifestyle changes required for living with a chronic 
disease’’     (Wilkinson and Whitehead, 2009, p. 1145). 
 
Influences on assessment of outcome 
Perspectives on what constitutes ‘a good outcome’ following a self-management support 
intervention vary (de Silva, 2011), with lack of consensus regarding appropriate assessment 
measures or understandings of what is valued from the person’s own perspective (Boger 
et al, 2013). The attempt to transfer the work and responsibility of managing conditions 
from organisations to patients and their social networks is linked to the belief that it will 
help save money while improving health (May et al., 2009). This system-centred framing 
focuses on actions that can add value in dealing with long term conditions that policy 
makers consider important (Narasimhan and Kapila, 2019). When attention is directed to 
service use costs, the focus of self-management support turns to biomedical markers of 
health and the behaviours that might contribute to them. This instrumental policy focus 
has been criticised for categorising health conditions as seemingly isolated from broader 
social and cultural contexts (Atkin et al., 2010). Critique includes a questioning of this 
dualistic framework: the separation of cognitive from bodily elements of living with long 
term conditions. The assumption that increasing patients’ knowledge will promote their 
engagement in LTC management (Rijken et al., 2014), and the focus on patient compliance 
to prescribed tasks, constructs self-management support in separation from the rest of a 




Educating and motivating patients to adopt clinicians’ recommendations for disease 
control perpetuates an instrumental view of patients without recognition of the supportive 
value of relationships (Entwistle et al., 2016). Implementation of tools such as the NHS 
Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF), providing financial incentives to GP practices, 
increasingly standardise adherence to specific measurements of individuals’ physical 
‘normality’ applied to single conditions.  For example, the QOF for diabetes mellitus 
(NICE, 2016) gave a required range of readings of blood pressure and glycated 
haemoglobin (a blood marker of long term glucose control) and categorises the person’s 
feet to signify diabetic morbidity. Here, ‘health’ and its management are considered to be 
measurable and doing so is mandated for the demonstration of healthcare impact.  
 
Interventions to support self-management risk ‘playing to the test’ by clinicians, if 
focussing on aspects of professional practice that is subject to quality assessment (Owens 
et al, 2017). Further, the need for healthcare services to measure and demonstrate control 
of biomedical parameters potentially increases ‘burden of treatment’ or workload for 
patients, resulting from activities prescribed to patients by healthcare providers (Mair and 
May, 2014; Ridgeway et al., 2014). Adherence-focused approaches then represent a kind of 
“bureaucratic self-management” (Brijnath and Antoniades, 2016, p. 5), ‘done to’ recipients 
whose unique values and “rich and complex expertise that is emergent directly from the 
lifeworld” is unknown or  beside the point (Pickard and Rogers, 2012, p. 120). 
 
The emphasis in policy that seeks to move toward engaging people in managing their own 
health is apparent within the current enthusiasm for measuring ‘patient activation’ in 
areas of knowledge, skills and confidence in complying with professionally-recommended 
behaviours (Hibbard and Gilburt, 2014). The implication is that those deemed ‘activated’ 
by these measures will be eligible for self-management support, as the ones most likely to 
benefit. When the degree of ‘activation’ is determined through professionals’ judgements, 
resultant gate-keeping to self-management support has potential to exclude those deemed 
ineligible, including assumptions that people are ‘incapable’ (Guldager et al., 2019). Certain 
groups may then be prioritised by healthcare professionals as those who are considered 
‘most likely’ to benefit from self-management support following judgements about their 
suitability, for example leading to exclusion of those with cognitive or communicative 
impairment (Kendall et al., 2011). Further, it suggests certain people, lacking in some way, 
need to be managed differently, for their own beneﬁt, thereby positioning them as 
someone who ‘must be helped’, and emphasising health professionals as the legitimate 




The rationale presented by advocates of ‘patient activation’ for self-management is that 
they need to be activated to acquire "sufficient knowledge, motivation, skills and 
confidence to properly manage their disease" (van Vugt, 2019, p.74). Four stages of patient 
activation have been described: (1) the patient believes that an 'active role' is important for 
disease management, (2) the patient has the knowledge and the confidence to take action, 
(3) the patient takes the action, (4) the patient can maintain this behaviour even at times 
of stress.  These aspects are commonly captured in a standardised measure known as PAM 
(Patient Activation Measure), assessing patient self-reported knowledge, skills and 
confidence in self-management (Hibbard et al, 2004). Many healthcare organisations have 
built the PAM into standard processes. Patients might complete it either during the 
checking-in process on arrival, in the course of their consultation, or during an inpatient 
stay. The PAM data are then entered into the patient’s medical records (Hibbard and 
Gilburt, 2014, p. 34). The use of PAM is becoming established in the 'evidence base' 
discourse for supported self-management interventions as a measure of service 
effectiveness (Armstong et al, 2017). It is seen as a validated, generic tool that can produce 
"metrics that could demonstrate the effectiveness of person-centred care" (Armstong et al, 
2017, p. 78). However, understanding of how interventions or support should be integrated 
into service delivery, for patients identified by the PAM at different levels of 'activation', is 
not clear (Hibbard and Gilburt, 2014). If used as the basis of decisions about which services 
will be offered it becomes a "gate-keeping or eligibility tool...to ensure that any patient 
being referred is sufficiently activated to be able to benefit from such services." (Armstong 
et al, 2017, p. 80).  
 
By assigning people to levels of activation, defined by specified properties, the intention 
then is to help them move to a ‘higher’ level of activation. However, patients may not value 
items specified within PAM as much as other possible actions, for example maintaining 
their social networks or gaining support for their families to live well (Demain et al, 2013). 
Further, social contexts and conditions of constraint make change difficult to achieve, 
regardless of the level of ‘activation’ that has been clinically scored and documented in the 
medical record. 
 
Personal connections and ‘being me’  
What is taken to be ‘self-management’ occurs within a complex network of people, spaces, 
and discourses. However, dominant approaches to support may fail to recognise the 
context of interaction, particularly individuals’ interpretations and connections to social 
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structures. Tools used to measure effectiveness of self-management interventions have 
frequently been developed without input from people with long term conditions that they 
seek to support. Little attention is given to outcomes valued, or to a need for support that 
is suited to the dynamic and fluid changes experienced day-to-day  (Boger et al., 2012; Ryan 
and Sawin, 2009). 
 
Research on self-management of long term conditions from patients’ perspectives has 
tended to focus on conditions such as diabetes, asthma, epilepsy, or rheumatoid arthritis 
(Townsend et al., 2006). A systematic review of self-management-related outcomes, 
identified by people with long term conditions, highlighted the importance of a positive 
social network. Here, two components of a positive network were described: ‘informal 
relationships’, and ‘health professionals’. Authors identified that self-management might 
be “something co-created with family members” (although few studies reviewed had 
explicitly identified families’ perspectives), and that the “relationship between patients 
and health professionals is fundamental to ensuring professional support for self-
management is effective” (Boger et al., 2015, p. 14). Biomedical outcomes were considered 
to possibly sit alongside but in tension with a need to ‘be me’, which comprised factors of 
feeling ‘normal’, and that the condition or its management would not “define nor dictate 
their lives” (Boger et al., 2015, p. 15).  
 
Tested theoretical models and programmes for self-management support, as described 
above, have emphasised the importance of a trained workforce to facilitate patients’ 
individual problem-solving and goal setting skills, and to help patients build self-efficacy, 
in managing long term conditions (Battersby et al., 2010; Bodenheimer et al., 2002; 
Holman and Lorig, 2004). However, a reliance on the biomedical aspects of supporting 
self-management responds to the dominant healthcare viewpoint that there is a prioritised 
need ‘to educate’ patients before a broader range of components in living well with their 
condition might be addressed (Hughes et al., 2018). The appropriateness of such forms of 
support has been questioned, “because [it does] not seem to pursue what people … 
themselves strive for, or use the kinds of strategies they have found supportive” (Morgan 
et al, 2017, p.244). People may prioritise maintaining valued social roles, identities and a 
`normal’ life, sometimes over symptom containment (Townsend et al., 2006), or 
“participating in life as fully as one chooses” (Manning et al., 2019, p. 3). 
 
In contrast to support for self-management that is meaningful to the context of people’s 
lives, services often focus on process outcomes, (for example, reduction in service use or 
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change in parameters measured by blood tests), without necessarily considering factors in 
the person’s life context within interactions (Boger et al., 2015). Instead of health 
professionals tailoring support for self-management in interaction, what prevails is a 
situation that does not take into account complex relational factors. Further, 
understanding is required of the “aspects of a person’s agency or action that support is 
intended to bolster” (Entwistle et el, 2016, p.7).  
 
Exploration of self-management for people living with TBI may open a new space to 
consider interactional, identity and agentive aspects. Further, supporting self-
management after brain injury potentially exposes a form of inequality among long term 
conditions that are seen as ‘worthy’ candidates for intervention, as no obvious outcomes 
exist for monitoring of the ‘good self-manager’ against biomedical markers of disease 







“Viewers are as much a part of the landscape as the boulders they stand on” 
(Spurgeon, 1996, p. 172)  
 
Situated knowledge derives from positions of interpretation (Haraway, 1988). By situating 
my viewpoint, I acknowledge that my life experiences impact my efforts in knowledge 
production (Harvey, 2017). My positions and views, shaped by contexts and changing over 
time, influence both how I view myself and how I am viewed by others. These viewpoints 
derive from many positions I have or have had, for example student, researcher, clinician, 
caregiver, patient, partner and so on. The positions I have not experienced are also 
relevant, as I am not disabled, I am not from an ethnic minority, and am not 
socioeconomically disadvantaged and there are doubtlessly other categories for which “I 
can give no account” (Butler, 2005, p. 40).  I acknowledge, though, that particular views 
and attitudes have developed through my professional experiences, which are relevant in 
situating myself in this research. 
 
The incentive for pursuing this research project arose after years of working in 
neurorehabilitation services with people who had experienced brain injury, and their 
families. An insidious component of my experience was a sense of isolation while fulfilling 
what appeared to be the requirements of the position, according to power relations within 
healthcare service delivery. To some degree, this was a sense of lacking connection with 
the professional identities of other members of my clinical community. I also experienced 
a sense of remoteness from the people accessing the services, when upholding the role 
required in ‘delivering’ professional expertise. The ‘clinician-as-knower’ position required 
particular structured approaches and styles of speech, and was constrained by the 
expectation of producing an account of others’ experiences in terms of ‘brain pathology’, 
stripping problems of their context, supposing cause and solution (Gray, 2011).  
 
This research project started off with a critical curiosity into these tensions: ‘‘a readiness 
to find what surrounds us as strange and odd; a readiness to throw off familiar ways of 
thought and to look at the same things in a different way’’ (Foucault, 1997, p.325). My 
particular focus on the construct of supported self-management resulted from an 
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intention to probe its deeper meanings and contradictions while seeking to generate 







I proceed, in Chapter 2, with an exploration of literature specifically addressing support 
for self-management after traumatic brain injury. I seek to establish a context for my 
research within current healthcare approaches, to understand the theoretical 
underpinning of existing interventions and the focus of their evaluation. The synthesis will 
form the background to the potential contribution of this thesis to research and practice. 
Following this review, I present a critical analysis of additional concepts relating to self-
management after brain injury.  
 
In Chapter 3, I outline the research aims and objectives. I set out the methodology 
underpinning the research, firstly presenting ontological and epistemological 
considerations leading to a qualitative research approach, specifically through narrative 
inquiry with people living with TBI, in combination with their chosen other person in 
dyadic interviews and using a longitudinal approach.  
 
In Chapter 4, I describe the research methods including the setting for this study, sampling 
considerations, my approach to recruitment, data generation activities of interviews and 
field notes, confidentiality and ethical considerations. 
 
My intention in Chapter 5 is to describe the iterative development of my analytic 
processes, leading to an integrated use of Michael Bamberg’s positioning analysis of 
narrative research with Judith Butler’s work on performativity. In acknowledging my own 
influence on data generation and analysis, I include the role of emotional awareness within 
my analysis. 
 
In Chapter 6, I present the research findings and analysis. I commence by introducing the 
people who took part in the interviews. I then describe interrelated areas of findings from 
my analysis of positioning and performativity in the interview conversations, through 
which navigation of change and continuity is brought about. This section includes 
consideration of positioning within talk about clinical interactions. 
 
In Chapter 7, I discuss the research findings, commencing with analytic reflections and 
situating my analysis within the research context described in Chapter 2. I explore 
strengths and limitations of the research undertaken.  
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Finally, in Chapter 8, I consider the potential contribution of this research to policy, 
practice and research in supporting self-management, for people with TBI and long term 
conditions more broadly. I describe a strategy for practical application of this work, within 
a related project informed by principles of coproduction to develop a supported self-









Traumatic brain injury entails socially complex yet frequently hidden challenges. 
Attention to support for people after TBI brings scope for broader understandings of 
supported self-management, where consequences such as memory impairment are seen 
to collide with the very substance of ‘who a person is’ (Atkin et al., 2010). I commence with 
an assessment of existing literature exploring aspects of supported self-management for 
people with TBI, including methodologies applied in researching the topic. I review 
research into development and implementation of interventions in this field, delineate key 
concepts referred to, and approaches to outcome evaluation. After discussing the main 
literature findings, I explore gaps identified and I expand on concepts that are related to 




Guided by the review model proposed by (Arksey and O’Malley, 2005), refined by (Levac 
et al., 2010), I commenced with concept definition and population identification, to 
establish a search strategy. Specifically, I explored (1) key concepts relating to self-
management after TBI; (2) healthcare interventions intending to support self-
management after TBI; (3) outcomes used in the assessment of self-management support 
for people after TBI.  
 
Search strategy 
The framework for the review and my iterative development of a literature search strategy 
are shown in Appendix 1a. I applied the final search strategy for the key concepts of 
‘traumatic brain injury’ and ‘self-management support’ in the MEDLINE database and then 
converted its format by using a combination of indexing terms and free text search with 
                                                          
1 This literature review has been developed from my University of Westminster DProf assignment 




relevant subject headings identified according to each database. My sources included 
electronic databases, reference lists of key articles identified and individual searching of 
journals likely to include relevant coverage of the topic. In addition, I searched two UK 
‘think tank’ organisations (the Health Foundation and the King’s Fund) resources for 
additional articles. In view of the potential applicability of the search to a variety of 
disciplines, I added databases to represent principal healthcare and psychological 
literature: Cumulative Index to Nursing and Allied Health Literature (CINAHL), Psych 
Info, Embase, Allied and Complementary Medicine Database (AMED), Cochrane library, 
and ProQuest Dissertations and Theses, from inception to March 2019. Finally, I 
performed searches using key words in Google Scholar with limitation to “since 2018”, in 
March 2019, to allow identification of more recent publications, which may not have been 
captured through database searches.  
 
I imported citations into the bibliographic software package Zotero for data management 
and to facilitate removal of duplicate articles. I reviewed abstracts against the inclusion 
and exclusion criteria shown in Appendix 1b and then reviewed whole articles to determine 
their relevance. I extracted key concepts discussed by authors; interventions; outcome 
measures and key findings. I used an Excel spreadsheet to manage and compare the data 
generated, before synthesising the content to facilitate my interpretations. 
 
Findings 
A total of 590 titles were generated from the search, from which 90 abstracts were 
retrieved and considered for further review (Appendix 1d). Numbers of articles I identified 
within each phase from the databases searched, and the selection process from which I 
identified a total of 20 articles for full review, are shown in Appendix 1e. A summary of 
content from the articles included is included in Appendix 1f. In the following, I explore 
the themes identified, in relation to my areas of focus on concepts, interventions and 
outcomes used in self-management support for people after TBI.  
 
Participants  
Participants with mixed causes of acquired brain injury were included in many studies 
identified (Brands et al, 2014a, Brands et al, 2014b; Kendrick et al, 2012; Muenchberger et 
al, 2011, Backhaus et al, (2010)), as were self-reported histories of “mild TBI” (Trontel et al, 
2013; Tsaousides et al, 2009), or broader, mixed neurological diagnoses of stroke, brain 
injury or other “monophasic neurological impairment” (Dixon et al, 2007). Patients with 
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traumatic brain injury were also included within a “general trauma” group by Wegener et 
al (2014) and by Connolly et al (2014). 
 
Methodologies of identified studies 
The papers’ approaches reflected a range of methodological perspectives, from a 
randomised, controlled intervention study (Backhaus et al, 2010) to in-depth interviews 
with narrative analysis (Price-Lackey and Cashman, 1995) or phenomenological 
interpretation (Schutz, 2007). Outcome assessment through questionnaires was 
frequently employed (Cicerone and Azulay, 2007; Tsaousides et al, 2009; Wegener et al, 
2014, Brands et al, 2014a, Brands et al, 2014b). The qualitative studies highlighted an 
approach of seeking individuals who were considered to have self-managed their situation 
after brain injury particularly successfully. Authors then sought to understand how this 




Self-efficacy and coping 
The predominant concept discussed within the identified literature was that of self-
efficacy. Authors refer to Bandura’s concept of self-efficacy as the belief in one’s 
capabilities in achieving goals (Bandura, 1997). Dixon et al (2007) generated a topic guide 
for qualitative interviews, which they structured around Bandura's components of self-
efficacy (Bandura, 2006, 1997), and suggested that this could be used to derive a novel self-
efficacy scale as a measure for use in rehabilitation settings in general, and in assessment 
of supported self-management interventions, in particular.  
 
Studies looked at the relationship of self-efficacy to social participation (Brands et al., 
2014a) and coping (Brands et al., 2014b; Yehene et al., 2019) after acquired brain injury and 
the concept of employment-related self-efficacy, specifically after TBI, was explored in four 
studies (Price-Lackey and Cashman, 1996; Sherer et al., 2014; Soeker, 2012; Tsaousides et 
al., 2009). Authors reported that employment-related and general self-efficacy positively 
correlated with perceived quality of life (Tsaousides et al, 2009). In qualitative exploration 
of return to work after TBI, Soeker (2012) identified a theme of participation in occupation 
that enabled ‘positive growth’. Sherer reviewed the effects of self-reported traits and 
environmental barriers or facilitators on employment outcomes after TBI, suggesting that 
findings indicated self-efficacy was ‘probably’ not predictive of employment and coping 
style was ‘possibly’ not predictive of employment. By contrast, self-reported well-being, 
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pain, social interaction and post-concussive symptoms were identified as being likely to 
make important contributions when predicting employment.  
 
Two studies including people with mixed causes of acquired brain injury diagnoses 
(including TBI) measured self-efficacy, coping and social participation through postal 
questionnaires administered up to one year after acute onset of brain injury. The 
questionnaires included a 13-item TBI Self-efficacy Questionnaire and ‘coping 
questionnaires’ relating to responses to situations perceived to be a specific consequence 
of brain injury, for example: “I am very stressed when I meet people because I cannot 
remember their names” (Brand et al, 2014a, p. 870). Defining coping as the cognitive and 
behavioural efforts made to manage stressful situations (Folkman et al., 1986), the authors 
reported that higher self-efficacy protected against the ‘negative effects of emotion-
orientated coping’ and suggested that, as assessed through questionnaires, self-efficacy 
facilitates the use of restoration-oriented behaviour (task coping). The findings suggested 
that self-efficacy appeared to be of less importance in ‘long-term’ (up to one-year post-
injury) social participation. 
 
In a more recent study exploring self-efficacy and coping following traumatic brain injury 
specifically, authors used a general self-efficacy scale (Schwarzer and Jersusalem, 1995), 
aiming to assess coping and adaptation abilities (Yehene et al., 2019). The authors 
proposed that self-efficacy relates to emotional outcome after TBI, through its impact on 
subjective stress appraisal, which affects the ability to accept one’s condition. Further, 
authors suggested that coping after TBI “may not be different to coping with any other 
unpleasant life events that require adjustment” (p.5). They proposed that the underlying 
mechanism may be similar to that in post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and 
recommended that clinicians should encourage people with TBI “to engage in activities 
that will help challenge their maladaptive cognitions and perception of how the injury has 
affected their lives” (Yehene et al., 2019, p. 7). 
 
Trontel et al (2013) sought to explore “why individuals with mild TBI may complain of 
lingering symptoms” (p.961) by applying the concept of ‘stereotype threat’: a reduction in 
performance associated with negative stereotype about belonging to a social group. They 
investigated the effect of indicating to students that they had been selected on the basis 
of their history of (self-reported) TBI, which they considered would have the effect of 
making this diagnosis ‘salient’ (Suhr and Gunstad, 2002). Trontel et al termed the resulting 
scenario a ‘diagnosis threat’. Under these conditions, students reported significantly lower 
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academic self-efficacy as measured by a questionnaire, and were more likely to 
misevaluate their cognitive ability than the control group, despite showing similar 
performances on cognitive tasks. The authors proposed that academic self-efficacy would 
be amenable to change, and highlighted the importance of taking into account individual 
self-perception within supported self-management interventions.  
 
Schutz explored self-efficacy through a phenomenological qualitative study of nine 
individuals the authors considered to have made a “highly successful” recovery after TBI, 
selected from a cognitive rehabilitation programme, in which they were taught 
compensatory techniques for adaptation to cognitive impairments. This involved training 
in the use of external memory and time management aids and a procedure to develop self-
correction skills. The patients were referred to as: 
 “self-therapists, taught to watch ardently for their errors, prescribe their own self-
corrective procedures, and review and revise their methods continuously to upgrade 
the quality of their adaptive repertoire”.  
(Schutz, 2007, p. 50) 
The individuals considered highly successful were described by the authors as showing 
“uncommon persistence and self-discipline” in applying the adaptive techniques (Schutz, 
2007, p. 53). These participants, when interviewed, attributed their successes to their 
continued reliance on, and elaboration of, the cognitive compensation strategies that they 
had been taught in the rehabilitation programme. Unlike their less successful peers in the 
programme, authors proposed that those who were most successful had demonstrated 
“self-corrective self-management”, which had minimised the functional impact of their 
deficits. They considered that these participants particularly demonstrated an “intolerance 
of error and embarrassment” that resulted in heightened determination to apply error-
prevention strategies (Schutz, 2007, p. 53). 
 
One study adopted a narrative approach (Price-Lackey and Cashman, 1996) within a case 
study of an individual who was interviewed twice, at an interval of one year. The authors 
intended to explore the complexity of personal approaches in rehabilitation and meaning-
making over an extended time following TBI and sought perspectives on patients as 
‘occupational beings’, by gathering a life history focused upon occupation/employment. 
The authors’ narrative analysis identified a theme that they described as "times of great 
change are times of great opportunity”. They suggested that the patient’s self-devised, 
gradually more complex occupations (including “studying, playing music, writing, 
computer graphics, and theater production, to…exercise creativity” (p. 306)), contributed 
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to her post-TBI recovery. Their analysis illustrated how potentially ‘negative’ situations 
might be reconfigured as positive opportunities, and ways that personal meanings of 
functional activities were integrated within a narrative of an overall life story. The  
individual summarised her own approach as “my self-treatment program…a work in 
progress…Life is, after all, an eternal process of being and becoming” (Price-Lackey and 
Cashman, 1996, p. 312). 
 
Self-management interventions 
Interventions in the literature identified were underpinned by an approach where forms 
of knowledge and ‘expertise’ were conveyed to patients. Self-management intervention 
formats included time-limited individual coaching sessions, delivered by an occupational 
therapist and psychologist (Kendrick et al., 2012); a group-based preventative intervention 
led by “two professional facilitators with a minimum of a master’s degree” (p.843) for 
people and their caregivers following discharge (Backhaus et al., 2010, p. 843); a peer or 
healthcare professional-led community-based programme (Muenchberger et al., 2011); or 
an occupational therapist delivered problem-solving-therapy framework to “teach 
individuals to self-manage fatigue” (Raina, 2018, p. n/p). One protocol planned a clinical 
trial to evaluate the effectiveness of a person and family-centred intervention to reduce 
unsafe events, increase self-managed activities and enhance participation after brain 
injury (Steele, 2017). The programme comprised of an assessment phase by a clinician 
followed by ‘prevention education and goal-setting’, and then ‘in-home activity training 
with a life skills coach’ through eight home visits. The life skills coach would provide 
training, compensatory strategies, and social or technical supports on selected activities. 
Patients and family members were to receive a personal report on their own strengths and 
risks (Steele, 2017).  
 
A summary of the interventions identified to support self-management after brain injury 





Table 1 - Summary of self-management interventions for people living with brain 
injury 
Reference Intervention Participants Key features 
Backhaus 
et al, 2010 






diagnoses (n=20)  
Caregivers (n=20) 
Psychotherapy, psychoeducation, 
stress management and problem-
solving skills through Cognitive 






(‘Skills to Enable 
People with brain 







42% stroke)  
 
Community-based six-session group 
programme for people with focus on 
planning a collective activity. 
Structured programme of ‘relevant 
topics’ facilitated by a trained local 












‘Coaching sessions’ at rehabilitation 
centre, with focus on symptom 
education, adaptive strategies, 
cognitive reframing, collaborative 
problem-solving and weekly goal 
setting. Eight sessions with 
occupational therapist and eight 




of interventions to 
increase self-








Suggested self-efficacy was 
positively influenced by supervised 
educational interventions, coping 
strategies and/or cognitive 










(n= 20) and 
control (n= 14) 
groups. Mean 
duration post-TBI 
was 58 months.  
 
The intervention involved a 
problem-solving Occupational 
Therapy framework ‘to teach 
individuals to self-manage their 
fatigue’ through two 1:1 sessions 
per week for 8 weeks, via web 
cameras. This was compared to a 
‘health education attention control 






Outcome measures  
 
Self-efficacy related 
Cicerone and Azulay (2007) explored relations among standardised measures of 
“community integration, activity-related satisfaction, self-efficacy beliefs, and perceived 
quality of life” in people with TBI living in the community (p. 259). They used a ‘TBI Self-
Efficacy Questionnaire’, which they modified from a measure designed for people with 
‘chronic medical disability’. The intention was that it would relate to: 
 “self-efficacy to perform self-management behaviors that had the highest inter-
correlations…[for] persons with diverse disabilities, and contained items that appear 
most meaningful for people with a neurological disability” (p.260) 
 
This questionnaire incorporated four subscales covering social, physical, cognitive and 
emotional items. The adapted scale was developed by the authors for the group 
categorised as ‘neurological disabilities’, though they referred to the new version 
specifically as the ‘TBI Self-Efficacy Questionnaire’.  
 
Similarly, Muenchberger et al (2011) implemented a scale to assess how people were 
managing effects of acquired brain injury (including TBI). Their group self-management 
programme was assessed using a ‘self-efficacy scale’ that consisted of items assessing their 
level of confidence in managing. The authors proposed that ‘self-management’ should be 
assessed separately, through use of an ‘active coping scale’. This was intended to assess 
participants’ capacity for coping, as well as perceived effectiveness of their coping, using 
questions such as, “How well do you think you will deal with any problems you are 
having?’. Each scale was generic, rather than specific for challenges after brain injury, 
having been developed for long term conditions (Lorig et al, 1989) and general ‘stress and 
coping’ situations (Terry, 1991) respectively. 
 
A scale intended to assess perceived self-efficacy was developed by Backhaus et al (2010) 
for the acquired brain injury population, including a heterogeneous range of stroke, 
hypoxia, ruptured aneurysm, metabolic encephalopathy or traumatic brain injury 
aetiologies. Their ‘Brain Injury Coping Skills Questionnaire’ was developed to “measure a 
person’s perceptions about ability to both understand the effects of brain injury and cope 
and manage one’s reactions and coping skills” (p.844), with an example item: “I know what 
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kind of automatic thoughts I have and can catch myself when I have an automatic 
thought.”  
 
Bergman et al (2011) developed and piloted a measure specifically for the traumatic brain 
injury context, by adapting a “measure originally created as a self-management measure 
for HIV/AIDS” (p. 144). The authors considered headache, dizziness, and memory 
difficulties to be common complaints after TBI, and added these to some of the existing 
items in the HIV/AIDS related measure: e.g., fatigue, depression and anxiety. The authors 
noted that the question inviting respondents with TBI (n=14) to add other symptoms 
through free text was “the only item not consistently used” on the questionnaire. They 
proposed that this was “a positive quality of the scale in that items did not need to be 
written in and therefore further items do not need to be added to the scale” (p.146), 
without acknowledgement of the known under-reporting of symptoms in this group and 
cognitive difficulties that can affect questionnaire completion (Kelley et al, 2014). The 
authors also proposed that healthcare providers should “better educate this population 
about what might be most helpful in terms of symptom self-management” (p.146). The 
strategies presented for self-management within the questionnaire were predetermined 
and emphasised actions such as medication compliance, accessing healthcare and seeking 
information. 
 
A qualitative semi-structured interview approach was taken by Dixon et al (2007), instead 
of the questionnaire-based assessments discussed in the studies above.  Their sample came 
from a neurorehabilitation setting. Interviews were conducted according to a checklist of 
topics informed by literature on motivation in rehabilitation (Grahn et al, 2000), and 
Bandura’s self-efficacy theory (1977, 1997). They reported themes identified in the 
interviews, such as “recognising one’s own improvements”, “vicarious experience”, and 
“external reassurance”, thereby closely mirroring the key components of Bandura’s self-
efficacy theory (1977, 1997) of mastery, modelling, social persuasion and physiological 
factors, which they had used in the construction of the topic guide. Dixon et al concluded 
that such a measure of self-efficacy could be used in rehabilitation settings to assess “the 
effectiveness of interventions designed to improve self-efficacy and allow patients to make 
the best use of the services offered” (p.238). 
 
Quality of life, function and impairments 
Although health-related quality of life is often conflated with level of function, these 
represent discrete outcomes (Corrigan and Bogner, 2004).  Kendrick et al (2012) assessed 
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the outcome of their self-management coaching intervention solely through a 
questionnaire-based measure of daily function (the Canadian Occupational Performance 
Measure (Law et al, 1990)), without assessment of quality of life.  Brands et al (2014a) 
incorporated assessments of quality of life using the EuroQOL (1990), a standardised 
instrument used as a measure of health outcome that is considered to be applicable to a 
wide range of health conditions and treatments (EuroQol, 2015). They applied this along 
with the TBI self-efficacy questionnaire devised by Cicerone and Azulay (2007) which, as 
discussed above, had been developed for the context of neurological disabilities, rather 
than for self-efficacy after TBI. 
 
The ‘modified Fatigue Impact Scale’ and ‘Patient Reported Outcomes Measurement 
Information System’ were used to assess fatigue impact in everyday life, without 
qualitative evaluation. Here, the author reported that the therapist-led fatigue self-
management intervention had a  sustained  effect  on fatigue impact as measured by these 
scales (Raina, 2018).  
 
Patient ‘activation’ 
Although none of the identified studies used the ‘Patient Activation Measure’ (PAM) 
employed in studies of readiness for self-management support in long term conditions 
more broadly, as discussed above (Hibbard and Gilburt, 2014), one study aimed to assess 
a similar notion of people with TBI’s willingness to participate in supported self-
management interventions (Wegener et al, 2014). The authors’ reported development of 
an instrument based on the ‘Stages of Change’ model comprising pre-contemplation, 
contemplation, preparation, action and maintenance (Prochaska and DiClemente, 1983). 
 
Literature review discussion 
This literature review on supporting self-management with people following TBI 
identified limited research that brings forward perspectives of people experiencing it, 
changes over time after injury, or meaningfulness in daily life of the interventions 
delivered (Muenchberger et al, 2011; Brands et al, 2014a; Brands el at, 2014b; Dixon et al, 
2007; Eghdam et al, 2012). Epistemological positions (origins and nature of knowing 
(White, 1982)) were not explicitly addressed within the majority of papers reviewed, but 
studies predominantly relied upon interpretations of standardised measures (e.g. Cicerone 
et al, 2007; Brands et al, 2014a, Brands et al, 2014b, Backhaus, 2010; Begrman, 2011). Studies 
did not explore qualitative accounts of priorities in support for self-management. 
Measures employed in assessing outcomes frequently focussed on self-efficacy but had 
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been devised for people with ‘neurological disability’, raising questions over their 
relevance for experiences after TBI in particular (Cicerone and Azulay, 2007; Brands et al 
(2014a). Additional self-management outcome measures were adapted from different 
conditions (e.g. Bergman et al., 2011) where a lack of attention to TBI-related fatigue or 
cognitive change could be relevant when participants are required to sustain written 
responses in extended questionnaire batteries (Kristman et al., 2014).  
 
The studies identified focussed on individual self-management without inclusion of family 
and others, though Backhaus et al (2010) highlighted family as an integral component in 
coping with sequelae of brain injury. Research focused on family members as carers 
focussed on “training” them to  “manage the patient better” (Fisher et al., 2017, p. 1). In a 
recent scoping review on the related topic of ‘brain injury education’ intended for adult 
patients with TBI and/ or their family members, the authors identified just one study that 
had incorporated elements of self-management training (Hart et al., 2018).  
 
Programmes underpinned by Bandura’s self-efficacy principles have been suggested to be 
the most effective at changing psychological state and quality of life, in research on self-
management support for long-term conditions (da Silva, 2011). Several of the studies 
identified in this review were based on Bandura’s self-efficacy theory (1977, 1997) where 
the assessments were based on self-reported standardised questionnaires (e.g. Dixon et al, 
2007; Kendrick et al, 2012; Connolloy et al, 2014). Other studies relied upon questionnaire-
based outcomes that focussed on changes in function and participation after brain injury 
(e.g. Kendrick et al, 2012; Brands et al, 2014b; Jones et al, 2014; Muenchberger et al, 2011).  
Here, researchers determined what the self-management support was intended for, 
designed the interventions as programmes the recipients were expected to comply with, 
and designed outcome measures that led to isolated categories of changes to be measured, 
without acknowledgement of the complexities of life and social relations after TBI.  
 
Few interventional studies attempted to support self-management for people only after 
TBI but instead included people with TBI in groups of people with other forms of brain 
injury, neurological disorder or traumatic injuries.  These interventions generally followed 
a group-based format (Backhaus et al., 2010; Kendrick et al., 2012; Muenchberger et al., 
2011), mirroring the dominant model of ‘expert patient’ long-term condition supported 
self-management intervention, as I discussed in Chapter 1 (Holman and Lorig, 2004; Lorig 
and Holman, 2003). Limitations of group-based programmes have been acknowledged: 
difficulties for people in participating due to work commitments, access to transport and 
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symptom-related hindrances (Muenchberger et al, 2011). Further, structured content may 
be insufficiently tailored for situations people are dealing with, and time-limited sessions 
do not necessarily take account of ongoing needs beyond the programme. A lack of 
integration of the group format of self-management support into normal ways of 
healthcare working also fails to reach the broad range of patients for whom this support 
could be relevant (Jones and Riazi, 2011; Lawn and Schoo, 2010).  
 
The studies identified frequently asserted that people living with brain injury could 
become more socially productive and more effective in their utilisation of healthcare 
services. These priorities reflect the endpoints considered of importance in supported self-
management programmes more broadly: “health behaviour, health status, and health 
service utilization” (Lorig et al., 1999, p. 6). They fail to include the outcomes that people 
themselves have been found to value in support for self-management, such as the patient-
professional relationship and a need to “be me” (Boger et al., 2015, p. 15).  
 
 
Summary and implications 
The increasing policy emphasis on supporting self-management in healthcare, combined 
with a paucity of studies specifically considering supported self-management after TBI, 
points to a need for further understanding in this area of research and practice. Traumatic 
brain injury is a long term condition with an acute onset and often lifelong implications 
for the individual and family (Oyesanya, 2017). The focus of existing support is on 
education about TBI (Jones et al., 2015). Limited evidence exists on how to develop 
partnership-working between patients after TBI, families and healthcare professionals, or 
how this could be enacted. Research into self-management support has taken relatively 
little account of the tensions or demands in social relations, including those with 
healthcare professionals.  
 
The identified approaches to support for people living with TBI uphold the assumption 
that professional expertise will remediate patient deficits, placing the emphasis on what 
the clinician will bring to the encounter (Kendrick et al., 2012). To offer support for self-
management is to intend to change a person’s situation for the better, and therefore means 
that judgements will be made about what would represent improvement and what trade-
offs are at stake among people’s priorities and needs (Townsend et al., 2006). Here, 




 “[they] make claims on us; they command, oblige, recommend, or guide…When I 
say that an action is right I am saying that you ought to do it; when I say that 
something is good I am recommending it as worthy of your choice”  
(Korsgaard et al., 1996, p. 8).  
 
‘Responsibilising’ the patient to carry out professionals’ recommendations is not merely 
engaging them in neutral acts of self-help but can be seen as a ‘disciplining’ for them to 
act in certain ways to serve another end (Foucault, 1988): that of health service efficiencies 
where “success is the physician’s to claim, blame is the patient’s” (Thille et al., 2014, p. 103). 
‘Bad’ patients who are not helped by such disciplining bring the limits of medicine into 
focus (Sointu, 2017). People living with TBI may therefore not only be disadvantaged by 
current conceptualisations of supported self-management, but can potentially expose 
healthcare systems’ inherent limits and deficiencies in this area. 
 
In the following, I consider ways in which the concepts of biographical disruption, self and 
identity, and agency may deepen understandings of self-management, before linking these 
with literature on experiences following TBI, to more specifically identify the research gap 






“There is the language of metrics, and value added…and of impact. And there is the 
language of kindness and grief, of loneliness, love and friendship, of the ties that 
bind, our sense of identity and of belonging”      
 (Unwin, 2018, p. 9) 
 
The sociological literature is rich in studies of how people manage their lives when facing 
a long-term condition. The need to take account of patient – rather than medical - 
priorities is apparent within concepts such as ‘biographical disruption’ (Bury, 1982) or 
finding a ‘new normal’ (Couchman et al., 2014). These concepts align with the ‘turning 
point’ idea in illness narratives, viewed as an event that results in a sudden change and 
calls for re-evaluation of one’s lifestyle. The turning point is told through stories of life 
before and life after an event that constructs an identity as ‘changed’ (Hydén, 2010). The 
work of living with long term conditions extends, then, beyond ‘illness work’ to manage 
the health condition. It potentially includes the work of maintaining or reconstructing 
one’s biography (Corbin and Strauss, 1985, 1988). This biographical dimension broadens 
the focus of the self-management construct, yet it is generally excluded from clinical 
practices of supporting self-management for long term conditions (Murray et al., 2018), as 
discussed above.  However, self-management support might offer a bridge between the 
‘language of biomedicine’ and ‘the language of ‘life’, as conveyed by Unwin in the quote 
above, by acknowledging the centrality of self and identity work within self-management 
of long term conditions. 
 
Qualitative research highlights personal impacts of living with TBI as a loss of pre-injury 
self and the challenge of re-constructing identity (D’Cruz et al., 2019; Levack et al., 2014; 
Martin et al., 2014; Nochi, 1998). Further, research has specifically examined concepts 
relating to of self, identity and their ‘loss’ following brain injury, intending to develop 
approaches in rehabilitation to support identity re-construction (Coetzer, 2008; 
Geytenbeek et al., 2017; Gracey et al., 2008), thereby becoming a target for supported self-
management intentions. However, greater understanding is required of the “aspects of a 
person’s agency or action that [self-management] support is intended to bolster” 




More than three decades ago, a classic study explored ‘changes in self’ after TBI (Tyerman 
and Humphrey, 1984). The authors assessed changes in self-concept through participants’ 
completion of scales of “anxiety and depression, an attitude questionnaire relating to 
physical disability and semantic differential ratings of present, past and future self” (seven 
months post-TBI, on average) (p.11). They found that self-ratings of present-self were 
“dramatically” different when compared with ratings of past-self (p.11). Inherent in this 
study design is an assumption that we can access and categorise a unified sense of self, 
and draw temporal distinctions in its evolution. More recently, authors have suggested 
that a changed sense of self is linked to poorer rehabilitation outcomes and mental health 
problems after TBI (Cantor et al., 2005; Thomas et al., 2014; Ylvisaker et al., 2008). The 
connection of TBI with an inevitable change in self raises the question of what it is that 
changes – and whether it does change, or in some ways remains the same. 
 
I proceed by considering the concept of ‘biographical disruption’, leading to exploration 
of the broad interpretations of related concepts of  personhood: ‘identity’, ‘self’ and 
‘agency’ (Higgs and Gilleard, 2016).  I reflect on these concepts in light of my research 
findings, in Chapter 6. 
 
Biographical disruption 
Over the last four decades, since Bury’s classic study of people living with rheumatoid 
arthritis (Bury, 1982), the concept of biographical disruption has been widely used in 
describing how individuals experience health conditions. Biographical disruption portrays 
a rupture in “the structures of everyday life and the forms of knowledge which underpin 
them” (Bury, 1982, p. 169). This rupture is proposed to impact narratives that people use 
to make sense of, and talk about, themselves, the coherence of their lives, and their 
identity (Charmaz, 1983). Bury (1982) initially used biographical disruption to describe 
how people viewed themselves in the context of a long-term illness, “disrupting” their 
sense of self and, for some, disconnecting them from their anticipated future. As such, the 
idea of biographical disruption might be understood within “efforts at life-planning or 
attempts to ‘colonize the future’ under the conditions of ontological in/security in late 
modernity” (Kenny et al., 2019, p. 60).  
 
Bury later identified two aspects of disruption:  ‘meaning as significance’, referring to 
impact of the condition on a person’s sense of identity and how others perceive her or him; 
and ‘meaning as consequence’, referring to the impact of the bodily effects of illness 
(symptoms, impairments, participation) in everyday life (Bury and Anderson, 1988). The 
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related concept of biographical reconstruction refers to narratives seeking to realign order 
in ‘meaning as significance’ through revisions of self-concept, as a “reconstruction of [a 
person’s] changing relationship to the world in which they live” (G. Williams, 1984, p. 175). 
Whiffin has instead considered a more complex “narrative misalignment”, as a lack of 
symmetry between people, events, experiences, and its impact on their interpretation 
(2017, p. 7). 
 
Recently, authors have argued that any disruption resulting from illness onset is far from 
inevitable (Faircloth et al., 2004; Saunders, 2017; Wiles et al., 2019). Recent 
conceptualisations also view the disruption to take place at the level of the “habitual 
behaviours that govern daily life” rather than at the level of individual identity (Engman, 
2019, p. 126). Others argue that the rupture of taken‐for‐granted expectations about our 
lives is itself problematic, as people instead attempt to normalise their health condition 
by incorporating elements of it into their life narratives (Sanderson et al., 2011).   
 
Summarising critique of the biographical disruption idea, Williams raises caution about 
the “unreflexive usage or the ritual doffing of caps” for commonly accepted concepts as a 
fixed point of reference (Williams, 2000, p. 41). His argument is instead that illness may in 
fact be biographically anticipated, rather than disruptive. The effects of contextual factors 
have been highlighted in anticipation of such events and lessening a sense of disruption, 
such as age of onset of conditions (childhood versus advanced age) (Engman, 2019, p. 120). 
Further, recent authors argue that once contextual factors are considered, the idea 
of biographical flow becomes more relevant than disruption (Faircloth et al., 2004). 
Faircloth’s conceptualisation of flow related to older people living with long term 
conditions who went on to experience stroke, reportedly viewing the stroke as part of their 
ongoing biography rather than as a disruptive event.  
 
In this understanding, the abrupt onset of TBI, an unexpected event typically unlinked to 
any existing health conditions, may be seen to potentially heighten biographical 
disruption, due to “the problem of lost normality” (Prigatano and Pliskin, 2003, p. 315). 
Further, the symbolic significance of the label ‘brain injured’ may invoke its stigmatising 
potential, whereby an individual who sustains a TBI may be reclassified by others 
according to an undesirable and ‘not normal’ stereotype (Goffman, 1961). My intention is 
to explore disruption, or continuity, through the analysis of narratives of TBI in this study. 
In the following, I consider broad understandings of self and identity before further 




Self and identity  
The human brain is a commonly understood to be the site of privileged values, including 
those which define individual human identity (Krahn, 2015). The term ‘identity’ is often 
used interchangeably with ‘self’, when authors make reference to a sense of “personal 
continuity and emotional coherence” (Fivush and Graci, 2017, p. 268). Harré asserts that 
“persons `have’ selves” (Harré, 2015, p. 3), identifying four aspects of personhood to which 
‘self’ is applied:  the embodied self (unity in a person’s point of view the world, and across 
time); the  autobiographical self (the ‘hero’ or ‘heroine’ of stories, a self that can differ from 
story to story); the social self (variable personal qualities displayed in encountering others) 
and self-concept (beliefs that people have about themselves, their qualities, and their life). 
Others have argued that the range of ‘self’-related terms suggests that ‘“self is not really a 
single topic at all, but rather an aggregate of loosely related subtopics” (Baumeister, 2010, 
p. 681) and further that “one begins to wonder what the term self actually means in any of 
them” (Leary and Tangney, 2012, p.4). 
 
Across a broad range of academic inquiry, debates have proliferated around self-identity: 
old versus new identities, the foundations of - and transformations in - selfhood (Jenkins, 
2014). The related concept of ‘identity work’ has been defined as: 
 
 “the mutually constitutive processes whereby people strive to shape a relatively 
coherent and distinctive notion of personal self-identity and struggle to come to 
terms with and, within limits, to influence the various social-identities which pertain 
to them”  
(Watson, 2008, p. 129). 
 
Identity work has been developed with analytic distinctions between an internal ‘self-
identity’ and an external ‘social-identity’. Tajfel defined social identity deriving from 
significant group membership (Tajfel and Turner, 1979), seen to provide a link between 
“socially available discourses and self-identities” (Watson, 2008, p. 121). The importance of 
social factors following brain injury is gaining increasing recognition, whereby social 
identity is one factor proposed to predict well-being after injury (Haslam et al., 2008; 
Walsh et al., 2015). Membership of social groups, for example families and or work 
colleagues,  is considered “crucial” for identities  in the context of adversities such as brain 
injury, through “a range of positive social interactions and various other acts of solidarity” 
(Walsh et al., 2015, p. 556). Consideration of the importance of social factors again 
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highlights questions over individualism in dominant approaches to neurorehabilitation 
and supporting self-management, as discussed above. 
 
Billig proposed that “banal” aspects of social identity are those that remain largely 
unexpressed and yet are available to be drawn on when required (Billig, 1995). Although 
Billig’s initial concept focussed on a shared sense of national belonging, the idea of latent 
shared aspects of belonging, to draw upon at the time of stressors, could become relevant 
in identity work after TBI. Latent aspects of social identity will be a factor under 
consideration in narratives of TBI in this thesis. In addition, questions arise about power 
structures behind social relations and the socially-available discourses available to be 
mobilised in narration (Paton, 2018).  
 
Within narratives of TBI, identity processes are often assumed to be “interrupted and thus 
laid bare” (Walsh et al., 2015, p. 568). In order to explore (re)negotiation of identity after 
TBI, I draw on Judith Butler’s theory of performativity, where identity is seen as  a 
continuous processes of reiteration and resignification (Butler, 1990). In the following, I 
briefly introduce Butler’s concepts and I return to these when describing development of 
my analytic approach (Chapter 5). 
 
Judith Butler’s work encompasses conceptualisations of subject formation, discourse and 
the nature of being and becoming. She draws on a range of theorists including Foucault, 
Derrida, Austin, Althusser and Lacan to interrogate understandings of identity. 
Importantly, Butler argues that coherence and continuity of the self are not logical features 
of personhood, but “socially instituted and maintained norms of intelligibility” (Butler, 
1990, p. 7). Following Foucault, she describes notions of identity derived from regulatory 
ideals (Butler, 1993, p. 1), providing ideal norms which people are expected to live up to, in 
categories which they iteratively create and recreate. Failure to cohere with societal norms 
precludes recognition as a particular category of person, which coherence to these norms 
would otherwise confer (Brady and Schirato, 2010, p. 37). 
 
In her account of performativity (which I expand on in Chapter 5), Butler utilises the 
notion of an “interpellative call’, originally outlined by Althusser as the ‘hailing’ of people 
into an existence (Althusser, 1971). When individuals are hailed as subjects by dominant 
ideologies, they are called to an identity and, upon recognising the self as the one ‘hailed’, 
they act in the expected manner. Interpellation involves a demand being made for an 
account to be given of the self that accords with the trajectory of the self in a coherent 
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manner. The interpellated subject then becomes positioned in relation to others through 
acts that the “community sees and recognises as coherent” (Meyerhoff, 2015, p. 2), 
described as a “matrix” in which identity positions are recognisable and stable (Butler, 
1993, p. 51).  Identity, then, is a “performative accomplishment compelled by social 
sanction” (Butler, 1988, p. 520). Performative interpellations create subjective experiences 
and may deny agency through passive positioning (Butler, 1997).  
 
In the following, I consider conceptualisations of agency and autonomy in relation to the 
principles and assumptions underpinning the dominant approaches to supported self-
management discussed above. 
 
Agency  
A fundamental social science question is “how we can understand the dynamics of human 
agency in conditions of constraint” (May, 2014, p. n/p). The concept of agency is “a slippery 
one and its definitions vary” (Jolanki, 2009, p.215). Agency is typically operationalised as 
decision-making but may take many forms, such as “negotiation, deception and 
manipulation, subversion and resistance” (Kabeer, 1999, p. 438).  In common with 
critiques of the ‘autonomous individual’ concept, the concept of agency raises questions 
about how far it can be seen as individualised rather than relational (Mason, 2004).  
 
Conceptualisations of agency through relational or dispersed processes are not broadly 
integrated into contemporary practices of Western healthcare where ‘reality’ remains 
reducible to the actions of independent individuals (Prainsack, 2018). As discussed above, 
prevailing practices in self-management support for those with long term conditions 
privilege the idea of individual rationality over relational possibilities (Hughes et al., 2018). 
The discourse, typically focusing on individuals’ knowledge, skills and behaviour, seems 
to neglect the social nature of agency and “the inherent complexity of interpersonal 
support and healthcare” (Entwistle et al., 2018, p. 1465). If the limits of individual agency 
are not acknowledged by professionals in interactions, then the intentions of ‘person-
centred care’ could be at stake, through recreation of the power relations it purports to 
disrupt. Further, in emphasising individual agency, the idea of self-management may seem 
to blame those do not manage conditions successfully, according to healthcare service 
parameters (Rubinstein and de Medeiros, 2015).  
 
If agency is taken as the notion that people are the “authors” of their own ideas and actions 
(Burr, 2003, p. 121), then  human ability to ascribe meanings to life events, and to act on 
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those meanings, is brought to the fore. This interpretation, as captured within self‐
determination theory, is considered to be a psychological foundation of well‐being: acting 
as a source of mastery for turning our lives into what we want, through behaviour that 
aligns with our beliefs, and preserves our of sense of self (Deci and Ryan, 2012). From a 
narrative perspective, this understanding of agency has been considered “fundamental to 
rebuilding a more useful narrative of the self in recovery: Stories cannot usefully be foisted 
on people” (Ridge and Ziebland, 2006, p. 1052).  
 
Challenges to this notion - the strategically rational individual - question the implication 
that we are somehow independent of the Other (Prainsack, 2018; Salecl, 2010). For 
Midgley, “we are not hard, discrete, billiard-ball-like atoms, but are organically related, 
members of one another” (Midgley, 2003, p. 37). Even when individuals are heralded as 
agentive, they may not see themselves as agents if lacking sufficient availability of 
alternative choices or the capabilities to make them (Gubrium and Holstein, 1995). Lamb, 
for example, describes how older adults of low income convey “a sense of lacking agency 
to realize healthy aging” (2019, p. 4). Agency is intrinsically threatened by discourses of 
independence, where the “dependent Other is the quintessential non-actor in society” 
(Weicht, 2010, p. 214). 
 
In contrast to this notion of the agentive individual, feminist scholars instead highlight 
developments arising through relationships: “We are who we are because we relate to 
others” (Prainsack, 2018, p. 25). Here, the emphasis is that rational abilities developing 
through relationships that are viewed as a precondition for subjectivity (e.g., Gilligan 1982; 
Butler 1990; Prainsack, 2018). Feminist understandings of relational care diverge from an 
ontology that separates out the individual, instead recognising interconnectedness 
(Ahmed, 2004). Feminist theory seeks understanding of the ways pervasive political and 
cultural structures are reproduced through individual practices, and personal situations 
are situated in a broader, shared contexts including those that can enable or empower us 
in unanticipated ways (Butler, 1988).  
 
In this thesis, I understand agency as discursively constituted, diverging from the notion 
of autonomy as “an individual standing outside social structures and processes” (Jensen, 
2011, p. 110). Within a poststructural framework, a “device of interruption and 
deconstruction of taken-for-granted assumptions” (Frewin, 2002, p. 3), I consider agency 
to derive from the accessing of a subject position in which “one has the right to speak and 
be heard” (Davies, 2000, p. 66). For Butler, the possibility of destabilising an identity, 
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through a repetition that fails to reproduce the norm, opens the possibility to make sense 
of identity on the basis of an alternative set of attributes. Agency is then not seen as 
intentional response but instead comes from reconfiguring and resignification of 
responses and conventions, thereby “negotiat[ing] an answer to the question of who the 
‘I’ will be in relation to norms” (Butler, 2005, p. 22).  Agency is the freedom to recognise 
that positioning in discourse practices, by powerful others, cannot determine or delimit 
one’s identity and is “a fragmented, a transitory, a discursive position” (Davies, 2000, p. 
67). Similarly, I view a sense of self as going “beyond the given meaning …through 
imagining not what is, but what might be” (Davies, 2000, p. 67) (italics in original). I am 
interested in exploring how we make sense of our ‘selves’ and how we produce a desired 




In reflecting on the research discussed in this chapter, I proceed to identify gaps in 
research addressing supported self-management after TBI and extending to the related 
areas of the ‘self’ after TBI, ‘identity work’ in neurorehabilitation for people living with TBI 
and qualitative approaches that have been used to explore experiences of possible change 
in the self after TBI. 
 
Supporting self-management after TBI 
If self-management entails “complexities of managing illness, managing the self, and 
managing everyday life” (Brijnath and Antoniades, 2016, p. 6), then insufficient attention 
has been given to the components of managing the self and managing social contexts of 
everyday life following TBI  (Ong Bie Nio et al., 2014, p. 226). To date, research has not 
offered insights into ‘self-management’ from the perspectives of people with personal 
experience of TBI or family members supporting them. Existing literature brings to the 
fore the supportive aspects of interaction, by demonstrating ways in which family 
caregivers are vital in long-term rehabilitation (Graff et al., 2018; Lefebvre et al., 2008). 
However, interpersonal tensions and their navigation has not been the focus of research 
that has explored supporting self-managing after brain injury. As demonstrated in the 
literature review of supported self-management interventions above, the approach has 
typically been one of providing information and education to families in a way that 
overlooks the potential for both fragility and power within support that unfolds in the 
everyday. The potential for both positive and negative aspects of family interaction in 




Research on patient choice and taking control in health contexts has not focused on people 
during the post-acute, unpredictable stages after TBI (Wilde, 2014), including the phase of 
recovery immediately following discharge from hospital (Bushnik et al, 2008) and first two 
years in which changes in “damaged brain functions” are often anticipated clinically 
(Klinger, 2005, p. 9). Specific problems encountered by people during this dynamic phase 
have received less attention than longer-term community reintegration aspects, many 
years or decades later (Turner et el, 2007; Nadler et al, 2013). 
 
‘The self’ after TBI 
In contrast with neurodegenerative disorders such as dementia, abrupt injury is seen to 
suddenly render the brain “strange”, invoking a sense of “lost self” Nochi (1998). However, 
research into this experience has often privileged the account of a family member or other 
supporter, or presents the person with TBI separately from the voice of this other person 
(Cloute et al., 2008). After TBI, people may be assumed to be incapable of “narrative 
thought” as a tool in meaning-making (Medved and Brockmeier, 2008, p. 470), for example 
if they are considered to produce talk that contains “coherence disrupting elements” 
(Kintz et al., 2018, p. 47), or where a “void” in memory is seen as a barrier to self-
understanding (Nochi, 1998, 1997). The question becomes, then, “whether the inability to 
tell stories about the past and to establish a plot implies a loss of identity, replaced by a 
void that is never to be filled again” (Hydén, 2010, p. 34). 
 
The terms loss of self, loss of self-identity, loss of personhood and ‘identity work’ that 
frequently appear in brain injury-related literature are used variably within and across 
several disciplines. It is unclear how such concepts relate to associated terms such as self-
awareness, self-esteem, self-knowledge, vulnerability of the self, self-regulation, and so on. 
The concept of ‘loss of self’ following TBI, when used with little explanation of intended 
meaning, risks perpetuation of “ambiguous terms [that] continue to confuse research 
results leading to theoretical and empirical obfuscation” (Markova and Berrios, 1992, p. 
398). Literature on managing interaction in daily life with cognitive and communicative 
impairments highlights interactions between the person and other parties, for example, 
relatives who jointly sustaining the “social status or the personhood of the person with 
dementia” (Hydén and Samuelsson, 2018, p. 16). Studies that have examined the narrative 




‘Identity work’ in neurorehabilitation  
Psychosocial consequences, or identity struggles, become a focus of rehabilitation when a 
person’s physical impairments or other traumatic injuries have improved and direct 
medical care is no longer accessible (Muenchberger et al., 2008). Research has highlighted 
a need for significant adjustment for individuals with TBI in relation to identity (Nalder et 
al., 2013). Although identity is therefore increasingly seen as a necessary ‘target’ within 
neurorehabilitation for people after TBI, it is generally consumed by interventions that 
target specific components of cognitive, physical or psychosocial functioning, with limited 
conceptualisation of identity (Levack et al., 2010). Attention to power relations between 
professionals and patients – that is, the authority ascribed to the professionals and the 
rehabilitation encounter - has recently led to calls for the identification of opportunities 
to shift away from “continually reproducing the status quo” in rehabilitation that aims 
toward idealised norms within narrow interpretations of returning people to “productive 
citizenship”  (Fadyl et al., 2019, p. 7) or, alternatively, “fostering realistic expectations” 
when professionals have determined that productive citizenship will be unattainable (Peel 
et al., 2019, p. 1). 
 
Neurorehabilitation approaches draw on a generally positivist paradigm seeking a 
unification of the “self” after TBI (Prigatano, 2000). This field of research upholds 
healthcare’s conventional assumptions in seeking  ‘objective’ portrayal of reality, or the 
‘true’ version of events (Sbordone et al., 1998). The implication is that person with TBI’s 
account cannot be considered credible if periods of reduced consciousness and 
fragmented or displaced memories are considered to have reduced narrative coherence 
and allowed ‘inaccuracies’ to enter. The tendency to take accounts from others to 
‘establish’ the meaning of events for the person with TBI overlooks the possibility that 
particular aspects of self are not inevitably shared by others in a family or broader kinship 
system after TBI - or at any time. Interpersonal tensions, shared telling or emergent sense-
making are not acknowledged when capturing the ‘true’ account from one family member 
(Oddy, 1995). For example, in relatives’ intentions to support the person with TBI in ‘self-
managing’, they may directly talk about the person’s ‘independence’, despite also 
providing personal, financial or social support for them.  
 
Narrative approaches after TBI that seek to help people to form a ‘coherent life narrative’ 
(Neimeyer, 2000) or ‘reconstruct’ a sense of self (Prigatano, 2000) assume a singular self 
that it is lost for them to start with, and that someone else will know what will bring their 
coherence back. The search for narrative coherence leaves little space for the unsettling 
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insecurities and ambiguities that are inevitably part of the complexity of our lives (Siegl, 
2019). I proceed to consider approaches to qualitative inquiry into experiences of TBI, 
beyond - but potentially relevant to - the focus on self-management. 
 
Qualitative research in experience of TBI 
Interest in identity recognised within and through language is apparent in varied 
analytical methods, including conversation analysis and approaches within the broad field 
of discourse analysis. Both study talk-in-interaction and postulate that identity is an 
active, discursive accomplishment that is maintained by, and can be transformed within, 
interactions (Korobov, 2001). Conversation analysis starts with the notion that “ordinary 
language can be analysed as a vehicle through which we perform interpersonal actions” 
(Wooffitt, 2005, p. 19). By contrast, foundations of discourse analysis are the ideological 
meanings attached to language (Wetherell and Potter, 1988). Discursive psychology 
combines analysis of talk with “an interest in the organisation of the broad, social and 
culturally resonant interpretative resources participants draw on” (Edley and Wetherell, 
2001, p. 441). Here, "ideological dilemmas" are considered to be dilemmas portrayed as 
participants try out, resist, or uphold versions of culturally available argumentative 
threads (Korobov, 2001). The site of analysis is the identification of tension between 
competing interpretive repertoires, referring to culturally familiar and habitual lines of 
argument drawn from recognisable themes (Edley, 2001). However, critiques suggest that 
this analytic tool, the interpretative repertoire, itself represents a mere template attached 
by researchers to participants’ talk (Wooffitt, 2005).  
 
Cloute et al (2008) drew on discursive psychology to identify interpretive repertoires in 
talk between people with brain injury and one or two significant others. Interpretive 
repertoires, “building blocks speakers use for constructing versions of actions, cognitive 
processes, and other phenomena” form a key component of this stream of discourse 
analysis and are considered to be internally consistent (Wetherell and Potter, 1988, p. 172). 
In seeking to identify interpretive repertoires employed by people with TBI and significant 
others across timeframes (pre- to post- injury), the authors used the approach of semi-
structured interviewing “to elicit conversation around lived experience over time, from 
before the injury to future aspirations” (Cloute et al., 2008, p. 655). These accounts were 
gathered through single time-point interviews, calling for participants’ reflection on 
change over time and a topic guide structuring temporal narration of events. The authors 
identified interpretative repertoires that they considered to inform participants' identity: 
“Medical model referencing” (the passive positioning of individuals with TBI in relation to 
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memory loss), “dependence as intrinsic to TBI”, “TBI as deficit” and “progression and 
productivity as key life-defining features” (p. 651). Here, single time-point approaches, and 
the search for internal consistency, preclude the potential for accounts to vary across times 
of telling, with different, contradictory or inconsistent versions of characters, motives, 
states of mind and events, and the opportunity to explore affordances at particular times 
and in different interactional contexts. 
 
One study, using a positioning discourse approach, explored how people are positioned 
and position the self after TBI (Glintborg, 2015). This researcher used semi-structured 
interviews at two time points after TBI: the first was described as a short conversation 
while people were still in hospital and the second was a follow-up interview after one year. 
The same topic guide was used to structure each interview. The content of transcripts was 
then ‘condensed’ and thematic analysis was undertaken on the condensed format, rather 
than analysis of full interactional content. Glintborg portrays the case study of one man 
who ultimately asserts in an interview: “I do not think I have changed” (Glintborg, 2015, p. 
14) despite the dominant highlighting of ‘disabling’ physical change by clinicians working 
with him. Glintborg proposed the potential for use of narrative approaches therapeutically 
to transform identity after disruption from TBI. 
 
By employing several narrative techniques, Medved and Brockmeier aimed to: 
“investigate how the participants experienced the symptoms of their changed brains, 
how this might have influenced their sense of self, and how this again impacted the 
experience of their symptoms” (2008, p. 473).  
The authors found that people with TBI emphasised sameness and an unbroken 
connection between their pre- and post-injury selves (though authors noted that some of 
the stories “lacked cohesion”). The authors postulated that these individuals “felt they did 
not have to recover their former sense of self because they subjectively seemed to have 
never lost it” (p. 469). The finding of “narratives of unbroken senses of self” (p. 476) 
counters the dominant narrative of disruption within research into sense of self after brain 
injury. The difference has been attributed, by some observers, to Medved and Brockmeier’s 
inclusion of participants displaying ‘anterograde memory impairment’ (reduced ability to 
form memories of events since TBI), according to standardised neuropsychological 
assessment. Others speculate that this may have precluded participants’ ability to convey 
accounts of change in self across time (Glintborg, 2015). The authors, however, maintain 
that this change in functioning would itself be anticipated to create a “a loss of mooring in 
an autobiographical past” and yet instead, in the stories told, “an amazing sense of 
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continuity came to the fore” (Medved and Brockmeier, 2008, p. 476). They proposed that 
‘narrative memory techniques’ underpinned the continuity: memory importation 
(memories that were shifted from before to after the injury), memory appropriation 
(presenting someone else’s memory as one’s own), and memory compensation (shifting 
attention from a ‘gap’ in memory instead to the active search for it, for example by saying 
I “wonder”; thereby normalising the conversation) (p.475). 
 
The discrepancies outlined within these qualitative research examples point to the need 
for further understanding of constructions of sense of self after TBI, particularly if 
interventions seek to ‘fix’ a sense of self that was not (previously) experienced as 
subjectively ‘broken’. I proceed to discuss the implications of the gaps identified in 
research, in the shaping of the current project. 
 
Implications for current research 
Considering dominant assumptions that the self is ‘lost’ after TBI as discussed above, my 
intention is to instead focus on the processes of managing a sense of self  when living with 
TBI, and identity as shared with others. I seek to undertake a critical examination of the 
assumptions underlying conceptualisations of self‐management and person-centred care 
that derive from a “a unitary imagining” of identity (Horton and Horton, 2018, p. 2). Little 
research has addressed the influence of professional power or impact of interactions 
themselves, on experiences of change or consistency in the self.  
If self-management support is to be achieved through clinical interactions, then an 
understanding is required of each party as “coherence-creating or coherence-declining 
agent[s]” (Blix et al., 2018, p. 10). In contrast to the ‘coherence paradigm’ of narrative 
research, which may neglect the telling of challenging stories and may marginalise those 
who tell more fragmented stories (Hyvärinen and Watanabe, 2017, p. 7), I instead seek to 
include the potential for such fragmentation in this narrative inquiry and avoid a 
‘smoothing out’ of narrative content. By emphasising the social nature of narratives and 
their broader generation within personal, social, temporal and cultural relations (Esin et 
al., 2014), I seek insight not into ‘what happened’, but into the social function of stories, 
within broader sociocultural contexts (for example, shared norms of NHS healthcare) and 
the local, interactional situation of the research interview.  (Heavey et al., 2019). I discuss 









Research questions, aim and objectives 
 
Iterations of research questions develop alongside “researchers’ capacities to examine their 
own roles and perspectives in the inquiry process” (Agee, 2009, p. 432). In progressing my 
understandings of the literature and conceptualisations related to this research area, I 
have become increasingly interested in exploring individual and relational aspects of 
everyday identity work, sense of self and agency to expand understandings of self-
management and approaches to its support. Attention to agency, and recognition that 
people may be significantly constrained by their relational circumstances and their 
normative social context, brings a ‘broader’ set of potential mechanisms of self-
management into view (Entwistle et al, 2016).  I pursued the following research questions:  
 
1. How can concepts of self, agency and relationship within ‘self-management’ be 
understood through narratives of traumatic brain injury? 
2. How can social interactions support or challenge sense of self and agency, 
following traumatic brain injury? 
 
It is not that I began with these questions; they became more focussed iteratively, as I 
progressed through the research in accordance with my aim and objectives:  
 
Overall Aim 
Following traumatic brain injury (TBI), to explore the ways people and their significant 
others construct stories about managing in everyday life, after discharge from hospital. 
 
Objectives 
 To gather stories from people admitted to hospital after TBI and a significant other, at 
two time points over the course of one year. 
 To explore changes in narratives of TBI over time in the context of everyday living in 
families, social relationships, and in healthcare encounters. 
 To seek understanding of co-construction of narratives of experiences, challenges and 
tensions following TBI. 
 To provide a nuanced account of sense of self and agency following TBI through which 
to understand and inform development of any specific intervention for supporting 
self-management for people living with TBI and families.  
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 To examine stories within the wider literature of neoliberal critique of self-






CHAPTER 3: Methodology 
  
Research methodology encompasses “the processes that grow out of the researcher's 
ontological and epistemological stance” (Varpio et al., 2017, p. 42). I begin by describing 
the ontological paradigm and my epistemological considerations, before setting out my 
rationale for following a qualitative methodology and, more specifically, narrative inquiry. 
In describing my methodological decisions, I acknowledge that “in a way I did not know 
what I was doing (though I thought I did). To the extent it appears that I did, this is 
because of subsequent revisions on my part” (Voysey, 1975, p. 60). 
 
Ontology and epistemology 
 
“Something called data cannot be separate from me, ‘out there’ for ‘me’ to ‘collect’”   
(St. Pierre, 2013, p. 226) 
 
Ontology, the study of being, encompasses assumptions about the nature of reality 
(Blaikie, 2007). Through medical training and clinical work in the English National Health 
Service (NHS), I have been immersed in an ontological paradigm which is positivist, where 
it is thought that “reality is constant and can be measured” (Broom and Willis, 2007, p. 20) 
and where “real” facts and subjective values are held as separate and distinct (Bacchi, 2016; 
Malterud, 2016). Epistemology, concerned with the character, origin, limits and 
substantiation of human knowledge (Hofer and Pintrich, 2001), has doubtlessly been 
shaped by my professional work in neurorehabilitation, “a world where the spotlight has 
commonly turned away from context, power, co-production of meanings” (Weatherhead 
and Todd, 2013, p. xi). This positivist heritage might be considered to raise questions about 
my interpretations of knowledge, following institutional practices in which I was required 
to attend to ‘objective evidence’ and adhere to scientific imperatives: “‘Quantify!’, 
‘Medicalise!, ‘Biologise!’” (Hacking, 2007, p. 306). Moving to a position as qualitative 
researcher, I am expected to explicitly trade in currencies of subjectivity. I consider that 
these potentially contrasting epistemological assumptions are themselves imperfectly 




“the actual business of interpreting human experience is messier. As researchers we 
find ourselves drifting, often profitably, from one paradigm of inquiry into another. 
We do not cross borders as much as we traverse borderlands.”     
(Clandinin and Rosiek, 2007, p. 58)  
 
In common with much sociological research into experiences of living with long term 
conditions, I broadly follow the epistemological tradition of social constructionism 
(Pickard and Rogers, 2012). I situate this within a relational ontology, where “entities do 
not ontologically pre-exist relationships, but rather that entities come into being through 
human and more than human relationships” (Murris and Bozalek, 2019, p. 2). That is, 
instead of thinking about stable objects and language to represent them, phenomena - an 
ongoing process between matter and meaning – become constitutive of reality (Barad, 
2007). The phenomenon in this study, of self-management after TBI, is attached to specific 
meanings of brain injury that are situated in a framework of cultural understanding that 
you are your brain (Krahn, 2015). 
 
Social constructionism poses a challenge to an  individualistic model of the person, 
replacing it with a social account personhood (Burr, 2015). It assumes that knowledge is 
produced between people in everyday interactions as we speak, write, reminisce and talk 
to others (Burr, 1998; Wetherell and Potter, 1988), rather being grounded “in an observable 
and definable external reality” (Burr, 2015, p. 2). Individual experience comes to have 
specific meanings, are produced, through “historical a priori that is cultural, historical, 
politically situated, and collective” (Alcoff, 2005, p. 45) (emphasis in original). As 
knowledge and meanings are situated, contextual and evolving (Musto and Rodney, 2016), 
something that we regard as knowledge is one construction among many possibilities. For 
example, concepts of illness are fluid, having changed significantly over time and varying 
varied across different cultures, thereby sustaining some patterns of social action while 
excluding others  (Burr, 2015). Shared meanings and understandings do not need to be 
redefined each time they are used in everyday conversation; instead they come to assume 
a reality which is largely taken for granted (Andrews, 2012).  
 
Constructionism pays attention to power relations within stories (Esin et al., 2014), and 
language (as social construct) is “a magnifier that selects, intensifies, exaggerates, and 
distorts” (Ray, 1996, p. 676). Contrast can be drawn between constructivism, in which the 
individual is “actively engaged in the creation of their own phenomenal [sense-
perceptible] world” and social constructionism, which emphasises our understandings of 
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the world as the “product of social forces” (Burr, 2003, p. 19).  This distinction becomes 
relevant when considering the methodology of narrative inquiry, which I discuss below. 
The essence of narrative may be used by constructivists as a cognitive, intrapersonal 
schema. Instead, I follow a constructionist interpretation of narrative as a dialogic 
performance with others (McNamee, 2004), where identities are negotiated through daily 
social interaction. A fundamental argument underpins constructivist and constructionist 
orientations, however, that it is through sense-making in language and interaction that we 
talk ourselves into being (Bamberg, 2014).  
 
Post-structuralism is seen as one of the social constructionisms (Korsgaard, 2007). 
Foucault-influenced post-structuralism describes power as productive, shaping particular 
sorts of subjects (Weedon, 2004). In a classic example, Foucault challenged 
understandings of ‘madness’ by focussing on the forces that shape it, arguing that madness 
did not exist as an entity outside of the practices that constitute it – that is, how ‘the mad’ 
were treated (Foucault, 2013). These practices “problematised” madness (Bacchi, 2016). 
Following Foucault, I consider that the categories of ‘the brain injured’ and ‘the self-
manager’ can be seen to be produced through the practices that have established them as 
recognisable entities, in which they are then measured or monitored within healthcare 
practices. The categories, and the practices that create them, exert influence on people as 
“subjects” through complex relations (Bacchi, 2015).  I use post-structuralism as lens to 
problematise what can be taken-for-granted in the application of these labels (Charteris, 
2016). I return to post-structuralist ideas when describing the evolution of my analytic 
approach (Chapter 5). 
 
Qualitative methodology is considered suited to exploring complex and potentially 
contested themes in the study of people, cases, phenomena, social situations and 
processes, where: 
 
“…individuals and their behaviours are unique, context-dependent and largely non-
generalisable. Hence, what is needed is not reductionism but ‘thick description’ of 
purposefully selected small samples or cases”  
(Yilmaz, 2013, p. 317).  
 
Qualitative research methodologies are traditionally informed by an epistemological lens 
that views people’s talk as reflection of their underlying conceptualisations and seeks to 
access these by using questionnaires, interviews or experimental designs assuming that 
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talk is relatively transparent, offering a window into meaning-making (Bamberg, 2014). 
The positivist view of the process of interviewing is something that is controlled within a 
uniform structure of standardised questions from “neutral interviewers, as this is the only 
way in which to elicit unbiased and replicable responses” (Smith and Elgar, 2012, p.6). 
Within research with people who are living with brain injury, participants have been found 
to report on their experiences differently when freely narrating in a spontaneous manner 
in contrast to responding to structured questions (Villemure et al., 2011).  With this in 
mind, I chose narrative interviewing instead of a semi-structured approach underpinned 
by predetermined questions. 
 
My specific approach of narrative inquiry intended to allow exploration of self-portrayal, 
confrontation, contradiction and negotiation of meaning within interaction, including 
that within the research interview (Bamberg, 2006).  Through narrative inquiry, I sought 
to recognise meaning-making processes that may be diverse and multiple: “at once 
emergent, slippery, and changing” (Charmaz, 2002, p. 323). I recognise my personal impact 
within interview interactions and analysis, as described in the following. 
 
Epistemology of emotion 
 
 “The intertwining of the social with emotion…constitute[s] missing pieces in making 
sense of how social representations and stereotypes suffuse and shape a field 
explicitly heeding the ideal of scientific objectivity”     
(Sointu, 2017, p. 64)  
 
The silencing of emotion in Western modernity in general, and in clinical medicine in 
particular, also pervades health research inquiry, including through qualitative 
methodologies. In clinical and research practice, suppression of emotion requires its active 
management through emotional labour that seeks to protect self-esteem and maintain our 
“status shields” (Hochschild, 1983, p. 173; Twigg et al., 2011). The suppression of 
professional emotion contributes to the asymmetrical relationship in clinical interactions 
with patients, as “the power of biomedical discourse is embodied in the affective clout that 
biomedical diagnosis and treatment possess” (Sointu, 2016, p. 317). 
 
An ‘epistemology of emotion’ integrates emotion within the research process in a way that 
intends it to contribute to understanding (Holstein and Gubrium, 2003). Emotions can 
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become central to choices we make through our perceptions of ourselves, of others and 
the world. Confronting others can force us to confront ourselves, thereby surfacing 
emotions that may then elicit an inauthentic response in interaction - as an escape strategy 
from confronting emotion (Sartre, 2014).  If attended to in research analysis,  emotions 
might have explanatory function through development of intuitive insight into 
occurrences of (in)authenticity (Burkitt, 2012; Holtan et al., 2014). These deeper insights 
will require such occurrences to be “digested, symbolised, processed" (Hollway, 2015, p. 4).  
 
Emotion is intimately tied to the key concerns within this research project: identity, sense 
of self, kinship, legitimation and interaction (Denzin, 2001). By acknowledging the 
influence of emotion within my findings, I aim to acknowledge Sointu’s “missing pieces” 
in my interpretation, by making visible the taken-for-granted in analysis (Knowles, 2006). 
Emotions can be understood as individually experienced feelings that we sometimes share 
but “despite taking place ‘within’ concrete individuals, and thus having roots within 
concrete psychical and organic systems, are also socially constructed” (Cantó-Milà, 2016, 
p. 1). Ahmed further highlights a ‘split’ in theories of emotion: that emotions are primarily 
linked to bodily sensations, or to cognition and involving judgements, which “rehearse 
[our] associations that are already in place” (2004, p. 5).  
 
When referring to an epistemology of emotion, I refer to emotional awareness within 
interaction, as a relational flow that produces subjectivities and shapes the co-
construction of narratives. The integration of emotional awareness within analysis 
requires identification of those embodied aspects that cannot be sensed by listening to the 
audio or reading the transcripts to simply seek linguistic markers as evidence of emotive 
reactions, through verbal expressions that relate to feelings (for example, happy, relieved, 
overwhelmed) (Strauss et al., 2019). Emotional awareness is not easily captured textually 
and transcripts do provide a “transparent window” into emotionality (Holmes, 2010, p. 62). 
It is instead “woven into the fabric of the interactions we are engaged in” (Burkitt, 2012, p. 
459; italics in original).   
 
I suggest that awareness of, and processing of one’s emotions during and subsequent to a 
research interview is useful additional data, in terms of critiquing the taken-for-granted 
within steps of interpretation (Holtan et al., 2014). This interpretation involves reflecting 
on emotional associations to determine their significance within the context of the 
interaction (Habermas, 2018). I attended to particular moments that brought about some 
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emotional significance within interviews (which may be a vague feeling, for example, of 
frustration). I describe my approach to processing these within the analysis (Chapter 5).  
 
In the following, I continue by briefly introducing the broad field of narrative inquiry and 
I consider epistemological tensions in the use of narrative to explore concepts of the self, 
identity and agency. I highlight factors influencing my decision-making when building my 





Narrative provides a primary structure through which human existence becomes 
meaningful (Polkinghorne, 1988). There is broad consensus we typically see, live or 
experience our lives as a narrative of some sort, “or at least as a collection of stories” 
(Strawson, 2004, p. 428). Narrative inquiry, when taken as a metaphor for life and 
experience, has been described as “a game changer, triggering the big change for the turn 
to narrative in the social sciences” (Bamberg and Demuth, 2016, p. 24). However, 
definitions of narrative are varied and many approaches to its examination have been 
described (Hydén and Brockmeier, 2008). Frank asserts: “Narrative is like the elephant in 
the fable of the five blind men, each grasping a different part of the beast and saying with 
certainty what sort of animal it is, based on that grasp” (Frank, 2018, p. 107) (emphasis in 
original). Brockmeier and Harré (2001) raise caution over escalation in the range of 
applications of narrative in research, proposing that there is a risk of losing its analytic 
force.  
 
There is a long tradition of using narrative as a site for understanding the self and identity 
(Bruner, 1987, 1986), where the connection between the narrator, stories and the self is key 
(Hydén, 2008a). Such approaches define narrative as a concept of social epistemology 
through which we “come to know, understand, and make sense of the social world, and it 
is through narratives and narrativity that we constitute our social identities” (Somers, 
1994, p. 606). Narratives of identity formation are situated within the power relations of 
the local setting and the broader forces that shape language and experience (Langellier, 
1999; Squires et al., 2015): we are located “within narratives rarely of our own making” 
(Somers, 1994, p. 606) (emphasis in original). Further, Foucault’s influential work informs 
understandings of power relations that shape regimes of knowledge or discourses (e.g. 
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Foucault, 2001, 1982), where a discourse “is to be understood as an institutionalised use of 
language and language-like sign systems…to know anything is to know in terms of one or 
more discourses” (Davies and Harré, 1990, p. 52). Discourses shape conditions of what is 
said, thought, acknowledged or dismissed (Foucault, 2001).  
 
Within traditional narrative identity research, the analytic focus is often on the “life story 
model of identity…a person defines him- or herself by construing an autobiographical 
story of the self” (McAdams, 1990, p. 148). In this model, the story is conceived as a clearly 
identifiable and coherent entity, embedding identity in time and spatial relationships.  
Stories of the narrator’s life events often contain an account of life before a turning point, 
a turning point itself, and life afterwards (Hydén, 2018, 2010): “something happens, and 
life at the end is substantially changed from how matters stood at the beginning” (Frank, 
2018, p. 119).  
 
In influential work on personal experience narratives, Labov generated narratives of past 
events in response to the question, ‘Have you ever been in danger of death?’ (Labov, 1972). 
Labov’s analysis treats the elicited story as a text that “recapitulate[s] the told in the telling” 
(Mishler, 1995, p. 92). This focus on narrative’s function as the telling-of-events has widely 
informed definitions of narrative (Patterson, 2008). The assumption is that storied events 
have ‘actually happened’ and the narration will form a more-or-less accurate 
representation of these ‘real’ events. For Frank, this assumption is: 
“one of the elephants in any room where narrative is discussed, which is the 
veracity/fictionality of stories; how does a story represent what actually happened in 
some then-and-there?”  
(Frank, 2018, p. 109).  
 
The onset of a health condition may be considered to be landmark life event that evokes 
a life story (Frank, 1997; Riessman, 2003). Narrative has gained importance as a means for 
understanding illness experiences and negotiation of life situations with the “problems of 
identity that chronic illness brings with it” (Hydén, 1997, p. 51).  Narrative inquiry into 
living with long term conditions has been linked to changing power relations in healthcare 
or epistemic injustice: “a wrong done to someone in their capacity as a knower” (Fricker, 
2007, p. 1). However, if “the meaning of the narrative is thought to be found inside the 
narrative” (Hydén, 2008b, p. 50), then the assumption is that the story will contain a 
coherent plotline and will convey a perspective to a particular audience who will 




Critics suggest that expectations of linearity in narrative chronology becomes a way to 
“convince ourselves that things are simpler than they are” (Rosiek and Snyder, 2018, p. 3). 
Further, if coherent narration is taken as a marker for coherence in sense of self, then those 
not demonstrating such coherence may be disregarded. Researchers pursuing the 
coherent narrative may seek narrators who can provide the correct form that upholds the 
norms of an explicit narrative. Those categorised as having cognitive or communicative 
change, for example following brain injury, may be excluded from narrative contribution 
due to assumptions of “striking listener burden” (Biddle et al., 1996, p. 447) that is 
attributed to: 
 “global coherence errors…the listener must filter through the tangential information 
and search long-term knowledge to fit the conceptually incongruent information 
into the overall representation of the narrative”  
(Kintz et al., 2018, p. 48).  
 
Their story may instead be gathered from another who acts vicariously as the ‘author’ of 
the story and of their perspectives (Hydén, 2008a). Researchers gathering accounts of 
‘incoherent events’ and ‘tangential information’ may organise and re-story narrative in an 
attempt to reveal the ‘real’ chronology and causal links, which recognisably adhere to 
temporally-coherent norms (Creswell and Creswell, 2017; Hydén, 2018). At times of 
potential disruption, smoothing out narrative to create “the perfect offering” (Siegl, 2019, 
p. n/p) overlooks opportunities afforded through the telling: the mastering, sustaining and 
potentially reshaping of identities (Hydén, 2008b).   
 
An alternative to narrative analysis that seeks a coherent, ‘real’ storyline, is an approach 
that prioritises narrative co-construction, attending to brief narrative activity and what 
stories do in the interaction; aspects which may be overlooked in traditional life story (‘big 
story’) narrative research (Bamberg and Georgakopoulou, 2008; Georgakopoulou, 2015). 
Here, narrative identity is defined as “how a sense of self comes into existence by way of 
relating” (Bamberg and Georgakopoulou, 2008, p. 387). This approach can be seen as 
complementary to, rather than competing with, traditional life story research as one flows 
into the other, making each type possible (Frank, 2018).  
 
Within this research, my reliance upon narrative inquiry is not to determine the ‘true’ 
picture of events for participants following TBI, but to explore shared-sense-making 
within complex relationships. Further, time itself may be relevant in meaning-making, 
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through mechanisms as described by Medved and Brockmeier (2008) of importing stories 
of events in the past into tellings that place them in the present, thereby extending notions 
of temporal order as a “fundamental principle of narrative and its organization” (Hydén 
and Brockmeier, 2008, p. 4).  
 
In the following, I discuss dyadic and longitudinal approaches within my research design. 
I return to consider brief moments of talk-in-interaction as a unit of narrative analysis 
when describing the development of my analytic approach in Chapter 5.  
 
Longitudinal design 
Qualitative longitudinal research is considered suited to capturing social complexities 
through the examination and incorporation of accounts of experiences over time (Bidart, 
2013; Fadyl et al, 2016). Questions arise over analysis addressing sense of self through single 
time-point interviews (Hall, 2004), particularly when considering narratives after hospital 
discharge, where consequences and adjustments take place over time within fluctuating 
patterns of physical, cognitive and  social change. A longitudinal design brings 
opportunities to explore stories across time and situation, including those that have a 
fluidity of movement (e.g. non-linear time configurations) within narration (Barak and 
Leichtentritt, 2014; Frank, 1997). 
 
Dyadic interviewing 
Dyadic interviewing, referring to two participants interacting in response to open-ended 
questions, has been considered to ‘fill the gap’ in a continuum between one-to-one 
qualitative interviews and focus groups (Morgan et al., 2013). The key difference between 
individual and dyadic interviews derives from the interaction between participants, 
drawing responses from one another, in an interaction that can be quite different from the 
discussion of focus groups and instead, in some ways, reflecting everyday conversational 
practices (Hydén, 2010). 
 
Within the field of family research, dyadic interviews focus on interviews with pairs of 
people who share a pre-existing role relationship, where foundations of joint meaning are 
explored (Eisikovits and Koren, 2010, p. 1653). The inclusion of a family member or 
significant other within interviews can facilitate telling of stories that encompass differing 
perspectives, concerns and needs. Further, “even if participants do not give their silences 




Dyadic interviewing can facilitate socially distributed remembering, where talking about 
shared past experiences constructs a shared resource. Cognitive or communicative 
problems that may be associated with brain injury may be addressed by the dyadic partner, 
by complementing restricted narrative functions and thereby “scaffolding” the shared 
storytelling capacity (Hydén, 2017, 2011). Described in the context of impaired cognitive 
and communication function, ‘narrative scaffolds’ refer to processes where participants 
share narration responsibilities; for example, interpretations of contributions made by a 
partner, prompting for word-finding, or turn-taking.  Such scaffolding becomes an integral 
part of shared meaning-making as “a deeply moral activity” (Hydén, 2011, p. 346), which 
may support sense of self and sustain kinship bonds. This understanding “changes 
impairments from an individual property, to a property of the interacting participants” 
(Hydén, 2017, p. 123) as a feature of the narrative collaboration (Hydén, 2011).  
 
Acknowledging that cognitive coherence may be achieved through others with whom 
participants have relationships also implies the potential for tensions or misalignment 
within narrative scaffolding activities, for example because of “feelings of discontinuity 
with the survivor [with TBI]” (Salas, 2012, p. 83) and continuous definitions and revisions 
of “who they are in relation to each other” (Hydén and Nilsson, 2015, p. 719). Although 
narrative scaffolds convey meaning, they may also contain violence, as stories and ways of 









On commencing this research my clinical work base, King’s College Hospital NHS 
Foundation Trust, London, formed the setting for recruitment to this study. King’s is the 
Major Trauma Centre for the South East London, Kent and Medway Trauma Network, 
where approximately 350 patients are admitted following traumatic brain injury per year 
(data from clinical database at King’s College Hospital, 2016). My clinical work, as 
consultant physician in Rehabilitation Medicine within the multidisciplinary Brain Injury 
Team, entailed provision of support to people and families in the acute Neurosurgical and 
Trauma wards, inpatient rehabilitation on a specialist unit, and outpatient follow-up 
clinics held collaboratively with a regional branch of Headway (a brain injury charity). 
 
Sampling 
In my initial approach to sampling, I relied upon the purposeful strategy of maximum 
variation (heterogeneity) sampling: the selection of cases with maximised diversity that 
seemed relevant to the topic, to enable its exploration (Patton, 2015). I intended that each 
person in the sample would be different from the others according to pre-specified 
dimensions of severity of traumatic brain injury, age groupings, and whether the 
participant was employed, studying, out of work or parenting, prior to injury. The variable 
of requiring initial management in the Intensive Care Unit (ICU) represented a marker of 
severity of TBI (more severe injuries requiring initial neurosurgical management in ICU), 
which could be clearly established at recruitment (Bulger et al., 2002), in contrast to 
practical issues presented by inconsistent recording of clinical markers such as the 
Glasgow Coma Scale (GCS) and/or duration of post-traumatic amnesia (PTA). Using these 
sampling parameters, I developed an initial pragmatic sample size estimation of 8-12 
individuals living with TBI. I aimed to interview each with their chosen family member or 
‘significant other’. My initial sampling frame, according to these parameters of variation, 
is shown in Appendix 2. 
 
Evolution of sampling decisions 
As my methodology developed over time, I no longer considered that the categorisations 
in the initial sampling frame were necessarily meaningful. Further, I began to consider my 
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selection of categorisations as potentially problematic, as “identities are complex…[while] 
simplistic analyses reduce people to identity categories (e.g. “black”, “female”)” (Taylor and 
Littleton, 2006, p. 24). My decisions evolved from these pre-determined categorisations to 
more dynamic considerations in sampling, through which I considered further 
recruitment by making iterative decisions (Ellingson, 2017). In later stages, my sampling 
intentions remained aligned with the overall ‘maximum variation’ approach, yet my 
decisions were based upon more fluid social situations and a narrative conceptualisation 
of identity to use in sampling instead of fixed parameters. For example, a narrative 
conceptualisation might consider changing responsibilities for family dependants or 
shifting social support networks that created separation from family support overseas. 
Using this approach to sampling, I intended to represent the complex, evolving 
circumstances in which people live their lives.  
 
As I reflected on my early analyses, I became increasingly aware of the temporal fluidity in 
people’s talk, in contrast to linear ‘progress’ over time since injury as anticipated by a 
clinical framing of predicted trajectories of recovery.  My sampling intentions then 
extended to explore the temporal component further, through inclusion of people whose 
injury may have occurred more than 12 months previously (the timeframe that had been 
my initial intention). This aspect extended temporal considerations within a longitudinal 
design where change over time is already a key focus (Thomson and Holland, 2003). 
 
Recruitment 
After securing NHS and University of Westminster ethical approval (detailed below), I 
commenced screening of people who had been admitted to hospital following TBI and I 
liaised with colleagues with whom I worked clinically in the Brain Injury Team, to consider 
and discuss potential participation in the study. The diagnosis of TBI was supported 
through the inclusion criterion that the participant had required admission to an inpatient 
hospital ward for management of traumatic brain injury at the time of their acute 
presentation (Turner-Stokes et al., 2005). I discussed the study with potential participants 
after medical and surgical stability had been reached.  
 
If there were reasons to think that someone may not have capacity to make the decision 
to participate at the time of invitation or informed consent (described below), then I 
undertook a capacity assessment for making the decision to be take part. I undertook this 
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in accordance with the Mental Capacity Act Code of Practice (2005)2. My intention was to 
include people who may have cognitive or communicative impairments following TBI, if 
they had capacity to make the decision to participate in the study. Those who did not have 
capacity to consent to participate were not included within this study. Additional 
inclusion and exclusion criteria are outlined in Table 2.  
 
The criterion relating to sufficient English language to participate in narrative interviews 
without an interpreter was a pragmatic consideration in view of lack of funding available 
for this study. Further, this exclusion related to methodological considerations in cross-
language qualitative studies, including the potential effects of interpreters on the 
narratives gained from participants and the translation of more complex concepts, which 
may have impacted upon the interpretation of co-constructions of narratives (Squires, 
2009). 
 
Table 2 - Primary participant inclusion and exclusion criteria 
Inclusion criteria Exclusion criteria 
 Traumatic brain injury requiring acute 
hospital admission at time of presentation 
 Capacity to give informed consent to 
participate in the study 
 Adults of 18 years or over 
 Sufficient English language to participate 





 Discharged directly from the Emergency 
Department without need for hospital 
admission  
 Lack capacity to give informed consent to 
participate  
 Insufficient English language to participate in 
narrative interviews without an interpreter 
 No telephone or email access for 
arrangements to be made 
 Current alcohol and/or substance abuse 
 Severe mental health problems (undergoing 





                                                          
2 I had been performing capacity assessments on a regular basis for many years during my clinical 




I provided people with a written information sheet about the research study, which I 
developed in consultation with four people living with brain injury and one family 
member. Following their feedback, I made adjustments to the information sheet to 
produce the final version, which these reviewers considered to be easy to follow 
(information sheets are included in Appendix 3).  
 
Following a minimum of one week after providing the information sheet, I arranged time 
for participants to ask any questions prior to their consideration of the informed consent 
form (see below for consent procedure). I explained that their participation or non-
participation would not affect usual NHS Care and I included a statement to this effect 
within the participant information sheet (Appendix 3).  I arranged the research interviews 
at a time and location convenient for the participants.  
 
I asked each person with TBI who agreed to participate in the study to select a family 
member or significant other person. I provided each significant other with the appropriate 
information sheet (Appendix 3) and opportunity for questions and discussion, as above. If 
an individual agreed to participate but preferred not to involve another person in the 
whole of each interview (or if the ‘significant other’ person was not available for the whole 
duration of each interview), then I made arrangements according to their expressed 




Informed consent  
Prior to commencing the interview procedures, I gave the informed consent form to 
participants (see Appendix 4 for patient and ‘significant other’ consent forms). I reiterated 
the purpose of the study, what to expect, and checked that people would be comfortable 
with my use of a digital recorder during the interview. I also described the anticipated time 
required and the plan for a second, follow-up interview which would be up to twelve 
months later, at their convenience. I advised participants of their right to withdraw from 
the study (including withdrawal of their data, if they were to notify me of this prior to the 
analysis stage), without a need to offer explanation and without any consequences for 
ongoing or future care. I informed each participant’s GP of study inclusion following the 
participant’s informed consent. The informed consent form included the information that 
their GP would be provided with standardised information about their participation in the 





I followed a narrative interview approach of asking a simple opening question to elicit 
stories about everyday life, as an ‘open’ form of interview designed around what the 
participants wish to talk about (McCormack, 2004; Whiffin et al., 2017), intending to 
“follow participants down their trails” (Riessman, 2008, p. 24). I started with an informal 
conversation, until this naturally arrived at the purpose of my visit, when I asked one open 
question: “How have things been since you were in hospital?”. After initial narration, 
avoiding interruptions by asking questions, I explored aspects in greater depth with 
prompt questions or continued in the flow of participants’ own conversations. In my 
approach to pacing the interviews, I intended to allow each of us the ”time necessary to 
inhabit the conversational space” (Medved, 2007, p. 607). I kept in mind the idea that the 
interview guide would provide an “initial framework for opening the interview 
conversation rather than a recipe to follow” (Charmaz, 2015, p. 1613). I added any questions 
of a ‘closed’ nature after completion of the open narrative phase, to allow participants to 
follow their own sequence in engaging with ‘open’ questions, without introducing prior 
potentially suggestive areas of salience (Patton, 1990). I piloted my interview approach was 
before starting full data generation and reviewed the process with project supervisors. 
 
Each interview lasted around 60 to 90 minutes. I checked the approximate length of time 
participants had available, at the beginning of our discussion. Factors affecting the length 
of interviews included fatigue and unanticipated occurrences such as phone calls or other 
issues requiring the participant’s attention during the interview. Where appropriate, I 
paused audio-recording for such events or for a break in discussion and resumed when 
participants indicated they were ready to proceed. I arranged a second interview with each 
participant and their chosen significant other person, at an interval of six to twelve months 





Figure 1 - Overview of longitudinal interviewing approach 
 
  
I viewed the time interval between interviews flexibly, acknowledging the balance needed 
between practical considerations of my participants’ time availabilities and my own, 
between employment commitments, and with awareness of the finite time available for 
conducting this research study. On meeting for the second interview, we talked about the 
last interview as and when participants referred back to it. If not, then at the end of 
opening discussion, I introduced areas they had raised at the first interview that had 
seemed to be source of anticipation during the first interview. Interview guides for each 




The sensitivity protocol that I implemented during interview procedures, to ensure 
wellbeing of participants, included: 
 Discretion so that, if topics appeared to be causing undue distress, I would cease 
recording of the interview. 
 I did not put participants under any pressure to resume discussion but sought their 
preferences on whether to proceed. 
 In circumstances where clinical concerns arose, I left contact details for the helpline 
of the Brain Injury Team at King's College Hospital, who provide long-term, holistic 
support for people after brain injury. 
 In the case of any instances of distress, I followed up with participants within a few 
days by phone or email, and anonymously discussed problems within the project 
supervision team as appropriate. 
Hospital 
admission
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6 -12 
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I referred to ‘INVOLVE’ guidance on good practice for recognition of participation in 
research (NIHR, 2017). This included reimbursement for any travel expenses that may be 
incurred and acknowledged the contributions by giving participants a gift voucher for £20. 
The approach and monetary value was determined through discussion with peer 
researchers who had undertaken interviews entailing similar requirements for participants 
in recent months. I chose the voucher after discussion with a sample of potential 
participants and selected a provider easily accessible within the participant’s location. 
Consensus of discussion with colleague researchers suggested that such vouchers would 
be suitable for this purpose, for a range of participants. On concluding each interview, I 
thanked participants, discussed plans for the follow-up interview where relevant and gave 
a thank you card with the voucher, in acknowledgement of their contribution.  
 
Field notes and reflexivity 
Reflexivity in qualitative research typically refers to: 
“a process by which we as researchers hold ourselves accountable for the 
assumptions we enact when we do research, a process of justifying why we are 
inquiring about people and the world in particular ways”  
(Shaw et al., 2017, p. 1735).  
 
Reflexivity allows for observation of the unexpected, capturing a ‘quick glimpse’ of 
something that may affect interpretation of the research. This concept aligns with the 
inclusion of emotional overlap within the analysis (described in Chapter 5). However, here 
I consider reflexivity to be linked to more overt or verbally identifiable “sticky events” 
(Riach, 2009, p. 361), for example the introduction of a contentious or controversial point 
that can be demonstrated textually within the transcript, for example if participants were 
to raise clinical questions to me ‘as a clinician’ within the course of the research interview. 
 
Throughout the project, I reflected on my own influences in constructing the research, 
including choices I make in my approach to the topic and the analysis of findings. These 
activities contribute to a validity procedure in which my own positioning is explored, 
acknowledging that the researcher and the process of inquiry are not separable (Creswell 
and Miller, 2000), while also increasingly acknowledging a need “to admit to oneself the 




The time in participants’ homes provided opportunities for observations of interactions in 
the environment where they naturally occur (Adler and Adler, 1994) This naturalistic 
setting provided scope for additional observations and interactions surrounding the 
interview itself, for example, with other family members and with pets who were also 
present. I recorded anonymised observations, where relevant to the study, within 
handwritten field notes. I made initial journal entries immediately after each interview 
episode, to ensure that sufficient detail could be recorded. However, I found that 
“information can be added at any point to create a comprehensive documentation useful 
in later data analysis” (Phillippi and Lauderdale, 2017, p. 6). I continued to maintain 
participants’ anonymity and confidentiality within these notes. I also used field notes to 
reflect on research progression and to explore developments in my theoretical awareness 
(Barak and Leichtentritt, 2014; Carter and Little, 2007).  
 
My field notes generally comprised three key components: (1) a description as a “concrete 
and detailed” account of observations (Patton, 2015, p. 387); (2) personal reflections on 
meanings of the encounter including noticing and processing my own emotional reactions 
to the experience “potentially created in the intersubjectivity between participant and 
researcher” (Holmes, 2010, p. 166); and (3) interpretations or early analysis of what 
happened or its significance. The functions of my field notes are outlined in Table 3 
(adapted from Phillippi and Lauderdale, 2017).  
 
Table 3 - Field notes: overview of functions 
Function Examples 
Prompting As a tool to prompt observation of environment and interactions  
 
Complementing  To complement data from text-focused interview transcripts 
 
To document aspects of physical environment and participants’ non-verbal 
exchanges or movement within the setting 
 
Reflecting Facilitate noticing and processing own emotional reactions  
 
To provide a focus through which to consider potential biases in 
interpretation 
 
Analysing Facilitate preliminary analysis and iterative design  
 
Documenting development of theoretical awareness and steps in analysis 
 






My research governance activities followed the Research Governance Framework for 
Health and Social Care (HRA, 2017b) and the University of Westminster’s Framework for 
Research Governance (University of Westminster, 2016). I secured ethical and Research 
and Development (R&D) approvals from: 
 London City and East Research Committee (IRAS ID 168036) 
 R&D department of King’s College Hospital NHS Foundation Trust 
 The University of Westminster Research Ethics Committee  
 Health Research Authority (HRA)  
 R&D department of Imperial College Healthcare NHS Trust  
 
The approval documentation for each of these bodies is included in Appendix 6.  
During the course of this research project, I changed my hospital work-base from King’s 
College Hospital to Charing Cross Hospital, Imperial College Healthcare NHS Trust. This 
relocation incurred significant delay in securing additional approval for inclusion of 
Charing Cross Hospital as a study site. On 31st March 2016, Health Research Authority 
(HRA) approval was introduced for all research within NHS England (HRA, 2017). As my 
project had initially gained NHS permission for research at King’s College Hospital 
through a Research Ethics Committee (REC) review, the altered process meant that I was 
also required to apply for HRA approval to recruit patients through my new clinical base 
at Charing Cross Hospital. As I anticipated that the length of wait for additional approval 
processes would impact upon my participant recruitment timeline, I applied for and 
secured an honorary contract at King’s College Hospital (Appendix 7). By liaising closely 
with the helpful Research and Development (R&D) department, I gained approval to 
continue recruitment to the study through patients I had worked with while based in the 
Brain Injury Team at King’s College Hospital. 
 
In the following, I describe particular ethical considerations for this project, including 
participation of participants who may be experiencing cognitive changes following TBI; a 
longitudinal approach to data generation through follow-up interviews; decisions around 
exclusion of non-English speakers; the inclusion of another person within dyadic 
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interviews; potential burden of study procedures for participants; and considerations 
about my clinician/researcher roles.  
 
Cognition considerations 
During the first weeks after TBI, patients often experience a phase of post-traumatic 
amnesia (PTA), “representing the length of time from injury until return of orientation 
and continuous memory for events” (Ponsford et al., 2016, p. 997). Patients who were 
assessed as being ‘in PTA’ were not approached regarding the study, until this was deemed 
to have resolved (for example at a later stage of clinical interaction, such as outpatient 
follow-up review).  
 
People with brain injury may be excluded from research about their own experiences, due 
to the perception that persistent cognitive impairments caused by the injury (after the 
phase of PTA) limit their  provision of ‘meaningful information’ (Paterson and Scott-
Findlay, 2002). The ethical concern here relates to the concept of ‘ “a wrong done to 
someone speciﬁcally in their capacity as a Knower” (Fricker, 2007, p. 1). When inviting and 
including people to participate who may be considered to be experiencing cognitive 
changes, I implemented strategies to facilitate discussions, including taking account of 
fatigue by building in breaks as guided by participants and taking an informal 
conversational approach, not requesting responses to pre-structured questions, but 
instead determined by participants’ preferences in the discussion.  
 
Dyadic and longitudinal approach 
When discussing study procedures with participants, I asked if they would be willing for 
the interview to take place jointly with their chosen ‘significant other’ person. Many people 
after TBI prefer to have a family member or other supporter involved in discussion, 
especially if they have experienced memory impairment since their injury. If the family 
member or significant other requested to speak privately and if the issue to be discussed 
did not relate to the research interview, I would offer guidance back to standard clinical 
processes (see ‘sensitivity protocol’, below).  
 
Longitudinal research can make considerable demands on the participants, through 
repeated interview participation. I sought to minimise the impact of my research on 




Potential burden of participation 
The need to make journeys to unfamiliar settings can frequently seem overwhelming to 
people and might particularly be an issue following TBI. I therefore offered the option of 
meeting participants at home for interviews, if they preferred this to travelling to a 
meeting venue. I adhered to King’s College Hospital NHS Foundation Trust’s lone worker 
policy when visiting participants in their own homes. Although the majority of 
participants preferred to meet in their own home or the home of the significant other 
joining the discussion, two participants chose to meet in cafés, which I considered may 
raise ethical concerns about confidentiality and possibilities of being overheard. However, 
together we took measures to choose seating which would enable privacy for our 
discussion. I confirmed comfort level with the arrangements for each participant 
intermittently through our conversations. Within interviews, I was guided by participants’ 
indications of time for breaks and for overall duration of the interview, according to 
fatigue.   
 
My potential conflict of interest 
My dual roles as both a healthcare professional and researcher introduced the potential 
for conflict of interest within research with patients who had experienced the service in 
which I was employed. This study was a non-interventional, qualitative study, seeking 
knowledge that may inform future service improvement initiatives. The discussions I held 
with people with TBI and their family members/significant others in clinical practice 
already had emphasis on the complex, longer term considerations and effects of the injury 
on function and quality of life when people return home, rather than the biomedical 
treatment focus of the acute Major Trauma Centre more generally. I introduced the 
purpose of this research to study participants within this framing, including the intention 
to seek understanding of people’s experiences after leaving hospital and when they are 
often coping without access to specialist healthcare services. No therapeutic promises or 
expectations were made regarding participation, and no coercion exerted. Where any 
matters arising indicated a participant’s wish to pursue clinical management-related 
discussion, I offered redirection to usual care processes, as discussed within the ‘sensitivity 
protocol’.  
I was aware that my identity categories as doctor and researcher could construct power 
imbalances. I paid attention to possible verbal and non-verbal (for example, body language 
or tone of voice) cues that might indicate participants’ reluctance to continue in an 
interview, or particular aspect of a discussion. I consider potential conflicts between my 
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roles as clinician, researcher, and other positions, alongside my analysis of interview 
findings (described in Chapter 5). In brief, I found that distancing myself from the role of 
clinician within research encounters gradually required less conscious monitoring as my 
experience of the qualitative researcher role expanded. I became aware of a change in my 
own approach when allowing interactions to unfold without the constraints and 
expectations of a clinical gaze. 
 
Anonymity, confidentiality and data storage 
 
Confidentiality  
I maintained confidentiality of information regarding participants in this study in 
accordance with the Data Protection Act, NHS Caldicott Guardian, The Research 
Governance Framework for Health and Social Care, and the Research Ethics Committee 
Approval. I stored patient-identifiable data in NHS premises in password-protected files, 
in locked drives, and no patient-identifiable data was shared beyond the direct care team. 
Information with patient-identifiable was securely destroyed at the end of its use; hard 
copy material was shredded and electronic medium was deleted. Anonymised transcripts 
will be retained for ten years after DProf completion. 
 
My initial intention had been to use professional transcribing services. However, after 
piloting initial interviews, I decided that I would undertake transcription myself, to 
facilitate my immersion in, and familiarisation with, the data and also to provide 
opportunity to make notes on non-verbal aspects that I recalled from interviews. I replaced 
names, places and other identifiers within transcripts with pseudonyms and made changes 
to other potentially identifiable content within narratives, through substitutions 




NVivo to Scrivener 
In commencing my analysis, I followed qualitative research norms in using the computer 
assisted qualitative analysis software package NVivo (QSR International) for data 
management and to facilitate analysis (Bazeley and Jackson, 2013). Over time and when 
moving through the analytic process described, I began to consider that my use of NVivo 
was creating a reiterative practice in which I felt distanced from data, components of the 
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data felt compartmentalised from each other and there seemed to be a risk that people 
and interactions would become reduced to objective codes. Similarly, Malterud notes that 
“software intended to support qualitative analysis seems to encourage decontextualization 
and fragmentation rather than recontextualization, synthesis and understanding” 
(Malterud, 2016, p. 127). I began to use ‘Scrivener’ (Literature & Latte, 2019), a programme 
that provides an interface which enables organisation, reorganisation and synthesis of 
information. In contrast to NVivo, Scrivener facilitates a sense of fluidity in thinking-and-
writing, contrasted with the linear containment I experienced within NVivo.   
 
During second and third readings of transcripts, I highlighted salient excerpts according 
to the analytic components outlined above and used Scrivener to detail my observations 
on what I thought was occurring with use of linkage function to create connections, 
disconnections or shifts between longitudinal interviews. In this way, I was able to use 
functions within Scrivener to connect analytic reflections across storytelling times and 
situations, opening up possibilities for a theoretically-inspired analysis to become 
something new, instead of repeating my old or established interpretations. Scrivener 
facilitated making meaning in non-prescriptive ways and supported my efforts to keep 
analysis ‘on the move’. I include a screenshot to illustrate my use of the Scrivener software 
in Appendix 8. 
 
Saturation 
My intention was not to reach a point of ‘data saturation’ in this study. The notion of 
saturation derives from the grounded theory approach described by Glaser and Strauss, 
intended for generating sociological theory from empirical textual data by comparing 
events sequentially until further information no longer adds to conceptual categories 
developed (Glaser and Strauss, 1965). The saturation idea is frequently mentioned in 
sample size considerations in qualitative research as concepts are identified in data to 
guide participant recruitment to further explore those concepts (Malterud et al., 2016). 
However, as a general marker of quality, it remains unclear what saturation means in 
practice for other qualitative approaches (Hennink et al., 2017; Malterud et al., 2016).  
Instead of data coding to reach “saturation” through sameness, I instead sought difference 
within and between participant’s expressions (Jackson and Mazzei, 2013). I consider the 
potential of the “available empirical data to provide access to new knowledge by means of 
analysis and theoretical interpretations” (Cohen and Crabtree, 2008; Malterud et al., 2016, 
p. 1759). I describe the process of seeking new connectives, between theory to data, within 





Validity, in the context of qualitative research, has been defined as “how accurately the 
account represents participants’ realities of the social phenomena and is credible to them” 
(Creswell and Miller, 2000, p. 124). Similarly, Tracy (2010) argues that a key criterion for 
‘quality’ in qualitative research is ‘credibility’, suggesting this to refer to the 
“trustworthiness, verisimilitude and plausibility of the research findings” (p842). Tracy 
goes on to suggest that one route to credibility may involve the researcher “seeking input 
during the process of analysing data” (p844). Member validation, or checking, generally 
refer to processes where participants are sent for their review and/or correction: (a) a 
transcript of their interview, (b) a copy of findings, or (c) a draft research report (Thomas, 
2017, p.23). Although these processes have traditionally been recommended as a specific 
validity procedure in qualitative research (Lincoln and Guba, 1985), some authors have 
further proposed that member validation may elicit narratives which participants may 
have felt unable, or reluctant, to tell in the original research interview (Kirkpatrick and 
Byrne, 2009). However, the concept of member checks in enhancing the credibility or 
trustworthiness of qualitative research has been questioned (Varpio et al., 2017), including 
concerns over “additional intrusion for participants [with] little or no substantive changes 
in research findings” (Thomas, 2017, p.39). Member checking may also support the idea of 
there being one identifiable ‘truth’ to be collected by the researcher (Angen, 2000).  
 
Mazzei et al argue more forcibly that processes traditionally pursuing ‘validity’ tether 
research to a plane of consistency (Mazzei et al., 2018), thereby losing the “radical 
possibility in the unfinalized” (Jackson and Mazzei, 2013, p. 271). Within the 
constructionist paradigm (outlined in Chapter 3), I anticipated that variations in narration 
would be both inevitable and valuable. Creswell and Miller broaden validity intentions to 
the acknowledgement of researchers’ paradigm assumptions, beyond specific procedures 
that have been used (2000). As described in my analytical rationale, I sought 
understandings of version-making in drafts of the self rather than an “attempt to catch the 
most authentic (as in true or real)—or even the most recent edition” (Bamberg, 2011a, p. 
18). 
 
Addressing the notion of “plausibility of the research findings” (Tracy, 2010, p. 842), I 
discussed transcript extracts with project supervisors from commencement of data 
generation  and throughout the development of my interpretations during the reiterative 
analytic processes. In addition, I ‘tested’ my analytical ideas with academic audiences by 
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presenting several conference papers on work-in-progress (my contributions to 
conferences are shown in Appendix 9). In these fora, I gained feedback about whether my 
interpretations seemed plausible in relation to the narrative extracts shared and whether 
the listeners described a sense of being “made to rethink a stance or opinion” (Winter et 
al., 2000, p. 35). These varied perspectives and aspects of feedback became integrated into 




CHAPTER 5: Analytic approach 
 
Introduction 
My analytic approach evolved from project conception through data generation, 
transcribing and interpretation, in response to learning from earlier parts of the study 
(Given, 2008). My early intentions were to gain a holistic picture of how people manage in 
daily life after hospital discharge following traumatic brain injury. As I considered using 
an inductive thematic analytical approach (Braun and Clarke, 2006), I became aware of 
potential critiques, whereby “themes, by definition, represent a loss of attention to detail, 
a loss of the idiosyncratic” (Peck, 2015, p. 3). Retention of the integrity of participants’ 
responses represents a pervasive challenge for qualitative researchers (Bailey and Jackson, 
2003). Further, conventional coding methods often focus on the meanings that the 
interviewees attach to their experience, yet “it is reasonable to infer that it is extremely 
difficult to attach a meaning to something that is not intentional” (Huyard et al., 2018, p. 
4). In seeking to identify meanings that participants attach to their experience, we may 
also ‘smooth out’ inherent contradictions and tensions. Further problems with coding data 
involve the risk that the categories of findings generated become, in some way, 
predictable.  
 
Acknowledging that qualitative research takes place with language or in language, I 
required an approach “that unravels the connection between experience of the world and 
the role that language plays within that” (Peck, 2015, p. 1). Michael Bamberg proposes an 
approach that intends to avoid the imposition of analysts’ concerns onto participants. It 
has been proposed that Bamberg’s positioning analysis (Bamberg, 1997) can avoid “the 
overly top-down trappings of CDA [critical discourse analysis] or the overly myopic 
technicalities of CA [conversation analysis] because it derives from neither orientation” 
(Korobov, 2001, p. 8). Bamberg’s concept of “narrative positioning” is influenced by 
Positioning Theory, which addresses how people use words and discourse of all types to 
locate themselves and others (Davies and Harré, 1990; Harré, 2015; Harré et al., 2009) and 
where “selves are located in conversations as observably and subjectively coherent 
participants in jointly produced story-lines” (Davies and Harré, 1990, p. 48). Positioning 
theory offers a lens to examine what is said, how it is said, and effects on (and from) the 




I commence by describing my rationale for focussing on everyday components of talk-in-
interaction within narrative analysis (Bamberg, 2014, 2006; Bamberg and Georgakopoulou, 
2008). I briefly consider alternative (and overlapping) narrative approaches that could 
alternatively have been applied within this analysis. I then expand the theoretical 
orientation with an outline of Bamberg’s positioning analysis and a framework for its 
application within my analytic steps. Finally, I describe my application of Butler’s theory 
of performativity as a sensitising device within the analysis. I demonstrate the interrelated 





“I think we are more than walking narratives” 
(Bamberg and Demuth, 2016, p. 21) 
 
My intention in analysis of data generated through interviews is to focus on what people 
do when they tell stories, where narratives are “sites for social and individual meaning 
construction and not just as the carriers of what may be considered as socially and 
individually meaningful” (Bamberg, 2008, p. 184). Storytelling can be viewed in variable 
and diverse forms including those highly integrated into ongoing conversations and 
therefore less easily circumscribed as a discrete entity from an analytic perspective (Ochs 
and Capps, 2001).  
 
In Chapter 2, I discussed tensions surrounding the concepts of sense of self and loss of self, 
and their potential relevance when considering ‘self-management’. ‘Small stories’ are “the 
rough, inchoate, in situ stories that comprise much of ongoing experience” (Freeman, 2017, 
p. 23): the term captures a range of narrative activities under-represented in conventional 
narrative analysis, includes talk about ongoing events, hypothetical events,  shared events, 
and also incorporating prior telling or refusals to tell (Ochs and Capps, 2001). Such stories 
are ‘small’ in length and are also seen to counter the tradition of ‘big’ stories – 
autobiographical narrative, which tend to “equate life and story…assuming that narrators 
have a self and an identity …locatable in the ‘big stories’ they tell” (Bamberg, 2008, p. 184). 
The term ‘small stories’ instead locates the means of identification and analysis of 
transcript at the level of ‘smallness’ of talk through fleeting moments of narrative 
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orientation to the world (Hymes, 1996). They allow exploration of how sense of self might 
be claimed through talk-in-interaction in situated contexts, including “who was 
positioned as doing what kind of things, in relation to what, or whom” (Jolanki, 2009, p. 
216). These elements of situated talk-in-interaction were central to my analytic focus. 
Criticism of narrative analysis of brief moments in interaction includes a claim that the 
very integrity of storytelling is at stake: 
 “[there is] a price for dissolving stories into smaller and smaller fragments until 
ultimately any thought seems to count as a story. The price is that the distinctiveness 
of the speech genre of story can get lost”.     
   
(Frank, 2018, p. 123) 
 
Instead of seeking units of analysis that would “count as a story”, I intended to explore 
ways in which a these smaller fragments of interaction might “help make visible ‘big 
issues’” (Georgakopoulou, 2017, p. 274). By contrast with ‘big story’ (life story) research, 
this approach does not assume that people are aware of a ‘self’, or that the researcher might 
locate it within their own or others’ narratives. Instead, in interaction with others, people 
are considered to display of a sense of self in everyday contexts (Bamberg, 2014). As a site 
where sense of self may be tested out, brief moments of talk-in-interaction allow 
consideration of the influence of the relational dynamic that occurs within the ‘here and 
now’ of the telling while also considering the ‘there and then’ of the events described 
(Bamberg, 2015).  
 
Accounts may be shared by more than one speaker, where positions are taken up or 
allocated as an interactive achievement or “site where constructions take place” (Bamberg, 
2004a, p. 333). This analysis attunes to local, interpersonal purposes and are not restricted 
to story content (Ochs and Capps, 2001). For example,  talk  constructed between couples 
where one partner is living with dementia may sustain the relationship and reaffirm 
personhood, even where stories may otherwise appear ‘meaningless’ (Hydén, 2017). This 
analytic approach includes the inconsistencies, contradictions, and moments of tension as 









Theory refers to “a scheme or system of ideas or statements held as an explanation or 
account of a group of facts or phenomena” (Oxford English Dictionary, 2019). The purpose 
theoretical perspectives within qualitative health research is debated (Malterud, 2016). In 
contrast to qualitative research that predominantly uses empirical observations (asking 
ask what is going on in terms of events or behaviour), an application of theory intends to 
examine why certain things happen and how they can be explained (Maxwell, 2012). These 
stereotyped approaches have been contrasted as activities in which: 
 
 “the researcher gathers detailed narratives of people doing things, orders them 
according to broad themes, and lets the data speak for itself…[or] the researcher aims 
to fit aims into a predetermined theoretical account, usually developed by some en 
vogue theorist” 
 (Tavory and Timmermans, 2014, p. 1). 
 
Rather than “forc[ing] data into predetermined codes or categories” (MacFarlane and 
O’Reilly-de Brún, 2012, p. 609), I sought theoretical concepts that might sensitise me to 
relevant interpretations, which I might not necessarily have identified through an 
inductive approach (Layder, 1998), while also considering how empirical findings might 
push theorisation in unanticipated directions.  The framing of data generation as an active 
process depends on the joining and ‘contamination’ of data with theory through a multi-
layered treatment, where knowledge might be opened up “in order to become”, instead of 
being foreclosed, reduced or simplified (Jackson and Mazzei, 2013, p. 271) (my emphasis). 
 
By integrating theory within this analysis, I aim to open up “self-understanding in the 
sense of our place in the world and how society around us works” (Carrigan, 2018, p. n/p). 
Further, I aim to explore Burke’s concept of ‘Trouble’ in narratives of brain injury, as “a 
violation of the conventionally expected, an upsetting of what should be taken for granted” 
(Burke, 1969, p. 4). I distinguish this from the concept of  ‘trouble and repair’ in 
storytelling, where troubles may arise for the audience in hearing or understanding what 
the speaker is saying and the associated ‘repair’ may comprise for example, repetition, 
rephrasing or elaboration to clarify the cause of ‘trouble’ (Hydén, 2010, p. 340). Specifically, 
through an application of Butler’s theory of performativity (Butler, 2010, 1990), I test out 
Frank’s assertion that  fleeting moments of talk-in-interaction (as opposed to ‘big’, life 
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stories) “lack a specific Trouble” in Burke’s sense of upsetting the taken-for-granted 
(Frank, 2018, p. 109) and I explore his question of whether stories “can be acts of making 
life liveable” (Frank, 2018, p. 111). 
 
In the following, I describe my interpretations of theoretical insights from positioning 




The concept of positioning has been widely used in narrative identity research studies on 
identity work. ‘Positioning’, bringing attention to dynamic aspects of interaction, has been 
defined as a discursive practice where selves are located in “jointly produced story lines” 
(Davies and Harré, 1990, p. 48). These 'discursive practices' impact the ways subjectivity is 
generated and, as discourses are contradictory, so too is subjectivity (Davies and Harré, 
1990).  
  
Bamberg’s model of positioning within talk-in-interaction provides a way to think about 
how people may meaningfully construct a sense of self and of each other (Bamberg, 1997; 
Bamberg and Georgakopoulou, 2008). The concept of positioning analysis enables 
exploration of “sense of self, the ideas and metaphors with which we think, and the self-
narratives we use to talk and think about ourselves” (Burr, 2003, p. 124). Sense of self is 
explored at the level of the talked-about, and at the level of speaker, in the here-and-now 
of the interview situation. Each of these levels feeds into a larger positioning in social 
discourses that extend beyond the here-and-now, as discussed in Chapter 3.  
 
Bamberg operationalises an approach to co-narration through a framework that explores 





Table 4 - Framework for positioning analysis 
Level of positioning Explanation Focus 
Agency versus 
passivity 
Navigation of the 
effects of the world 
upon the self, 
compared to the 
self onto the world. 
 
 Is speaker’s role presented as active and 
agentive?  
 Sense of self: imposed by others, self-
crafted, or both? 
 Are characters linguistically marked (for 
example as the agent, in control of the 




self and others 
(‘synchronic’) 
How the self is 
differentiated from 
others (actual or 
imagined audience) 
 Within interactions, do people bring up 
categories or make them relevant, which 
may be related to self or other (for 
example when categories of profession 
are made relevant to create sense of 
sameness or difference) 
Constancy or 
change in self over 
time  
(‘diachronic’) 






 How do people deal with being ‘the same’ 
or ‘changed’ in the ‘there and then’ versus 
the ‘here and now’? 
 Is constancy or change variably brought to 
the fore within interaction? (intention is 
not to ‘verify’ the change) 
  
In the following section, I introduce further analytic possibilities to develop my 
interpretations of positioning, by disrupting fixed conceptions of identity or assumptions 




In Chapter 2, I discussed the concepts of biographical flow/disruption as under-
acknowledged components of the work of self-management. These concepts first present 
the question: what is it that is flowing or being disrupted? I seek understanding of the 
spontaneous acts, or expectations to act, within familiar settings, to which we do not 
necessarily consciously attend (Butler, 1990), generating a subjectivity as something that 
we do: an interactional accomplishment that is actively constituted and re-constituted in 
interaction (Bamberg, 2015). Situated accomplishments of identity-work constrain 
speakers by norms of communication, yet may construct the self through that does not 
reflect pre-existing norms (Bamberg, 2005). Identity-work, the portrayal of ‘who I am’, is 
then a “project of limited range” (Holstein and Gubrium, 2000, p. 70), as a draft that is 




Expanding on the positioning analysis described above, I integrate an analytic move 
through which I specifically seek to disrupt ‘easy’ or ‘predictable’ interpretations of 
narrative. I use insights from Butler’s theory of performativity to provide a sensitising 
device (Gergen, 1973; Liu, 2004), bringing my attention to the performative aspects of self 
in questions of ‘who I am’ or ‘who I am becoming’. I discuss my interpretation of Butler’s 
work on performativity, before outlining how I consider these insights might deepen my 
analysis. 
 
Butler‘s theory of performativity questions those ideas and categories that represent 
themselves as self-evidently ‘real’ and ‘normal‘. In her book ‘Gender Trouble: Feminism and 
the Subversion of Identity’ (Butler, 1990), she critiques identity categorisation by 
uncovering exclusionary principles in conceptualising the subject, and seeks to destabilise 
these. The application of the theory seeks to: 
“counter a certain kind of positivism according to which we might already begin with 
delimited understandings…[it] starts to describe a set of processes that…bring into 
being certain kinds of realities or lead to certain kinds of socially binding 
consequences”  
(Butler, 2010, p. 147). 
 
In Butler’s view, compulsory repetition, or ‘performativity’, gives the appearance of a fixed 
and cohesive subject according to norms that are adopted for a viable subject to be 
produced (Butler, 1993, p. 232).  ‘Performativity’ originates in Austin’s ‘performative 
utterances’: an utterance “in which to say something is to do something; or in which by 
saying something we are doing something” (Austin 1962, p. 12). Austin’s performatives 
bring about what they say in the appropriate context and if speaker has serious intent. 
Butler departs from Austin, however, for whom performative utterances are active and 
intentional acts by speakers (Austin, 1975)3.  Searle's (1980) interpretation of Austin's (1975) 
speech act theory proposed that the social intention of the speaker determined the type 
of speech act, while Davies and Harré (1990) propose that conversation unfolds through 
participants’ joint attempts to render their actions socially established, becoming a 
speech-act as far as it is taken up as such by the participants.  
 
                                                          
3 Austin (1975) differentiates between linguistic acts as locutionary (language that describes), 
illocutionary (language that does things in the world) and perlocutionary (language that is the 
effect of that doing). 
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Derrida extends the understanding through the concept of ‘citationality’, where the 
utterance has consequence or action because it is recognised by participants as a social 
convention, “identifiable in some way as a ‘citation’” (Derrida, 1988, p.18). For Derrida, the 
performative’s force is not its intention, but its citational representation: the success of a 
performative as it is identifiable as a model and can be repeated (Derrida, 1978). For 
Derrida, performative statements ‘do things’ because they are citational (Gond et al, 2015). 
Derrida’s argument, then, is that citation precedes intention.  Butler upholds this assertion 
in her foundational argument that gender does not exist before its citation of practices 
that ‘bring off’ masculinity or femininity. Butler therefore uses the term ‘citation’ to 
describe adoption of norms (Boucher, 2006). Through ‘Gender Trouble’ (Butler, 1990) and 
‘Bodies that Matter’ (1996), Butler extends Austin’s linguistic origins of performative 
speech acts by applying the concept to gender identity. The conceptualisation can be 
extended to other subjective attributes (e.g. ‘adult’) as a repeated doing, which establishes 
‘the self’.  
 
Though constituted through the expression of repetitive acts, Butler’s account of identity 
performativity does not refer to intentioned (performed) acts, i.e. those characterised by 
some degree of pretence. Critics of Butler’s work have often conflated ‘performativity’ with 
‘performance’ but Butler explicitly addresses this misunderstanding in distinguishing 
between performance and performativity: 
 
 “Performativity is neither free play nor theatrical self-presentation; nor can it simply 
be equated with performance. Performativity cannot be understood outside a process 
of iterability, a regularised and constrained pattern of norms. And this repetition is 
not performed by a subject; this repetition is what enables a subject and constitutes 
the temporal condition for a subject”       
 (Butler, 1993, p. 95) 
 
Inclusion of performance-oriented aspects in analysis of narrative identities, extending 
back to Goffman (1959), have been reiterated within biography research by Riessman 
(1993). In using insights derived from Butler’s performativity, my intentions in analysis 
differ from Riessman’s ‘performative analysis’, which has also been described as a dialogic 
analysis. Riessman’s attention is directed to examine how talk among speakers is 
interactively ‘performed’ as narrative (Riessman, 2008; Smith et al., 2009), where the 
performance of narrative may include, for example, speakers’ emphasis on words and 
phrases, enhancement of particular parts with narrative detail, inclusion of reported 
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speech, pleas to the audience, or bodily gestures and movement (Riessman, 2001). Instead, 
I explore sites of negotiation and struggle in narration, where ‘performativity’ reveals 
competition, conflict, or synergy in subject positions (Langellier, 1999). 
 
Butler's work has expanded from identity categories of gender, central to her foundational 
work, to broader categories of social relations, particularly kinship (Butler, 2002a, 2002b), 
and moving "from pivotal concern with gender and sexuality to a general interest in 
alterity and the face/place of the other" (Segal, 2008, p. 384). Beyond Butler, ‘new 
materialist’ scholars now ask how our intra-action with other bodies, both human and 
nonhuman, may produce subjectivities and performative enactments that have not 
previously been imagined (Barad, 2003). Barad’s performativity moves beyond purely 
discursive approaches to the materiality of performativity and has been viewed as a critical 




Although we take theories into the field with us, these become relevant only if and 
when they illuminate social reality. Moreover, we tend to find very frequently that it 
is not a theorist’s whole system which so illuminates, but his scattered ideas, his 
flashes of insight taken out of systemic context and applied to scattered data. Such 
ideas have a virtue of their own and may generate new hypotheses…Randomly 
distributed through some monstrous logical system, they resemble nourishing 
raisins in a cellular mass of inedible dough. The intuitions, not the tissue of logic 
connecting them, are what tend to survive in the field experience. 
 (Turner, 1975, p. 23) 
 
Following Turner’s metaphor of nourishing raisins, I intended to draw upon some of 
Butler’s insights as illuminating resources. I saw performativity as a “toolbox” of ideas 
(Petersen, 2012, p. 17) to access interpretations of  assumptions and views that I would not 
necessarily articulate otherwise (Davidoff et al., 2015). Through exploration of narrative 
interview interactions, I aimed to reframe uncertainties surrounding sense of self, its 
disruption, and agency, as a matters of positioning challenges and performativity, using 
these concepts to produce knowledge differently through the empirical data.  
 
Importantly, my application of ‘performativity’ is in line with Butler’s non-dramaturgical 
understanding, as discussed above, although the ‘performance’ of storytelling is an 
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important and related area of analysis – that is, creative use of communicative to 
intentionally present oneself by telling a certain type of story to the right audience in a 
way that establishes an identity (Hydén, 2010).  
 
The performative framing of this analysis, following Butler, opens up questions such as, 
“How do performative practices and expectations confront subjectivities in everyday life 
following brain injury?”. To expand on my rationale: if performative acts signify what a 
community takes to be ‘normal’, then those living with TBI may be signified, or ‘hailed’, as 
‘Other’ within a matrix of situated understanding. Following Butler’s application of 
Derrida’s ‘citation’ that precedes intention, I also seek understandings of ways in which 
stories have: 
 “a provisional existence as things outside of consciousness, waiting to shape nascent 
consciousness and then be repaid when that consciousness perpetuates the stories’ 
lives by retelling them”  
(Frank, 2018, p. 123). 
 
The amount of data, from ten dyadic interviews across two time points, precluded any 
attempt to read across the dataset using a theoretical application of performativity. In 
addition, an attempt to draw directly from all transcripts and field notes would risk 
decontexualised generalisations (Jackson and Mazzei, 2013). Instead, I followed Bamberg’s 
positioning analysis approach to brief moments of talk and interaction (2006), as 
described above. Rather than seeking stability or ‘narrative coherence’ in the data, I 
became drawn to data that seemed to contain tension or ‘trouble’. I considered myself part 
of the construction: 
“If the “I” of the participant is always becoming in the process of telling, so too the 
“I” of the researcher is always becoming in the process of researching, listening, and 
writing…[I therefore] seek to unsettle the “I” of both the researcher and researched 
[as] a static and singular subject.” 
 (Jackson and Mazzei, 2013, p. 268) 
 
By using Butler’s theory of performativity as a sensitising device, I explored ways of 
thinking that might help me to move away from a predictable understanding but offers 
one of many possible interpretations (Mazzei and McCoy, 2010).  Further, ‘my’ Butler will 
not be the same as applications of Butler that pre-exist this work, “for they have inevitably 






I listened to audio-recording of interviews several times, including simultaneous listening 
alongside reading and re-reading of transcripts and field notes. As I transcribed the 
interviews myself, I developed preliminary analytic ideas at that stage and built on those 
recorded in my field notes. The analytic steps did not proceed in a linear manner but 
instead occurred simultaneously and re-iteratively (Figure 2). My analysis was initially 
data-driven, attending to instances within talk-in-interaction rather than looking for the 
overall ‘meaning’ or identifying the ‘big’ story, for example, the speaker’s biography. While 
listening and reading, I considered links between each dyads’ interviews and identified 
instances of tellings and retellings.  The analytic unit shifted from the entity of a ‘story’ or 
a ‘speaker’ to the practices under joint construction in talk-in-interaction (Bamberg, 2011a, 
p. 107).  
 
The challenge of acknowledging emotional elements (e.g. intuition, frustration, empathy) 
within my analytic reasoning, introduced in Chapter 3, was to make sense of - and 
articulate and conceptualise – the emotional content that was sensed during interview 
interactions, and sometimes lingered for days after the event. I cognitively attended to 
particular moments from my experience of the interviews that resonated as having some 
particular significance - for example, a vague embodied feeling - which may have suggested 
a form of emotional influence (Skoggard and Waterston, 2015). Viewing emotions as 
“fundamentally relational” (White, 1994, p. 231), I attempted to get “a sense of and narrate 
the insinuated, the unsaid, and the unseen” (Stodulka et al., 2018, p. 521), which I reflected 
on through field notes and discussions with my supervisors. I argue that the processing 
and scrutinising of such feelings can offer additional ‘information’ and insights into co-
construction within social interactions, moving beyond the mere textually identifiable, the 
‘talked about’ (Beatty, 2013).  
 
In conceptualising analysis of emotion within qualitative research, Feldman and 
Mandache describe “emotional overlap” as moments when emotions of participants and 
researchers are uncovered and acknowledged, offering sites of epistemological reflection 
(p. 227). This overlap contrasts with analysis that is more typically focussed primarily on 
participants’ emotions, or pertains to researchers’ reflections on their own specific 
experiences during fieldwork (Feldman and Mandache, 2019, p. 230). I incorporate 
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examples of such moments of emotional overlap in the narrative of findings (Chapter 6) 
and I reflect on the challenges of doing so, in Chapter 7.  
 
When identifying fragments of talk, my analysis turned to the navigation of positioning 
outlined in Table 4 (levels of positioning analysis). Iteratively “moving back and forth 
between a set of observations and theoretical generalisations” (Tavory and Timmermans, 
2014, p. 4), I considered ways in which positions which are fragile, due to tensions and 
contradictions, and open to repeated negotiations between the self and others in the 
interaction. I further questioned potential assumptions within my interpretations by 
applying insights from Butler’s performativity. I considered processes whereby norms of 
everyday life were told and re-told, bringing the possibility for disruption when 
encountering tension between what may be expected or taken-for-granted and 
considering how this is navigated within talk-in-interaction. Figure 2 summarises my 













Through an open narrative approach to interview interaction and its analysis, I explored 
talk that was co-constructed within the interview by considering of positioning of the self, 
and positioning of/by significant others. Sense of self, unfolding in talk-in-interaction, 
might be crafted within conversation by participants, imposed by others, or both. I added 
constructs from Butler’s work on performativity to consider subjectivities that are fluid yet 
situated within social positions, norms and expectations. Using this application of 
performativity, I sought alternative understandings of agency that may provide a space for 
disruption of normative conceptualisations of self-management as a willed, individual act 






CHAPTER 6: Findings 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I commence by introducing the participants in the study. I then present 
extracts of talk that were co-constructed in the interviews across two time points, to 
consider the micro-processes in navigation of constancy and/or change following 
traumatic brain injury (Bamberg and Demuth, 2016).  
 
Through my application of positioning analysis (Table 4), I sought to explore participants’, 
and my own, navigation of positions within the power dynamic and social expectations of 
the interview between myself (identified as a researcher foremost, but also secondarily a 
clinician, which participants will have been aware of), the person identified as having TBI, 
and the person identified as their significant other. Especially, I sought to demonstrate the 
ways in which alternative identities may be called up and made relevant beyond the setting 
of the interaction, when talking about the ‘there and then’ in the ‘here and now’.   
 
Applying the analytic framework (Figure 2) during repeated listening to audio recordings 
alongside (re)readings of transcripts, I became aware of moments of  ‘emotional overlap’ 
between myself and participants (Feldman and Mandache, 2019). As described in Chapter 
5, these could comprise a range of fluctuating emotions, for example, frustration, unease, 
pride or pleasure. I particularly attended to the talk associated with such moments, which 
may have otherwise appeared unremarkable in textual content and yet could represent 
instances of work in navigating agentive positions. 
 
I do not employ a thematic approach to presentation of findings. Instead, I seek to retain 
the integrity and complexity of talk-in-interaction. Here, I present illustrative sequences 
of key extracts, indicating the approximate time interval between the episodes of talk to 
situate the extracts within different episodes of interaction with each dyad. I have written 
the analysis in the present tense, in keeping with the unfolding, generative nature of talk-
in-interaction. I use pseudonyms and include line numbers to refer to in my accompanying 
commentaries. I present the transcribed text in conventional written form with standard 
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punctuation to assist readability, acknowledging that transcription practices always 
represent authors’ interpretations and biases4.   
 
The participants 
Ten participants (five males and five females; age range 19 to 80), along with their chosen 
‘significant other’ person (parents (3)5 , siblings (3), spouses (2) or partners (3), took part 
in interviews in the south of England, between February 2016 and January 2018.  
 
When commencing this research, I considered that it would be important to record 
‘accurate’, ‘objective’ information on aspects of people’s injuries, details of their hospital 
admissions, interventions, lengths of stay, scales documenting extent of cognitive 
impairments and so on, in order to ‘describe the sample’. To illustrate the nature of these 
data: six people who took part had been clinically categorised as having ‘severe’ brain 
injuries (according to the parameter of Glasgow Coma Scale (GCS) recorded to be 8 or less, 
at  initial assessment (NHS England, 2017); as discussed in Chapter 1). By the time of the 
first interview, three participants would have been  categorised as  having ‘severe’ injuries, 
in terms of long term outcome assessed through the Glasgow Outcome Scale (GOS), where 
‘severe’ is identified as a permanent need for help with daily living (Jennett and Bond, 
1975).  
 
Over the course of the research, I have come to appreciate Medved’s observation about 
treating people as if  
“straightforwardly categorizable…there is much that challenges this neurological 
segregation, which all but ignores the sociocultural process undergirding the 
experience”  
(Medved, 2014, p. 91).  
 
These descriptions of people, relying on categories of impairments and deficits, are 
constructed within normative healthcare conventions of managing ‘the brain injury’. 
Although I collated clinical data (cognitive and communicative consequences of TBI for 
each participant are shown in Appendix 10, Table b), I have come to see these 
categorisations, and their dehumanising power (Foucault, 1973), as increasingly 
                                                          
4 Commas indicate short pauses and full stops indicate longer pauses. No sections of the extracts 
have been deleted. Laughter is indicated in square brackets and italics. 
 
5 One participant wished to include both parents in the first interview  
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problematic in this research. Instead of providing categorical descriptions and clinical 
characteristics, I introduce each person’s situation as I present them throughout this 
chapter. 
 
In the following analysis, I use a term from Butler’s work on subjectivity that is 
underpinned by the concept of interpellation - the call that ‘hails‘ people into an existence 
(Althusser, 1971). I present extracts of talk that move through the positioning challenge of 
a hail to ‘a person with brain injury’, followed by resistance to the hail through narrative 
resignification. I then illustrate navigation of an invisible position as a person with brain 
injury with ‘hidden disabilities’. Finally, I discuss co-constructed talk where kinship norms 
and practices are reiterated following TBI, presenting tensions and affordances in 
maintaining a desired sense of self within family interactions and as participants talk about 
encounters with healthcare professionals. I present an overview of the findings below 
(Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3 - Overview of findings 
 
Representing  findings from research interviews, as Back observes, involves  “making the 
social world hold still for its portrait [and] can seem like a gross violence, reducing its 
mutable flow to frozen moments” (2007, p. 17). In Figure 3, I emphasise an interrelated 
flow between the findings that I explore in the following section. My intention is to 
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illustrate the constant complexity of navigation processes; the co-construction and re-
construction of a desired sense of self. 
Analysis of talk-in-interaction 
 
The hail to ‘a person with brain injury’ 
When Claire fell down the stairs at a party, she was far from home. Transfers between 
healthcare settings followed her emergency admission to a trauma centre close by, yet 
access to local services did not happen smoothly. Claire and her sister Rachel talk about 
challenges the family navigated to secure the support they felt she would need after 
discharge. In the extract below, Claire talks about her participation in brain injury 
rehabilitation, which she ultimately attended as a day patient at a specialist neurological 
centre. She introduces this account by emphasising that she was “very grateful” to have 
finally accessed this support. The service intended to rehabilitate people living in the 
community following brain injury, through educational group sessions led by 
multisdisciplinary neurorehabilitation professionals. 
 
Claire: I never begrudge it, it has been core to my recovery, but the intensity of that, 1 
naturally, then puts the person with brain injury in a situation where you are not really 2 
dealing with the repercussions of the day to day of living with the brain injury.  3 
Because talking about it, you are constantly being reminded about it and it is discussed, 4 
trying to get an understanding. So, the intensity of that is quite a lot to take on.   5 
I have had different people, now I am independent, saying just like, “You are so negative, 6 
all you do now is talk about brain injury. Can’t you talk about something else?” 7 
You have to kind of step back and say to someone, “One, I am trying to come to terms 8 
with the fact that I nearly died. Two, I wasn’t getting that treatment but now it is all 9 
coming at once”, which I can never ever begrudge, and that is fundamental. So, you have 10 
got to understand that, three or four days, or a week, being in the hospital, again and again 11 
and again, talking about brain injury or recovery from brain injury. Well, naturally, that is 12 
all that is going to be in your head. Specifically, because you are a person with brain injury.  13 
 
Claire conveys tension between subject positions through her account of being “in the 
hospital, again and again and again” when attending the rehabilitation sessions (line 11-
12), contrasted with trying to manage in her everyday life (line 3).  She conveys an 
“intensity” of the period in which healthcare professionals seek to educate her about brain 
injury, which overwhelms her ability to incorporate this intended support into her way of 
being, outside those sessions. Her frustration is apparent, in trying to reconcile the 
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rehabilitation – which she conceives as specialist and “fundamental” – with her desired 
self as she interacts with others. She presents the tensions involved in being a person who 
is both required to talk about brain injury in the former context, whilst avoiding talk about 
brain injury, in the latter. Claire refers to the constant reminders from rehabilitation 
discourse, of an identity as someone who has a brain injury (line 4). In line 6, she describes 
that other people pick this identity up as her ‘new’ broken one, through the content of her 
talk that has been shaped by the reiterative focus of the brain injury sessions.  
 
Claire presents the positioning in healthcare encounters as “a person with brain injury” 
(line 13) as a frustration of her desire to get on with everyday life. She expresses her own 
desire to deal with the “repercussions” of the injury (line 3) while also wanting to put aside 
the position of being a “person with brain injury”, to continue a liveable life. Trouble arises 
from a subjectivity marked out by the way she has come to view herself as “a person with 
brain injury”. She portrays this position as constantly reinforced in the rehabilitation 
sessions, yet disconnected from the repetitions of acts that could otherwise constitute her 
preferred, “independent” sense of self (line 6). Claire continues: 
 
Claire: And the difficulty is then people don’t realise and they might just assume, “Oh 14 
look at her, she is depressed and whatever” and then they flip you to one side. And okay, 15 
there are some appropriate emotional coping mechanisms or whatever, but there is a real 16 
lack of understanding about the individual, of what the person is dealing with. Then it is 17 
difficult, because everyone with brain injury differs, because no one knows what anyone’s 18 
brain is like, it is the most complicated organ in anyone’s body, but there has to be some…  19 
Rachel: Well, I think, if I can come in, Claire, we know through family members who are 20 
a lot more sympathetic to Claire’s condition than others, and they have had to take the 21 
time to research it… 22 
Claire: Or sit down and talk… 23 
Rachel: Yeah, talk to you… 24 
Claire: Not become too inquisitive but just to ask, “Okay, how are you?” 25 
 
Claire’s apparent willful dismissal of healthcare professionals in line 16, by saying 
“appropriate emotional coping mechanisms or whatever”, demonstrates her perception of 
the rehabilitation clinicians’ approach as not her priority. Her sister, Rachel, begins to 
insert an account of family members’ support (line 20), yet for Claire this intervention 
seems to re-emphasise a category in which her ‘new’ situation is simply to be ‘researched’ 
through detached resources. Instead, she advances her preference; for others to seek a 
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supportive understanding through talking with her on a personal level (line 23). Claire’s 
resistance asserts that the ‘researching brain injury’ approach, presented by Rachel, cannot 
lead to an understanding which she considers could provide useful insights that open 
questions might achieve, like “…how are you?”, for instance (line 25). This mirrors her 
frustration with the brain injury rehabilitation sessions, in prioritising a narrative of deficit 
which could potentially obliterate other thoughts and identities, if that is “all that is going 
to be in your head” (line 13).  
 
 
Resignifying the hail  
Claire and Rachel go on to discuss characteristics of Claire’s speech since her injury. Since 
her hospital admission, areas of potential change have been brought into focus by family 
members and by clinicians. In the interaction below, Claire uses clinical terminology and 
an interpretation of what she may be experiencing, explaining that this identifies her as 
someone who needs to receive speech therapy. She shares a story of a friend, known to 
Rachel also, and apparently held in high regard for her complicated use of language:   
 
Rachel: You can do the majority of things, 98%, but there are certain things that she does 26 
ask, “Rachel, what does that, what word is that”” 27 
Claire: I have got asphasia 28 
Rachel: Yeah, dysphasia. And it’s not bad… 29 
Claire: It is in there somewhere, and I can give a description of what I want to exactly get 30 
to 31 
Rachel: And, “What’s that word?”, yeah 32 
Claire:  The word is there, but just not quite there, and that is part of the reason why I am 33 
going through the set of speech therapy  34 
Rachel: But it’s not bad, it’s just… 35 
Claire: I just come out with complicated jargon  36 
Rachel: Yeah [laughs], when she woke up from a coma she was speaking all this gobble-37 
de-gook, and it was like, all these fancy words, and it was like, okay, there is something up 38 
there… 39 
Claire: Yeah, but it goes back to my friend. She was always like that, it was like she was 40 
Mary Poppins, she was always very califragilistic 41 
Rachel: Swallowed a dictionary!  42 




Claire begins by citing a professional term but is corrected in her mispronunciation by 
Rachel (lines 28-29), who positions herself as the knowing witness (line 26). Frequently 
through the interaction, Rachel makes relevant her identity as Claire’s older (and wiser) 
sister. Rachel shares a description of Claire’s period of transition “from a coma” (line 37), 
recounting a time period for which Claire cannot report on herself. Claire then navigates 
the change in herself that is presented by Rachel as “speaking all this gobble-de-gook” (line 
37), instead creating a sense of mastery (for complicated jargon), which is then reinforced 
with an association with a valued, ‘(super)normal’ ability (califragilistic); an interpretation 
that is endorsed by the apparently erudite Rachel (line 42). 
 
Claire’s navigation of the trouble that arises, in being labelled as someone who has speech 
difficulties, demonstrates her resistance to this additional ‘hail’ to ‘a person with 
dysphasia’. In the subsequent interview, she demonstrates re-appropriation of the valued 
characteristic that she had attributed to their friend in her earlier telling: 
 
Nine months later… 
Claire: I guess you are always worried, is someone gonna notice the scars, are they going 44 
to immediately know from me that I have had a brain injury, because you are trying to 45 
assess, right, this is me before, this is me now, which is an interesting, um, exercise to do.  46 
Petra: What are some of the things you think about, when you think about that? 47 
Claire: Um, not being able to express myself, in the same way I was before. So really silly 48 
things, like remembering the words for something and, um, I know the word is in there 49 
somewhere but being able to identify what it is, and not have to say to someone, “What is 50 
that called again, I know it begins with A”. And then, even when you are trying to express 51 
yourself in conversation, it can be quite frustrating. 52 
But then, I don’t know if that is partially because my friend used to say I was like Mary 53 
Poppins, making up my own, like I had swallowed a dictionary, and making up own 54 
phrases, and words and stuff. So, I don’t know if it’s that, I don’t know if it has stemmed 55 
from that. 56 
 
Claire’s re-attribution of being “like Mary Poppins” (lines 41 and in the re-telling, line 53-
54), from her friend to herself, demonstrates that the ‘true’ owner of this characteristic is 
beside the point. This is a reiterative use of a story as a resource that transforms others’ 
labelling of her speech as problematic. Claire identifies that being like Mary Poppins is a 
positive characteristic, which is valued by others. In the first interview, Rachel endorses 
Claire’s telling of this story, but she is not present at the time when Claire returns to this 
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story with me in the second interview, suggesting potential influence of context on the 
telling.  Each time that Claire tells the story of someone being like Mary Poppins, she 
identifies with the enchanting, fictional character, thereby crafting continuity in sense of 
self. Through this citation, Claire re-presents a separate occurrence of the story as not 
quite what it was before.  
 
The Mary Poppins citation marks out Claire’s sense of self in a manner which others may 
more easily comprehend and relate to, and value on its own, while challenging a deficit 
narrative that has marked her as ‘a person with brain injury’, ‘with dysphasia’. Through 
reiterative telling and re-telling this story, Claire has been able to infuse herself with some 
magic and mystery, when positioned by others as someone who has ‘changed’ following 
her injury. Others’ accounts of Claire as ‘changed’ had begun without her conscious 
response “when she woke up from a coma” (line 37).   
 
Claire persists in advancing her sense of self throughout, by initially problematising the 
positioning she reports on from others, as someone who is “so negative” (line 6), only 
“talk[ing] about brain injury” and “speaking all this gobble-de-gook” (line 37), by finding 
a way of re-signifying the reported change as a valued aspect of herself. Through 
positioning herself actively, as the one who has always been “very califragilistic” (line 41), 
she undertakes  a project of selfhood in the face of some opposition,  advancing her “desire 
to persist in [her] own social being” (Butler, 2005, p. 44). 
 
Andy was admitted to the trauma centre after a stranger assaulted him in the street. Like 
Claire, he was discharged home directly from the surgical ward, without rehabilitation in 
an inpatient unit. However, he seemed reluctant to take up community-based 
rehabilitation services following discharge. Andy and his partner, Danielle, were expecting 
their first child at the time of his assault and their son, Leo, had been born shortly before 
my visit to their home for the first interview. Andy and Danielle talk about follow-up 
arrangements made after his discharge from the trauma centre: 
 
Andy: The hospital tried, sorted stuff out with [the brain injury day centre] and stuff. I 57 
was up for it, but I just want to forget everything that happened to me now. I just want to 58 
crack on with my life and with my kid and that. They arranged for me to come, I got a 59 
letter this morning from [the brain injury day centre]. I am going to give them a call and 60 
I’m not going to bother with it, to be honest.  61 
It would be sessions with other people with the same injury as me. It could help me, it 62 
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might help me. But I don’t really think that’s me, in a group. It might have helped me 63 
earlier, but not now. I feel like I’m a private person and I keep myself to myself.  Being 64 
around a lot of people I don’t know, I don’t want to be rude to people, but I want to keep 65 
to myself. I don’t want to engage with everyone, talking, like. 66 
 
Andy resists the service offered by the brain injury centre, initially highlighting that it 
would mean “sessions with other people with the same injury as me” (line 62). He suggests 
this is a category he does not wish to identify with, while also conceding a possibility that 
the service “could help me, it might help me” (lines 62-62). He goes on to position himself 
differently from “other people with the same injury as me” by instead prioritising expertise 
in his own sense of self: “I don’t really think that’s me” and “I’m a private person” (lines 63- 
64). His partner, Danielle, does not comment on Andy’s reluctance to attend these 
sessions at this point but, at the subsequent interview, she reopens the story, highlighting 
his independence and doggedness. 
 
Six months later… 
Danielle: We spoke last time about [the brain injury centre]. He didn’t go ahead with it, 67 
he didn’t want to be reminded of it all the time. 68 
Andy: I decided I just wanted to crack on with my life and not think about what happened 69 
to me. 70 
Danielle: You can’t force him into anything, just does what he wants to do. 71 
Andy: One of my mates works for the council, he said it is old people there. Not that I got 72 
anything against old people, but I wanted to just get confident with myself. 73 
Even when I was referred to fatigue clinic, I didn’t go to it. I just feel I like to be in my own 74 
environment, my home, and do normal life stuff, like a bit of shopping. I feel I just want 75 
to get my life back and not get involved with stuff like that. 76 
 
Here, Andy agrees with Danielle’s portrayal of his reluctance to attend the brain injury 
sessions, nuancing his own refusal of the injury as “[I] didn’t want to be reminded of it” 
(line 68). He goes on to introduce a further justification for distancing himself from “other 
people with the same injury as me” (line 62), highlighting that a difference in age, between 
himself and participants in the rehabilitation sessions, meant he would have even less in 
common with participants (line 72). This service feature has been pointed out to him by a 
valued peer, “one of my mates” (line 72). His conflicted positioning between “it might help 
me” (line 63) and wishing to “do normal stuff” (line 75) perhaps demonstrates frustration 
between an assumed passive role conferred by a health service making arrangements on 
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his behalf and his own desire for an agentive role to “do normal stuff”.  Andy further 
demonstrates his reluctance to engage with such arrangements when he adds, “even when 
I was referred to fatigue clinic, I didn’t go to it” (line 74). Here, his earlier rationalisations 
of group format and age categories of service users do not necessarily apply and, instead, 
he re-asserts his desire to independently “get my life back” (line 76). For Andy, getting 
back on track is at odds with the position to which he is repeatedly hailed, as someone 
attending brain injury services. He determines to “not get involved with stuff like that” 
(line 76). 
 
Though resisting the hail to ‘a person with brain injury’ by these services, Andy anticipates 
a normative clinical expectation of ‘compliance’ with their offerings (Dingwall, 2016). 
During our interactions, my sense was that Andy put forward rationalisations from a 
subject position ‘as a non-compliant patient’; as if speaking to a clinician. A ‘double-bind’ 
seems to operate in the communication from services, informing Andy of what has been 
arranged for him (Bateson et al, 1963; Gibney, 2006), thereby implying healthcare services 
know what is best for the “person with brain injury”. However, these arrangements require 
Andy to move away from his desired sense of self and instead “think about what happened” 
(line 66). Andy’s agenda instead is to integrate his activities within his own environment 
and “get confident with myself” (line 73). As a self-perpetuating medical convention, 
failure to comply with professional expectations in turn can be interpreted as ‘lack of 
insight’ and therefore ‘evidence’ of his identity being steeped in brain injury, in a further 
frustration to Andy’s desire to “crack on” with his desired sense of self (lines 59 and 69). 
 
At other times, Andy more explicitly hails me ‘as a clinician’ in our interactions, when 
putting forward particular ‘medical’ questions. During these discussions, I occupy 
positions as a researcher/a clinician/both, but also neither: as a guest in Andy and 
Danielle’s home and aware of my possible intrusion, at a delicate time soon after the birth 
of their son. When Andy asks, “Now that I have got this titanium plate, is that just as 
strong as the other side of the skull?” he demonstrates an openness to consider his injury, 
alongside his earlier reluctance to do so when talking about the brain injury centre and 
the fatigue clinic. He initiates this question on his own terms, not in response to a 
clinician’s expectation that he will think about it. In responding, my various subject 
positions carry ethical obligations, including the position I resist during the interviews, ‘as 
a clinician’, from which I responded ‘clinically’ to his question. Andy achieves a fluidity in 
the ways we can now interact with each other, demonstrating his navigation in these 




Andy goes on, in the second interview, to convey further significance of his own valued 
ways of being, in comparison with his avoidance of healthcare services’ priorities. Talking 
about home visits from an occupational therapist (OT), he re-signifies the interpellation 
to a subject position as ‘a patient’ and ‘a person with brain injury’ who would engage with 
such a service, instead constructing his own achievement of “doing normal life stuff” (line 
75) within the visits:   
 
Danielle: An OT came round 77 
Andy: Yeah, she come round and done a few little tests on my memory, little puzzles and 78 
stuff like that. She gave me a task to cook food and stuff. Like, I baked a cake. This was 79 
just to build my confidence and to do stuff myself in the kitchen, ‘cos I weren’t doing 80 
nothing. It was all right. She came weekly and the night before, I got an urge to bake a 81 
cake. She come round and er, yeah, I chose to do the cake.  82 
Danielle: One thing that ain’t changed with him is the cooking. He was only out a couple 83 
of weeks and he was cooking. 84 
Andy: I’ve always cooked, yeah. 85 
Danielle: The only thing that might stop him now is tiredness. 86 
Andy: From being indoors for a long time, that was my main highlight of the day, was to 87 
cook something. I tried to like, put a bit of passion into my cooking. I didn’t have nothing 88 
else to do. 89 
 
Andy appears to quickly dismiss the OT’s “few little tests on my memory, little puzzles 
and stuff” (line 78), instead sharing a story where he positions himself agentively in 
deciding to bake a cake. He bolsters this active role by portraying the assigned “task to 
cook food and stuff” (line 79) as almost incidental.  He emphasises: “I got an urge to bake 
a cake” and “I chose to do the cake” (lines 81-82), foregrounding his mastery in baking the 
cake on his own.  Danielle brings additional attention to the significance of this story being 
about more than Andy’s cake baking, instead bringing a sense of continuity for Andy and 
for their way of being together as “the thing that ain’t changed” (line 83). Danielle extends 
this continuity back to an earlier stage of recovery after his injury, on which he is unable 
to report himself: “He was only out a couple of weeks and he was cooking” (line 83-84). 
Cooking is a skill Andy and Danielle value, which they relate to as “always” present (line 
85), yet not as a mundane “task”. He connects his “passion” through cooking (line 88) to a 




Andy’s story gives a sense of reconnection with “the energy of life” (Bamberg, 2010, p. 12), 
contrasting with his earlier talk about the fatigue clinic in which there was a sense of being 
weighed down; not wanting to “get involved with stuff like that” (line 79). Following brain 
injury, fatigue is commonly considered to be “one of the sequelae that pose the greatest 
challenge to self-efficacy and limit social participation” (Dumont et al, 2004, p.431). For 
Andy, reiterative actions through which he claims some degree of power over this 
immediate situation, illustrated here by cooking, achieves a continuity for Andy that has 
linearity to before the injury, becoming particularly meaningful for his identity at a time 
when he “didn’t have nothing else to do” (line 88). He reflects on the steps (achieved 
without the clinic’s intervention), saying: “I used to avoid going places, but now I am just 
getting up and doing it. The only way to conquer something is to get up and face it.” 
 
Ruby found her husband, Walter, unconscious at the bottom of the stairs, following a fall. 
He was admitted to the trauma centre and, after a prolonged hospital admission, he 
returned home. Ruby took early retirement to be at home to assist Walter. They have 
support from their daughters and their daughters’ partners, who live nearby. Ruby and 
Walter talk about a group run by a local brain injury charity that they have been attending 
together: 
 
Ruby: Another thing Walter enjoys, he doesn’t remember these things, I have to remind 90 
him, but we are still in touch with the brain injury group and he does like going to those 91 
get-togethers. He is in his element and he can talk for as long as he likes. They are all, you 92 
know. Used to be every month, and everybody knows everybody.  93 
Walter: They have got people [at the centre where the group meet], I was going to say they 94 
have got people with my complaint, but, er, it is not my complaint, it is my, um, exotic 95 
thing. You know, they talk and you can tell, when they talk, how they get on with people. 96 
And if you can get on with people like me, it’s good. For them, and for me. I don’t talk 97 
much about problems, I don’t like to talk to people about problems because, er, I don’t 98 
like to admit I have got any problems. But, er, it is nice to know what they are doing and 99 
sometimes you hear about some hobby they have got, and you have never met anyone 100 
with that hobby before. And it is interesting, what you can study and can enjoy yourself.  101 
Throughout our discussions, Ruby reiteratively uses language of foreclosure that 
constitutes Walter as a subject “through a certain kind of pre-emptive loss” (Butler, 1997, 
p. 23). For example, she points out to me, “they are all, you know…” with reference to “the 
brain injury group” (line 92-93). To accept a subject position means recognition of 
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language as self-description, as if to respond “Here I am” (Foth, 2013, p. 121). However, 
Walter repeatedly resists Ruby’s hail as a ‘person with brain injury’, instead naming the 
injury his “exotic thing” (line 95). He brings valued aspects to the fore, such as finding 
personal interest in talking with others at the group.  Walter and Ruby’s meaning-making 
of him as a person with ‘an exotic thing’ or ‘a person with brain injury’ differ, yet they co-
construct continuity through reference to Walter’s characteristic of getting on with 
people. In the second interview, Walter and Ruby go on to discuss their differing 
approaches to interactions with others: 
Six months later… 
Walter: When I meet people, I don’t worry about them getting the wrong attitude or the 102 
wrong view, because you can talk to anyone and for some reason or other they get this 103 
wrong view, and don’t treat you the right way.  But, you know, you can put up with it 104 
because you think to yourself, ‘Well, some people are like that, I’ll have to put up with 105 
them and, you know, make allowances for them’. 106 
Ruby:  I don’t want people to think any wrong of him.  I want them to realise that, and 107 
I’m at great pains to explain to people as well, that he does understand what you’re saying 108 
and if he uses the wrong words, because sometimes when people don’t know and he uses 109 
the wrong words, they start laughing.  And I’ll say he’s got this, because of the brain injury, 110 
he’s got this problem where he tends to use the wrong words.  So, he knows what he wants, 111 
he knows what he’s saying and he does understand it, so I go to great pains to explain this 112 
to people.  113 
The children are different.  Joy does a lot more with him, and she won’t…  She’ll just let 114 
him and she says whatever happens, happens. Or however they take him, that’s it. Because 115 
Joy is very much of the same sort of ilk as her Dad, so it doesn’t matter to her what people 116 
think, you know. 117 
 
In contrast to Walter’s description of his injury, saying “it’s not my complaint” (line 95), 
Ruby points out, twice, that she feels at “great pains” (lines 108 and 112) to explain to others 
“his problem”, “because of the brain injury” (line 110-111). Ruby goes on to position herself 
differently from her daughter, in being more concerned about the injury and perceptions 
of others. She aligns her daughter instead with Walter, acknowledging that, for them both, 
it “doesn’t matter what people think” (line 116). Walter acknowledges that Ruby’s view of 
his interactional abilities differs from his own, and he is the one who then goes on to 
resolve potential trouble arising from their different views. Instead, he reworks the 




Walter: I don’t think I have problems, except I’m not allowed to do things I am fit to do. 118 
But people who treat me like that cannot be blamed, because of regulations they are 119 
looking at. And they don’t want to spoil things or do things wrong way, so they treat me 120 
what they think is nicely, even though I think I am fitter and should be able to ignore it. I 121 
just say to myself, ‘That is how it is, I don’t think I can change things, it can create problems 122 
and difficulties’. I don’t want that, don’t want difficulties and problems. 123 
 
Walter demonstrates that when he goes along with restrictions, he allows “people” -
indirectly referring to Ruby - not to feel she will “spoil things” according to the 
“regulations” that frame her support for him (line 119-120). He suggests that to confront or 
“blame” people [Ruby] for not allowing him to do things could open up unknown 
“problems and difficulties” (line 122), which lie outside their familiar ways of being 
together. Walter’s positions himself actively, even when presenting his submission to “not 
being allowed to do things” (line 118), as he avoids potential disruption in their daily life. 
 
Navigating an invisible position  
Claire (introduced earlier, with her sister Rachel) is anxious that her brain injury might be 
apparent, saying that she is “always worried [others are] going to immediately know from 
me that I have had a brain injury” (line 45). She navigates the invisibility, or hidden 
identity, of being ‘a person with brain injury’ and yet wonders how she might be perceived 
by others, if they “notice the scars” (line 44). Claire and Rachel go on to discuss 
contradictory expectations from others: 
 
Rachel: People will say, “Claire is okay, she looks brilliant” 124 
Claire: “She looks fantastic” 125 
Rachel: And we will say, “Yes, she may look okay, but she is not” 126 
Claire: She is not, she is still really in a lot of recovery 127 
Rachel: And why don’t they take the time? I would never say that to anyone, and how can 128 
people be so shallow? But they are. 129 
Claire: I think that is general 130 
Rachel: Yeah, ‘cos I am 41, I am not married, just to give an example, and it’s all things 131 
like, “Why aren’t you married, why haven’t you got kids?” Well, I haven’t. And what I’m 132 
saying is, that is just a judgement. But people feel free to make the judgement. Nobody 133 
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knows what is actually going on, maybe you were divorced, maybe you can’t have children, 134 
but as a person, I would never say that to anyone. People need to be careful what they say 135 
to you. 136 
Claire: And that is the thing, with a blind disability, that people do make assumptions. 137 
People do make the assumptions. 138 
Rachel: Sometimes, it’s society, “Oh, this is what you…” 139 
Claire: That is different though, that is just about life 140 
Rachel: No, it’s because Claire looks well and they see that she, well, they think they see 141 
that she does the things she used to do. And they think she is better, but she is not. 142 
 
Claire speaks about herself in third person, positioning herself alongside her family in how 
they might explain her situation to others, and perhaps demonstrating to Rachel how to 
do it: “She is still really in a lot of recovery” (line 127). Rachel then attempts to extrapolate 
Claire’s dilemma of others assuming they know what is going on, when “shallow” people 
cannot see below the surface (133). Interestingly, Claire refers to a “blind disability” here 
(line 137), when talking about others’ inability to appreciate her situation (she is later 
corrected to say “hidden disability” by Rachel).  
 
Rachel shares her own example of others’ assumptions in relation to their normative 
expectations of marriage, which she apparently finds confronting (line 132). However, 
Claire resists Rachel’s implication that this comparison shares similarity to her own 
situation, saying “that is different though” (line 140). She suggests her own experience 
cannot be understood through Rachel’s observations, which she dismisses as “just about 
life” (line 144). For Claire, Rachel’s story does not resonate with the unresolved liminality 
for her of “the fact that I nearly died” (line 9).   
 
Talking about reactions of her work colleagues, Claire continues to talk about ways that 
others’ responses can be confronting. Here, she distances herself from the character in her 
telling: 
 
Claire: You are going to bump into people in the office who come out with strange things, 143 
saying things like, “Have you still got a brain?” 144 
Rachel: They did actually say that to her, and “Have you got a memory?” 145 
Claire: Yeah, “Have you got a memory?” and all of that sort of stuff 146 
Rachel: And these people are supposed to be educated  147 




In Claire and Rachel’s account, Claire’s identity coherence is disputed by colleagues. Her 
private experience is rendered social, through a foreclosed identification that implies a 
loss of self-as-brain. This unliveable position, in an “exclusionary matrix”  (Butler, 1993, p. 
3), is created through the force of speech acts that bring expectation of an identity 
drastically spoiled: “Have you still got a brain?” (line 144).  
 
Positive positioning, of a desirable self, preserves ‘face’ in situations of difficulty or 
potentially ‘spoiled’ identities  (Goffman, 1967). Rachel’s offering of her own example of 
“people need to be careful what they say to you” (line 135) perhaps demonstrates her desire 
to ‘share’ face with Claire, in the context of the interview. Resisting the attempt, “that is 
different” (line 140), Claire echoes her earlier assertion that she is dealing with “a real lack 
of understanding about the individual, of what the person is dealing with” (lines 16-17).  
Her description of “people in the office who come out with strange things” (line 143) 
further demonstrates more explicitly that, to give an account of herself, she requires others 
who are prepared to listen to her while developing some form of shared understanding of 
her private experience. She portrays this as clearly absent in her colleagues, dismissed 
through her comment “that it is the most outstanding thing”, that they are “supposed to 
be educated” (line 147-148). 
 
Claire’s navigation of her position in isolation from work colleagues is also suggested in 
relation to her parents, her older brother, and Rachel. However, here she presents her 
sense of being marginalised and struggling to be heard in the family as a continuous 
experience over time, since childhood: 
 
Claire: Being the youngest in the family anyway, I was never really listened to. Because I 149 
was the youngest, I didn’t know anything. So, then that as well, I think, has probably fed 150 
into that there is no point me saying anything, because I probably won’t be listened to, 151 
really, and that is just family dynamics, or whatever it may be.  152 
 
For Claire, overlapping positions of difference between herself and her family come from 
normative expectations of ‘being the youngest in the family’, and also of being ‘the one 
with brain injury’. During the second interview, Claire describes conflict between her 
family’s concerns and her own expectations for herself:  
 
Claire: [My family] are compounding my anxiety because, (a), “What are you doing? 153 
118 
 
Where are you going? But you can’t do that unless you go there now” and blah, blah, blah. 154 
And it is just them trying to establish their own confidence, and lessen fear, but it is very 155 
difficult then, ‘cos it makes it twice as bad. I think there is also a factor of living at home 156 
and being a 32-year-old adult, and not having my own independence. Um, because my 157 
parents, on their own, are generally quite full on, if you want to say that. They always were. 158 
 
Claire conveys a sense that she has always struggled to develop a sense of independent self 
as the youngest in the family and in the face of “full on” parents (line 158). She recreates a 
sense of continuity within the “family dynamics” (line 152) as it has always been, rather 
than as ‘a person with brain injury’. 
 
For Andy, who lives away from his parents with Danielle and his son (introduced earlier), 
his concern is to navigate an ‘invisible position’ while actively managing his parents’ 
impression of him as someone who is coping just as he did before his injury: 
 
Andy: I don’t want my parents to worry about me, I don’t want them to know. It’s 159 
probably, erm, I don’t want them to think I am, I don’t know, what is the word? I don’t 160 
want them to know, if I am going through anxiety.  161 
Petra: You’re aware of that, when you’re talking to them? 162 
Andy: Yeah 163 
 
This moment brings emotional significance, marked out by a long silence (more than five 
seconds), in which I sense the tension that arises for Andy and Danielle as we discuss this 
topic. His negotiation of his sense of self, when interacting with his parents, is revealed in 
a way which, it seems, Danielle has not previously seen. After this pause, Danielle asks 
Andy: 
 
Danielle: Do you do it to me? 164 
Andy: [Further pause] No. 165 
Danielle: How you are, you, you would tell me? 166 
Andy: Yeh 167 
 
Danielle is concerned that the facework portrayed in Andy’s management of interaction 
with his parents as he says, “I don’t want them to know…if I am going through anxiety” 
(line 161), is something that maybe he ‘does to her’ also (line 164). This is a moment 
potentially marking out distancing within their couplehood, now as parents themselves. 
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She goes on to comment, “I think, deep down, his parents do know, they know what he is 
going through”. Here, Danielle positions herself alongside his parents in their deep 
knowing of Andy. She does not disrupt his desired sense of self, or their shared way of 
being together, as she pulls off a complex navigation of their collective positioning. 
Danielle maintains their mutual interdependence, in a narrative move that also suggests 
its precariousness. 
 
Reiterations of kinship practices 
Monte was completing a postgraduate degree as an overseas student in Oxford, when a 
motorcyclist hit him on a pedestrian crossing. His family live in America and his younger 
sister, Florianne, was the one who flew to England to be with him, after they heard of his 
hospital admission. Monte and Florianne describe the early stages after his admission to 
the trauma centre: 
 
Monte: It is funny as I still had some logic in me. I asked Florianne, “What are you doing 168 
here, weren’t you in the States?”. And she said “Yes”, and I said, “So you came the entire 169 
way here?”.  She was like, “Yes”. And I’m like “Oh my god, I must be really fucked up, I 170 
must be really in real bad shape”, you know? These were the small things that made me 171 
realise that this is really serious.  172 
 
Monte begins this telling with “It is funny” (line 168), marking this account out as a 
significant resource in making sense of “small things that made me realise that this is really 
serious” (line 171) soon after his injury, while still in hospital. Monte applies this story as a 
resource about a time that he cannot remember, for which he accepts the account he has 
been given by his sister, demonstrated as he says “I guess I realised that [Florianne had 
come over from the US] on the spot, for like fifteen minutes of realising it, but after that I 
don’t remember that interaction at all”.  
 
In Monte’s accounts of later stages after his discharge, he constructs a sense of continuity 
in self, through the family’s natural way of being together, and contrasts this with the 
autonomous, distanced life he sought to return to: 
 
Monte: While I am here [in Oxford], I’ve got to deliver, constantly delivering something, 173 
or fighting for something, for my place, fighting for my art, fighting for my name. When I 174 
go there [home, in America], I think that’s also about the idea of disconnecting, you just 175 
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drop your gloves, you eat well, eat better, just get the love. And to know that you are going 176 
back, it gives you energy, you know. 177 
 
Monte presents the comfort of his home life through reiterations of kinship in which 
embodied practices cultivate an idea of family; he can “just get the love” (line 176). By 
contrast, the life to which he seeks to return presents constraints of a position where he is 
“constantly delivering something” (line 173). Monte constructs a sense of self 
performatively, as he and his family repeatedly act in ways they perceive to be ‘natural’ for 
them in being together.  
 
Monte: I would always go to my grandmother first, because everybody, we were all dealing 178 
with that, it wasn’t just me, when she died two months ago. So, we were all supporting 179 
each other, in that sense. And I am, er, a stone, for a lot of people in my family. So, 180 
regardless of my tiredness, I still had to be, to be there.  181 
Petra: You were saying it took a while before you re-found your voice in your roles here 182 
[in England]. How about your voice at home, did that seem different? 183 
Monte: Yes, yes, yes, yes. Definitely, I think that’s why, um, going home was important, 184 
or having a place where you don’t have, or you don’t need, that warrior voice, you know, 185 
because it has to rest also, you know. This voice of, like, “You’re gonna make it!”, this voice 186 
also needs to rest. When you go home, well, you get that rest, because you don’t need to 187 
fight for nothing. 188 
 
Monte portrays acceptance of his need for family in a life where he otherwise “fought” for 
autonomy. Back at home, where “you don’t have, or you don’t need, that warrior voice” 
(line 185), Monte moulds a sense of self that is intimately connected to performative 
dimensions of belonging and residence. The sense of mutual constancy this provides is 
conveyed by his metaphor of being “a stone for a lot of people in my family” (line 180). In 
bringing to the fore his sense of reliability within family ways of being, effects of the injury 
become almost irrelevant: “regardless of my tiredness, I still had to be, to be there” (line 
181). Monte negotiates this subjectivity not only in, but through, his sense of home (Brown 
and Knopp, 2003). His stories of everyday life back at home with family allow him to 
convey an identity that also allows disconnection from expectations of the lone self: 
“You’re gonna make it!” (line 186).  
 
Andy (introduced in earlier sections with his partner, Danielle) demonstrated his desire 
to “get confident with [him]self” in his familiar routines within his home environment, 
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which appears to be key for Andy in claiming a confident sense of self (line 76). In the 
weeks after his discharge from the trauma centre, he awaited surgery for the repair of his 
skull defect (resulting from emergency neurosurgery at the time of his initial admission 
with TBI). He had been advised to wear a protective helmet when going outdoors, until 
the surgery to place the titanium plate had taken place. His partner, Danielle, highlights 
the impact this had for both of them: 
 
Danielle:  At first it was really hard, he had to wear a helmet. Like your whole life, you 189 
find you’re just indoors all the time, you can’t really go out as much, obviously because of 190 
his confidence and the way people were looking and him explaining all the time, what had 191 
happened.  192 
 
The potential for impact on Andy’s confidence from “the way people were looking” (line 
185), identifies the helmet as a ‘social object’ that is defined by norms of social phenomena 
and regulates interactions (Mead, 1967). Danielle presents the helmet as an out-of-place 
object that needs “explaining all the time” (line 191), suggestive of contravening a public 
norm in which the “’normal’ healthy body is a moral obligation” (Oakley, 2007, p. 117). The 
helmet, as a co-constitutive agent, produces a certain type of ‘not normal’ subject. Through 
a mutual relationality with the helmet, Andy loses the ‘invisibility’ of TBI that he has when 
not wearing it inside the home and, Danielle suggests, he loses confidence (line 191). 
 
Andy’s goes on to suggest further meaning that is endowed in the helmet, through its 
production of previously unimagined subjectivities, when positioning Danielle as intimate 
carer for Andy:  
 
Andy: Danielle had to help me in the bath and stuff, because I was weak and I couldn’t 193 
afford to fall over. I had the helmet and stuff, but I took it off before I got in the bath.  194 
 
Here, Andy tells a story in which he is vulnerable: “I was weak” (line 193), even “reduced 
to the object of body work” (Twigg et al., 2011, p. 215) in requiring his Danielle’s help 
bathing. He foregrounds the helmet, whose materiality seems to exert a performative 
force, producing “the effect of boundary, fixity’’ (Butler, 1993, p. 9) between vulnerable 
Andy and his stronger, more confident self. Danielle continues her account of their home 
life in these months between Andy’s initial discharge from the trauma centre and his later 





Danielle: That is another thing we haven’t mentioned: Titan [their dog]. If it weren’t for 195 
him, you said he was… 196 
Andy: I had two rocks, him and my partner, to keep me going. I didn’t walk him for about 197 
four months. My partner used to take him, ‘cos I didn’t have the strength in me. He is 198 
quite a strong dog, he pulls. And I was worried, ‘cos I had my helmet on, I was worried he 199 
would pull, and I would fall. After that, I started to do it again. Bit of fitness for me, to walk 200 
him twice a day.  201 
 
Andy highlights everyday embodiment (habits of the body) between himself and Titan - 
disrupted during the four months while Andy had to wear the helmet when going 
outdoors, and then reinstated when Andy reclaims a desired sense of self that is no longer 
bounded by the helmet. The story about Titan is marked out as an important shared 
resource by Danielle, as she introduces it saying, “That is another thing we haven’t 
mentioned” (line 195). Andy positions Titan as “a strong dog” (line 199) in contrast with 
the vulnerability of himself as a character in telling of the months when he had the helmet, 
a time when “I didn’t have the strength in me” (line 198). Instead of the dog, Andy positions 
himself as the dependant one. However, these valued stories - concerning shifts between 
Andy, Titan and Danielle - constitute the reiterations of kinship that keep him going (line 
197), even when shared daily practices are disrupted by the need to wear a helmet. 
 
Versions of the self  
Chloe was holidaying with her friends from sixth form when she fell from a lakeside jetty, 
banging her head on a rock. Her admission to intensive care was followed by treatment 
on a neurosurgical ward, before her transfer to an inpatient neurorehabilitation unit. By 
the time of the first interview, she was living back at home with her parents and returning 
to her studies in Arts and Drama. Chloe, her father Aaron and her mother Maria describe 
family life since Chloe’s discharge: 
 
Aaron: Having been through the hospital, I think you came out with less inhibitions about 202 
yourself, and you were quite relaxed about yourself 203 
Maria: That’s true 204 
Aaron: And you almost had a strong self-confidence. It was almost like there was nothing 205 
much more that was going to phase you, really 206 
Chloe: It definitely puts, it shifts perspective, I guess, and um, yeah, I kind of feel like I 207 
came out with that as well. And it does, when you go through something that, er, shocking, 208 
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or, there are little things that seem like such a big deal, especially in sixth form, you know, 209 
there is lots going on between friendship groups. And I think that sort of lost its 210 
importance in my head, once I had sort of gone through that. I definitely viewed people 211 
more, not viewed people more critically, but felt I could have more understanding, of why 212 
people acted the way they did, or, I don’t know 213 
Petra: A different perspective? 214 
Chloe: Yeah, definitely had a different perspective. Not necessarily one that shifted who I 215 
was friends with, or what I did, but it just gave me a different insight into, just life really 216 
Maria:  So, when did you, um, the other thing you talked about is that you’ve started to 217 
feel more under pressure, in a way that you hadn’t before? 218 
Chloe: Yeah, I think that I noticed it more this year, in terms of the work that we had to 219 
do, and it was, you know, I was definitely more aware of it, but I definitely had, my 220 
confidence had been more knocked in terms of my work than it ever had been straight 221 
after my accident. Because then, there was that confidence thing. 222 
 
Aaron positions Chloe in an active position, saying she “had a strong self-confidence” 
following the accident (line 205). This acts against a dominant healthcare narrative during 
her admission, in which the family were informed of “a bleak outlook”. Chloe was at a 
stage of transition from sixth form to university, and from living with her parents to living 
independently, at the time of her injury; a phase of young adulthood commonly seen as a 
time of change, associated with expectations that “disruption to a sense of self and life-
context that is already somewhat fragile may be all the more devastating” (Saunders, 2017, 
p. 12). By contrast, Chloe elaborates that she has identified an ability to form different 
insights to those of her peers (line 211), presenting a positive component of coping with 
change while maintaining a sense of consistency, for example “not changing who I was 
friends with” (line 216). 
 
Chloe’s mother, Maria, alters the course of the discussion between Aaron and Chloe (line 
217). Maria again brings Chloe’s self-confidence to the fore, but now inserts a question that 
opens up considerations of potentially negative impacts on her confidence (line 217).  
Throughout our discussions, Maria frequently positions herself as ‘interviewer’, asking 
Chloe questions or prompting areas she might expand on, illustrated as she uses the 
narrative scaffold: “the other thing you talked about is…” (line 217). In addition, this 
opening, created by Maria, exposes the conditionality of my ‘researcher’ role, shifting the 
dynamics of our relational positions. Here, I became an observer to shifting family 
“narrative environment” (Hydén, 2017, p. 116), in which Maria appears to nuance an 
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established family narrative that positions Chloe as someone who is “confident” and 
“relaxed”. Instead, Maria tentatively questions the limits of this shared narrative, 
introducing the prompt that Chloe has been feeling “more under pressure” (line 218).  
Avoiding a direct contradiction with a narrative that Chloe is someone who has started to 
appear less confident, she attempts to frame this assertion collaboratively. This allows 
Chloe to reflect herself that, indeed, her high level of “confidence had been more knocked” 
(lines 221). In such moments, subtle shifts – rather than rupture – iteratively occur in the 
family narrative, through which Maria seeks insights into sources of trouble arising, which 
have not been explicitly shared in our discussion. These shifts perhaps accommodate her 
own uncertainties ‘as a parent’, as suggested by her later comment, “We were given quite 
specific advice from the Neuropsychologist…about Chloe not going back to sixth form 
when she did. I felt irresponsible as a parent”. 
 
During the second interview, Chloe talks openly about her feelings of anxiety, for example, 
saying “I kept looping back to, ‘Have I permanently damaged my brain [by returning to 
study too soon]?”. She describes steps she is taking to manage her anxiety and her return 
to study. She continues her earlier storyline of seeing her situation differently from typical 
worries of her peers and goes on to describe a critical opening in how she views her 
situation, when supporting her friend Lola in her struggles with anxiety: 
 
Six months later… 
Chloe: I think in terms of anxiety or depression or mental health, it’s about being able to, 223 
in the way that me and Lola have been giving each other advice, and knowing that we 224 
should give it to ourselves.  225 
 
Chloe expands this line of thinking by talking about ways that acting (in plays) enables 
her to gain “different insights” (line 15), echoing her earlier positioning of difference from 
peers, in appreciating broader perspectives about sixth form troubles that are “just life, 
really” (line 15). 
 
Chloe: I think it is, you know, that benefit of stepping outside yourself for a bit and seeing 226 
it from someone else’s perspective or being someone else. Um, I think it can be just really 227 
useful and at the same time, in building confidence, and um, at the same time just having 228 




Her narrative line of looking at her situation through a different lens from her peers is a 
useful device for Chloe in “building confidence” (line 228) and also suggests her desire to 
distance herself from a dominant clinical and “medicated” (line 229) framing of her 
emotions. Instead, she stories the building of her confidence through ways she is able to 
“step outside herself”, in relation to peers’ struggles and not be “left behind” in the social 
world a young adult (Harries et al., 2019, p. 10). She resets the family’s version of Chloe as 
someone who will be “confident” - even in the face of the family’s uncertainty. She 
incorporates the fragility exposed by Maria (line 216) while positioning herself as someone 
who is still able to “just have fun as well.” (line 217). 
 
Brenda and Derek had moved to warden-controlled accommodation eight years before 
Brenda’s injury. They had been managing everyday activities without external help, 
though each had been experiencing mobility difficulties due to arthritis. They were both 
still driving, but Derek had sold his own car some years previously, following his 
retirement. Brenda had been driving them both in her car for short trips locally, until 
Brenda fell while they were at the shopping centre, banging her head on the concrete floor. 
She was admitted to the trauma centre and then transferred for inpatient rehabilitation in 
a specialist unit. At the time of the first interview, Brenda’s car was still parked outside 
their ground floor flat, visible from her armchair through the window in the living room. 
By the time of my second visit, eight months later, Brenda’s car had been sold, following 
medical advice that she should not return to driving after her injury. Over the course of 
our two discussions, Brenda and Derek return to talk about their cars and about driving.  
 
Derek: Her biggest sorrow, though, is losing her car 230 
Brenda: Well, I think I’m going to lose it but it’s not definite yet 231 
Derek: It’s stuck out there. We can’t move it, because the battery is flat. I can drive but I 232 
haven’t got a car now, we didn’t want two. We got rid of the big one and we kept the little 233 
one, just to run about in. But now this has happened, we can’t do that.  234 
 
Eight months later… 
Petra: So, you were saying the car has gone now? 235 
Brenda: Yes, isn’t that terrible? I didn’t expect really, not to drive. I thought once I got 236 
better, I would drive. But even looking out there, I always see the car standing there. Even 237 
now, when I open the blinds in the mornings, my first instinct is the car. And of course, it 238 
has gone. Then I think, “Oh, you silly woman!” 239 
Petra: You’re so used to seeing it there  240 
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Derek: The thing is, Tetra [sic], it was like protection to her, when she saw her car there, 241 
that was it. Now she can see an open gate and anyone can come in straight to our door 242 
and break in. That’s what she is thinking.  243 
Petra: Oh, you think it’s… 244 
Derek: Yes, it’s so open now. It wasn’t with our car standing there 245 
Brenda: I do miss it 246 
Derek: ‘Cos mine used to stand there as well, and I had a big merc, didn’t I 247 
Brenda: Mmm 248 
Derek: So, that used to stand there and give her a little satisfaction. Mine went first, 249 
because I worked abroad for a few years and it was just standing there, wasting away. And 250 
it was a lovely car, beautiful car.  251 
 
[Derek leaves the room to make tea; Brenda continues] 
Brenda: I miss that car more than I realised, now it has gone. Still, never mind, what can 252 
you do? Things alter, don’t they?  253 
Petra: You had a lot of good times with that car? 254 
Brenda: Yeah, it was wonderful.  I just used to jump in and drive, clear off to the coast or 255 
clear off somewhere else. All that has gone. Perhaps it would have gone anyway, ‘cos I am 256 
getting older.  257 
 
Derek positions Brenda as passive and vulnerable, in his portrayal of her car as a physical 
barrier, “like protection to her” (line 241). Brenda appears to adhere to his narrative 
scaffold, initially deploying a co-construction strategy of compliance by simply saying “I 
do miss it” (line 246). However, she subsequently shifts to a more agentive position when 
he leaves the room, exposing apparently suppressed resistance to his account. With Derek 
gone, her pleasure erupts as she tells me of her thrill in driving for its own sake, as she 
recollects, “I just used to jump in and drive” (line 255). In place of the subordinate 
passenger, Brenda takes pleasure in telling her story of her liberty to “clear off to the coast” 
(line 255). She brings forward a subversive challenge to the masculine notion of driving 
and Derek’s framing of the car as static protection, a physical blockade. Instead, she uses 
driving to symbolise independence and choice (Charmaz, 1983). Her shift, with Derek out 
of earshot, suggests at least ambiguity about the shared construction of their relationship 
with (and through) cars.  
 
In the second interview, Derek introduces a story suggestive of further shifts in their 




Derek: She has conveniently forgotten a woman’s job in life, laundry and washing-up, 258 
which has done her a favour actually, because now it is up to me to do washing and cooking 259 
Brenda: Well, I think I have taken on a, a part of me just doesn’t work the same way as it 260 
did [laughs] 261 
Derek: Well, certainly not 262 
Brenda: Still, never mind. I’m better than I was. 263 
Petra: So, with the washing and things… 264 
Brenda: Oh, Derek does that. I’ll wash a top myself if I want it for a couple of days’ time, 265 
but I can’t seem to take on anything big. I can immediately feel myself sort of withdrawing.  266 
Petra: Why do you think that is? 267 
Brenda: I don’t know. I’ve never had it explained to me. Because, I always did all the 268 
laundry, and all the ironing, ironed all his shirts and everything.  269 
Derek: [Talking at same time, inaudible] 270 
Brenda: I never iron a shirt now 271 
Derek: I hate ironing. Do you like ironing? 272 
Petra: I hate ironing [laughs] 273 
Derek: Oh, ‘cos I’ve got a couple of shirts [laughs]. I’m trying to pass it on! 274 
Brenda: Well, we do get by, sometimes it is a bit muddly. I was sort of so efficient, even if 275 
I say it myself, when I did all that. And I went to work as well, didn’t I. 276 
 
Derek explicitly presents gendered norms in remarking on “a woman’s job in life, laundry 
and washing-up” (line 258), explaining that he now does this this gendered work and 
framing this as a convenience for Brenda (line 259). He positions himself as someone who 
‘knows what is really going on’ in his interpretation of Brenda’s withdrawal from tasks, 
which now comprise his work of caregiving, yet are “intimately bound with female 
identity” (Ribeiro et al., 2007, p. 303). When Derek asks me, “Do you like ironing?” (line 
270), he again invokes the idea of “a woman’s job in life”, further exerting symbolic 
violence, where “the other is dehumanised or rendered deferential” (Brady and Schirato, 
2010, p. 141). His words exert a power that disrupts the research interview by exposing 
taken-for-granted identity distinctions. ‘Saving face’ - my credibility as a researcher and 
guest in their home - I find myself colluding with rather than challenging this narrative 
trajectory, in my apparently compliant echoing of Derek’s words: “I hate ironing” (lines 




There were other times during my visits that I felt aware of Derek’s intrusive control. He 
sought to choreograph the interview situation in alignment with his dominant (gendered) 
scaffolding of narration.  He insisted on taking my bag away to another room, organising 
our seating arrangements and, after pausing for a tea break, suggesting I move from the 
couch, next to Brenda, to a seat closer to his armchair. These interventions disrupted the 
practicalities that enabled Brenda and myself to speak together. Additionally, he opened 
up a line of personal questioning of me; for example, questions about marital status. In my 
accompanying field notes from this visit, however, I noted that “Derek was having trouble 
getting up from his low armchair”. This embodied reality contrasted with his attempts to 
narratively – and literally - position himself as having the power in the interview triangle. 
Morrison and Macleod similarly observed “certain gendered behaviours…for instance, 
men’s tendency to challenge a female interviewer in various ways like asking her personal 
questions…These strategies served to shift the balance of power towards the male 
participant” (Morison and Macleod, 2014, p. 705).  
 
Brenda challenges Derek’s assertions with the closing line that she “went to work as well” 
(line 276). She reveals this shift that had occurred many years before, away from Derek’s 
expectation of “a woman’s job in life” (line 258); that is,  that a woman stays at home 
(Wetherell et al., 2001). Derek’s portrayal of gendered roles, told through stories of driving 
and housework, are in the context of his own physical decline and multiple shifts in his 
idealised self where his wife had been going out to work, though he downplays this in his 
talk of a woman’s job in the home. Derek avoids a positioning of self as ‘the other’ who is 
getting older, becoming physically frail, and struggling to stand from his chair. He is 
‘trying out’ new draft versions of self, now navigating unfamiliar identity as Brenda’s carer; 
himself doing “a woman’s job”. He sustains a masculine identity, and power over the 
relationship,  while renegotiating “what it means to be an old man in a ‘woman's 
domain’”  of caregiving (Ribeiro et al., 2007, p. 311). In turn, complying through a 
submissive positioning may offer Brenda legitimisation of (a degree) of dependency on 
Derek-as-carer (Jolanki, 2009).  
 
After Derek leaves the flat to attend a General Practitioner appointment, Brenda returns 
to talk about the positioning by Derek that she no longer fulfils a woman’s job in life: 
 
Brenda: Going back to when you said about how did we manage and that. Well, with food, 277 
you did know we have a restaurant upstairs, do you? 278 
Petra: No, I didn’t know about that 279 
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Brenda: Well, it’s on the floor that you come in, the third floor. You can get a meal there 280 
every day. You get a menu so you can choose, if there is something that you don’t like. If I 281 
don’t like it, then I’ll have an omelette. And we’ve started doing that more often than we 282 
did before. When I first came back [from hospital], we tried to still stay in our own place 283 
here to eat, but it got very tiring. Every time I had a bad patch, he’d get, well not irritated, 284 
but he’d want to sort of take over. And if you’re a woman and you’ve always run a house, 285 
um, well it’s ever so hard to drop back  286 
Petra: So, are there things you’re doing differently now? 287 
Brenda: Well, I like going up to lunch or dinner now. We see different people, sometimes 288 
sit with the same couple, sometimes other people who that haven’t seen before, and then 289 
you get to know somebody else 290 
Petra: It sounds like you enjoy that? 291 
Brenda: Oh yeah. I like people. I like to hear their life stories, things like that. Once they 292 
said to me, “How did you get to know that lady, Brenda?” And I said, well I saw her sitting 293 
all alone in the lounge, so I went in and started talking to her. And we went off from there. 294 
And I said, “Yes, she’s a very pleasant lady, I’m sure she will fit in nicely”. And sure enough, 295 
she has. But yes, I like speaking to people. 296 
 
Brenda demonstrates recognition of norms that structure Derek’s accounts, saying “if 
you’re a woman and you’ve always run a house” (line 285), while positioning herself as the 
one who has been in control of the house. In response to Derek’s actions to “take over” 
(line 285) in cooking their meals, Brenda describes a shift to using the restaurant in their 
sheltered accommodation more frequently. Being with others who live in the 
neighbouring flats, hearing “their life stories” (line 292) and “speaking to people” (line 296) 
bring advantages for Brenda, through which she presents her social skills. She shares a 
story of her approach to a newcomer and, “sure enough”, she was correct in her assessment 
that this lady “will fit in nicely” with their friendship group (line 295-296).  
 
Narrative co-construction between Derek and Brenda presents a “complexity which is not 
easily named” (Butler, 1997, p. 35). In parts of their shared storytelling Brenda complies 
with his presentation of problems, where she will “drop back” and “feel myself sort of 
withdrawing” (line 266). At other times, she conveys that it is “ever so hard to drop back” 
(line 286) and appears to resist positioning as a passive character in their shared stories. 
My own emotional response to being within this narrative environment involved a feeling 
of identification with the Brenda that Derek overlooked. I desired to enter the 
interactional space where she narrated the things she values; recollects humorous 
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interactions with her former colleagues; and elaborates on stories such as her thrill in 
driving down fast roads and country lanes to “clear off to the coast”. In this space, Brenda 
brings to the fore a continuity in her sense of self, such as when making friends, or through 
her close relationship with her sister. She demonstrates iterations in kinship bonds 
maintained through narratives that are constructed away from Derek, while continuing to 
comply with the norms of expectation in their life project of the last forty years together – 
collaborative scaffolds of meaning-making that precede Brenda’s injury and Derek’s 
increasing physical fragility. 
 
Although Walter (introduced earlier, line 90) had retired from teaching at the time of his 
fall down stairs, he continued to work on a part time basis. Ruby described Walter to be 
“the head of the family who did everything”, saying “I didn’t get involved in hardly 
anything”. Talking of their daily life together since Walter’s return home from hospital, 
Ruby shares a story of Walter’s allotment: 
 
Ruby: When Walter says he’s got nothing to do almost every day, I try and make time to 297 
take him up the allotment, but he will tell me he doesn't want to go.  And then in the next 298 
breath, because that happened on Wednesday when I took him to the doctor; the day 299 
before I said to him, ‘Right, get your stuff together I’ll take you up the allotment’.  ‘No, I 300 
don’t want to go’.  I pleaded with him but, ‘No, I don’t want to go’.  Then, the next morning 301 
he went to the doctor and said, ‘I never get up there’. 302 
 
Ruby infantilises Walter as someone for whom decisions must be made, and as an object 
of others' actions: “get your stuff together and I’ll take you” (line 300). Ruby’s positioning 
of Walter apparently reduces his prospects of being viewed as having an agentive role, 
where he is entitled to make decisions for himself.  Ruby goes on to convey expectations 
of Walter’s appearance, sharing a story of negotiations with Walter and his formal carer 
about taking him (as if a child) to have a haircut: 
 
Ruby: He would get to the stage where his hair so needs cutting and he would just refuse 303 
to have it cut. But Jenny [the carer] would say, ‘Leave it with me’, and they would go out. 304 
And I’d come back and he would have had a haircut [laughs]. I mean, it is silly little things 305 
like that, she is just so good with him. 306 
 
By the second interview, Walter had longer hair and had grown a beard and a moustache. 




Six months later… 
Walter: Well, I also haven’t shaved off my top lip… 307 
Ruby: [interjects] Moustache 308 
Walter: …properly, because I want to grow that, see whether I can have it sticking over 309 
the side.  It’s not that I’m untidy and couldn’t care less.  It’s taking care with it. 310 
Petra: You’re working on the length? 311 
Walter: Yes 312 
Ruby: Dear me 313 
Walter: I’m hoping my dreams come true! 314 
Ruby: And it doesn’t matter how I feel?  Doesn’t matter how I feel, at all.  I said to him, if 315 
when I met him he looked like that, I would never have touched him with a barge pole. I 316 
can’t stand it. 317 
Walter: But how would I think, if you had a beard? 318 
Ruby: I won’t grow a beard though, so there’s nothing to compare there 319 
Petra: What is it about it, that you like? 320 
Walter: Well, it just, it’s a natural thing. Because shaving off a beard and a moustache is 321 
the way of getting rid of it day, by day, by day, by day, by day, by day. And it goes on your 322 
lifetime.  So, it’s far better to let it grow, which is the natural thing to do 323 
Interviewer: Okay, so that makes more sense to you 324 
Walter: Well, if it made sense to you, go home and tell your husband! 325 
 
In sharing stories about Walter’s appearance, the emotionality underpinning Ruby and 
Walter’s account is close to the surface. Ruby expressed her exasperation with Walter, and 
appeared visibly upset at times. Walter would suggest that he would go upstairs to “allow 
her to continue”.  In Walter’s account of his decision to grow a beard and moustache, he 
asserts the importance to him of “taking care with it” (line 310). Walter displaces acts that 
have comprised their married life together, represented by his telling of shaving “day, by 
day, by day, by day, by day, by day” (line 323), in fulfilment of performative expectations 
in his marriage and employment. Walter reconfigures an agentive positioning, instead of 
that of a child where he feels that he is “not allowed to do things I am fit to do” (line 118). 
However, while an expression of agency, the act of not shaving jars with Ruby’s 
performative expectations of their life together. So much so, she goes on to state: “I don’t 




Walter resolutely foregrounds his embodied adulthood, defying infantalisation and the 
“dichotomy between dependence and independence” that underpins it (Weicht, 2010, p. 
212). Further, Walter resignifies the ‘researcher-participant’ relationship, which I have 
‘fixed’ as the researcher bringing an unquestioned right to question the participant who is 
constrained in response (Law, 2016).  Instead, Walter’s hail to me involves inviting me to 
consider the merits of – and potentially act upon – his world view: “If it made sense to you, 
go home and tell your husband!” (line 325). 
 
Relational scaffolding  
Mike owns a construction company. He fell from a height while at work and was admitted 
to the trauma centre before having rehabilitation in a specialist inpatient unit and, after 
discharge, through the community rehabilitation team. Mike and Donna discuss their 
adaptations in running the company since his fall, and implications for each other while 
Mike is not permitted to drive: 
 
Donna: It’s quite tiring, doing driving as well as all the bits I would normally be doing. He 326 
said we need to meet a new customer on Saturday, and I said ‘I don’t work on Saturdays’ 327 
[laughs]. But it is tiring and I think for myself, and Mike, it will be nice, nothing I am 328 
waiting for more, than to see him get in the car and get his independence back, as that is 329 
really important. For me, it is nearly normal for me, but the driving is the thing that is not 330 
normal, so it will be nice to just wave him off in the morning. I could still drive him if he 331 
wanted, to start, but I would like the licence to not take too long. I don’t mind driving ‘cos 332 
it is just what we do now, you know, I do the driving, and I drive him around but it would 333 
be nice not to have to so much, some time. I think we are ready to move onto next phase 334 
now, aren’t we? 335 
Mike: I think Petra can see who gets stressed out at work now! 336 
Donna: Who is that? 337 
Mike: You! 338 
Donna: No, it is just that it is not the norm, is it? But I don’t mind, I accept that, but the 339 
day you get your licence back I will have a big smile, ‘cos I know it is what you want. You 340 
are desperate for it. We will celebrate that day. 341 
Mike: I am not stressing. I have seen people in a worse state than me getting their licence 342 
back. Someday, I will get my licence back. 343 
 
In telling the story of ‘swapping roles’ as the driver (Stepney et al., 2018), Donna portrays 
this to be the thing that is “not the norm” (line 339). However, this narrative moves beyond 
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the activity of driving, instead demonstrating Donna’s positioning of Mike in his valued 
work identity, to which she could “wave him off in the morning” (line 332). Donna appears 
to joke about the notion that this is her work as well now as she says, laughing, “I don’t 
work on Saturdays” (line 327). She diminishes the significance of “all the bits I would 
normally be doing” (line 326). However, Mike then hails Donna as ‘co-worker’ when he 
says, “I think Petra can see who gets stressed out at work now!” (line 336). Donna appears 
surprised (line 337) by Mike’s reference to her being “at work”, in a shift from the 
expectations of their marriage that she considers to be “the norm”. In describing Mike’s 
return home from hospital, Donna navigates further shifts in their marital norms: 
 
Donna: Obviously, I was a bit worried. I was watching him like a hawk all the time. A little 344 
bit like, “Don’t fall, don’t”. Probably, I worry too much anyway, all the time. But no, it was, 345 
yes, you coped really well. For me, as I say, obviously I was just watching everything that 346 
he was doing and making sure everything was all right. Fussing, probably [laughs]. Fussing 347 
too much. 348 
Mike: Good word, fussing. 349 
Donna: Fussing too much because yes, I mean I was worried, because he’s been in hospital 350 
with all these therapists, and nurses, and carers, and everyone sort of protecting him, sort 351 
of looking after him. Then all of a sudden, it’s me. So, yes, I was fussing, probably a bit too 352 
much. 353 
But as I said before, we are, we just, head up, shoulders back and we get on with it, don’t 354 
we? That’s how we are really, all of us, you know. One day at a time and you just have to 355 
deal with what’s put in front of you. We coped really well, didn’t we? 356 
Mike: I think so, yes. I do. 357 
Donna: We don’t look at the past. As I say, the past is the past. There’s nothing you can 358 
do or say that will change what’s happened. Mike had his accident. We got over that, didn’t 359 
we, because at the end of the day it happened, there’s no point keep going over it, we can’t 360 
change it, so then we just literally get on with today and tomorrow, don’t we? 361 
Mike: Yes, absolutely. 362 
 
Tension arises for Donna as she shares concern that “all of a sudden, it’s me” (line 352), 
and “watching him like a hawk” (line 344) may seem like fussing, in Mike’s view. Mike 
navigates his agreement while avoiding also criticism, saying, “Good word, fussing” (line 
349). Describing how she was watching everything he was doing, Donna risks positioning 
Mike as someone who needs to be looked after, potentially challenging normative 
expectations of husband and wife. Donna instead moves to a shared understanding of their 
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established ways of coping, replacing her positioning as the one who worries “too much”. 
Instead, she brings forward a sense of collective family contribution, saying that together 
they “just get on with it” (line 361), in cohesion with their three children here also, “that’s 
how we are really, all of us” (line 355).  In the second interview, Mike tells a story that 
appears to be a resource for him in scaffolding this family narrative environment of coping:  
 
Mike: I remember Father John, our priest, when we had had a couple of deaths in the 363 
family.  Within four months, four people. And I asked him, ‘Is this normal?’, and he went, 364 
‘Mike, this only happens to the strongest people, life is just a test, you are just being tested 365 
at the moment’. I thought, ‘Well, this is interesting’, and I have always thought of it like 366 
that. And now, a few years later, or six years later, we got tested again, didn’t we? 367 
Donna: Mmm-hmmm 368 
Mike: And that is honestly how I see it.  369 
 
Mike marks this out as a significant story-telling moment, which he commences with “I 
remember” (line 363). He positions himself as an actor from the perspective of his priest, 
as one of “the strongest people” (line 365). He makes relevant his ability, as assessed by a 
valued other, to manage in conditions that are beyond “normal” for most people. He brings 
off a positioning of strength when “being tested” and emphasises “that is honestly how I 
see it” (line 369). The story demonstrates the struggle for shared meaning-making in 
circumstances where normative expectations have been disrupted, where they each find a 
way to re-instate the gendered order. Donna reiteratively employs this shared meaning-
making, at times when she may be “fussing too much” (line 347), instead reverting to a 
positioning she seeks to share with Mike, with “head up, shoulders back” (line 354): a move 
in which she can  “express and communicate belonging and identity as a family” (Hydén, 
2017, p. 116). 
 
Raminta moved from Latvia to England with her two sons. She was found unconscious 
after falling down stairs. She underwent emergency neurosurgery and required prolonged 
care on the intensive care unit. In the first interview, Raminta and her partner, Martin, 
talk about clinical reviews following her discharge from hospital: 
 
Raminta: I went back to [the trauma centre], all the staff, my surgeon, and those who were 370 
working with me in hospital, they asked me if I suicidal. I said ‘I haven’t got time to die’ 371 
[laughs]. ‘I have no time’. It was mostly psychological stuff, about my moods, ‘How is 372 
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mood?’. They are making more sure you are in the right position, that it is okay and you 373 
are not going to die soon.  374 
Petra: And how did you think your mood was? 375 
Raminta: When I left the hospital, or when I got out of the coma, I had wires everywhere. 376 
So, you know, one by one they start taking it away, so I can turn on my side. Then, when 377 
I started thinking about it, I started to appreciate my life more 378 
 
Raminta returns to the story about being asked if she felt suicidal, during the second 
interview: 
 
Six months later… 
Raminta: After surgery and discharge, they looked at me every month, three months and 379 
six and the thing they would ask was about my suicide [laughs], which I have no time to 380 
die here [laughs].  381 
Petra: They asked if you had thought about that? 382 
Raminta: Yeh, makes me feel I have no time to die 383 
Martin: You was more surprised than anything, weren’t you? 384 
Raminta: Maybe some other people when they have some nick off the brain, maybe they 385 
go funny or mad, I don’t know, but I have no time for dying, too busy really. 386 
 
In each telling, Raminta contrasts the clinicians’ questions about suicidal thoughts, with 
a portrayal of the fullness of her life: “I have no time to die” (lines 371, 381, 383, 386). She 
brings to the fore how much she has to do, while positioning at other times ‘as a mother’ 
of two sons (who are soon to move out of the home), ‘as a partner’ to Martin (who lives 
separately from her), and ‘as an accountant’ (who has been unable to work in this role 
since moving to England). Martin endorses that a wish to die was out of the question for 
Raminta, saying “You was more surprised than anything” (line 384). Through her story 
about clinicians’ questions about suicide, Raminta brings off a sense of stability in the 
fragile life that she “started to appreciate…more” (line 378). Raminta also resignifies the 
clinician’s hail to ‘a person with brain injury’, ‘who may wish to die’, limiting the brain-as-
self discourse by instead using minimising talking of “some nick off the brain” (line 385).  
 
Raminta positions herself in a similar way in each telling of the “no time to die” story, but 
when telling of her return to the hospital ward where she was treated, she uses the 
resource of the story in contrasting ways each time; firstly when Andy is not in the room 




Raminta: I know they called me a miracle that I survived. Even when I came for the check-387 
ups later, the nurses in the ward all ignored me, don’t remember me. I remember their 388 
faces, but they say, ‘Hello?’ [laughs] 389 
Petra: How was it, to hear that? 390 
Raminta: Well, my cousin’s wife said, ‘Go and buy a lottery ticket!’ [laughs] 391 
 
Six months later… 
Martin: Everything went fine in her care, care was fantastic. Great hospital that is, no 392 
complaints whatsoever 393 
Raminta: We went to see the team and still the nurses recognised me on the corridor, 394 
even though I don’t recognise them. I forgot a lot of things. The people in the room would 395 
remind me that Andy was coming every day, ‘cos I couldn’t remember 396 
Martin: Yeh, but all your memory is coming back now, isn’t it 397 
Raminta: Yeah, but my son said, “Well you forgot my name, why didn’t you forget to stop 398 
smoking?!” 399 
Martin: Well, she couldn’t remember anything 400 
 
Raminta tells the story about returning to the ward, firstly bringing to the fore that she 
remembered the nurses but they did not recognise her (line 388). During the second 
telling, she reverses the plot as she is the one who could not remember, and here the 
nurses did recognise her (line 395). Concerns about the ‘real’ events, who was recognised 
by whom, whether or not this was the same occasion, whether memory impairment is 
behind the discrepancies, may ensnare her stories if told in a clinical interaction that has 
hailed ‘a person with brain injury’. Instead, the story becomes part of a relational activity 
for Raminta, in which the ‘actual events’ or ‘reliability’ of her memory are beside the point. 
She has become a character in her own story, in the former case exceeding expectations of 
recovery to the extent that the nurses “called me a miracle” (line 387). In her later telling, 
when Andy is present, she does not recognise the nurses and brings an additional storying 
element about “Andy coming everyday” (line 396) while she was in hospital, though 
stresses that she had needing reminding of this by others on the ward. Talk of her memory 
loss is then supported by Andy’s positive response about it “all coming back now” (line 
397).  Raminta closes by jokingly sharing a comment from her son about her memory and 
her smoking (line 399). She demonstrates interpersonal significance of this story as a 





Talking of clinical follow-up appointments, Claire (introduced earlier, with her sister 
Rachel), describes her sense of interactions with professionals in a way that suggests she 
is offering advice for their development, beyond their interaction with her: 
 
Claire: Some discussions with health care professionals are all about the medical 401 
terminology and it is not about the individual sat in front of you, who may not know the 402 
medical terminology you are using, may just be agreeing with the diagnosis and symptoms 403 
and whatever. Just get them to have an opportunity to have, I guess, a personal platform 404 
with you. It doesn’t mean saying you will sit there and listen all day, but “Is there anything 405 
you want to discuss, or me to explain? Anything, rather than it be solely medical, ‘You’ve 406 
got that, that is going to be like that, you are going to get these drugs, and it can have 407 
these side effects, but that will be all right’.  408 
It makes you feel like they lack understanding or they lack empathy. Particularly because 409 
it is a brain injury, you don’t know what their experience is, you can’t know, so do give the 410 
opportunity to say what they have come across. In turn, that will help those people be 411 
more educated, or have more knowledge. 412 
 
Claire portrays a sense of distancing by healthcare professionals, who fail to connect with 
“the person sat in front of [them]” (line 402). She asserts her preference for an interaction 
with more opportunity to talk, to establish a “personal platform” (line 404). She indicates 
that this would, in turn, help professionals to “be more educated or have more knowledge” 
(line 412), highlighting a missing component in professionals’ education and knowledge. 
The “voice of medicine” (Mishler, 1984, p. 95) instead scaffolds these clinical interactions: 
a script for professionals that is marked out by diagnoses, symptoms, terminology, 
medication, side effects, “and whatever” (line 404).  
 
Claire’s and Raminta’s accounts each suggest lack of opportunity for establishing 
connection, sharing understandings or co-constructing narrative scaffolds in interactions 
with healthcare professionals. In stories of such interactions since his injury, Toby conveys 
active disruption to sense of self. Toby was a passenger in a car that was hit by another 
vehicle. Following discharge from the trauma centre, he returned to live in his parents’ 
home for a year and then attempted a return to university, studying Chemistry as an 
undergraduate. During the first interview, Toby perceives standardised assessments 
administered by healthcare professionals as unhelpful, in delineating change that 
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rendered him ‘different’ to his peer group, conflicting with the continuity of self that he 
strove to maintain (Mäkelä, 2017). Ten months later, he reflects: 
 
Toby: The best way to see if I am capable is trying. If I can’t do it, I can’t do it. So, the 413 
cognitive tests, they do frustrate me, I don’t like going through them. Well, I don’t think I 414 
would be too fussed now, but when I first came out of hospital, they were really irritating 415 
me. They were coming round here every week or so and giving me these tests, I wouldn’t 416 
get any benefit from them, and I was in a lot of pain and discomfort and these people were 417 
telling me to remember these random words, and that was frustrating. 418 
 
His mother, Susan, presents situations in each interview in which a sense of continuity has 
been supported for Toby in interaction, such as a story about their General Practitioner 
who “remember[ed] Toby from before, and he remembered Toby was at uni and he, he 
didn’t remember what science, but he knew he was doing a science, and he talked to Toby 
as a person”. In the second interview, Susan returns to a story about an assessment by a 
healthcare professional, who stood out from others: 
 
Susan: She explained to me, I remember I said to Toby afterwards, she was just talking 419 
about Chemistry, and she was pulling off him what he learned in first year, and to me it 420 
was gobble-de-gook.  421 
And he said, ‘What was that about? That was nothing’.  422 
And I said, ‘She was finding out what you knew before and how much you remembered’.  423 
He was like ‘Well, that was a waste of time, useless’. You have got no memory of that, have 424 
you? 425 
Toby: No, well, a lot of things are useless in hospital.  426 
 
Toby continues his positioning of healthcare professionals as “frustrating” and “useless”, 
in contrast to his own preference to get on and try for himself those tasks he finds relevant 
and meaningful (line 414). For Susan, the different interactional approach from this 
particular healthcare professional - more suggestive of building a “personal platform” (as 
described by Claire, line 404) -  appears to be more significant for Susan and a resource 
that she returns to in talk of Toby’s recovery: “I remember I said to Toby afterwards…” 
(line 419). 
 
Susan repeatedly positions Toby as someone who has always been academically capable, 
“a very clever boy”. Her story of this atypical clinical assessment suggests she found 
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reassurance through an approach that aligned with her own scaffolding of interactions 
with Toby through promotion of his capabilities, and she carefully contrasts this, in his 
presence, with the “really irritating” (line 415) standardised assessments that repeatedly 
distressed Toby and from which he felt he “wouldn’t get any benefit” (line 417). 
 
Ewa moved to England from Romania and has a four-year-old daughter. Her brother 
shares the house, though she described that doesn’t spend a lot of time there. She was 
admitted to the trauma centre after being hit by a bus. Here she talks about trouble arising 
from her interactions with healthcare professionals: during follow-up reviews. 
 
Ewa: I was seen by a doctor and, er, yeah, he gave me kind of like a test. And he decided 427 
that I don’t need any help.  I was feeling kind of, also slightly angry, when I saw the test, 428 
because it was a few pictures, like it was a kind of test like you would give to a child 429 
[laughs]. You were supposed to name the animals. Maybe if you gave me that test the next 430 
day after I left the hospital, I wouldn’t be able to do that, but well not now, it was about 431 
six months after the accident. 432 
Petra: That made you feel angry? 433 
Ewa: Yes, I was so ridiculously angry, kind of. But you know, I understand. It was his test, 434 
and he asked me a few questions, and that was it. Aha, maybe some physical activity, walk 435 
in a straight line, do something, er, yeah, [proceeding very quietly] and on the basis of what 436 
he saw, he thought that, that I didn’t need anything [shrugging], didn’t need any other 437 
help. 438 
 
Beyond a missed opportunity for a personal platform, and beyond disruption to sense of 
self, Ewa’s talk of these assessments was accompanied by an embodied emotional 
response. I sensed her feeling insulted, patronised and undervalued in this telling of “a 
kind of test like you would give to a child” (line 429). She portrayed the gravity of her 
relational situation, a single-mother in a country that was not her own and with family 
support inaccessible to her, to be disregarded. The assessment pictures Ewa refers to (“you 
were supposed to name the animals”; line 430), frequently used in cognitive 
communication assessment tools, persist as a standardised practice that follows clinical 
norms (Wongvatunyu and Porter, 2008). They demonstrate a form of “institutional 
interaction, which differs in systematic ways from everyday conversations” (Myrberg et al., 
2018, p. 471). In Ewa’s narration, these assessments have come to exclude any possibility 
of scaffolding a helpful relationship with clinicians. Instead, they exert a kind of erasure of 
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her personhood that made her feel personally cast aside and “so ridiculously angry” (line 
434).  
 
Ewa’s response is a refusal to the hail ‘to a patient’, which has become, for her, one “that 
you would give to a child” (line 429). Her subsequent disengagement from healthcare 
services states, “I will not dignify this with a response” (Butler, 2005, p. 12). The story of 
oneself is given in response to a “you” who has asked for an account (Butler, 2005, p. 11); 
Ewa’s silence then questions the legitimacy of the “you” who asks the question, and rejects 
the clinician-patient relationship. For Ewa, I sensed that I may have been representative 
of the symbolic violence of healthcare services that she conveys. She became 
uncontactable after our first interview, for reasons that I was not able to explore with her. 
However, her act seemed consistent with her silence as the “one queried refus[ing] the one 
who queries” (Butler, 2005, p. 12). I felt concern over our mutual positioning in this 
research interview, where ultimately I too was offering nothing other than “a few 
questions, and that was it” (line 435). 
 
Donna (introduced earlier with her husband, Mike), describes interactions with 
community neurorehabilitation clinicians, after Mike’s return home. She portrays their 
requests for the family’s reports of changes in Mike since his injury: 
 
Donna: We had forms to fill in. A questionnaire thing, like a multiple choice thing, and 439 
my daughter had to fill one in and I had to fill one in, and we had to be honest. It was quite 440 
hard really, because being honest is not being un-loyal to you. She done it in one room 441 
and I done it in another and a couple of our answers were different. I said, “We’ve got to 442 
be honest. If we’re not honest, they can’t help Dad”. And I felt like I was sort of being too 443 
hard on him. But then, you know, as I say, I had to be honest and I did fill out the 444 
questionnaires and that. And that obviously gave the girls [rehabilitation team therapists] 445 
something to work on, because we were the people to know you more than anybody.  446 
 
Donna indicates a sense of confrontation from healthcare professionals’ expectations, “we 
had to be honest” (line 440) in questionnaires seeking ‘standardised’ components of 
change. Donna alternates between explaining to me, and also reassuring Mike (and 
herself), that “being honest is not being un-loyal to you” (line 441). She again brings 
forward the collective family identity, saying, “We were the people to know you more than 




Donna: It’s quite hard, because you don’t want to highlight some of the changes that we’ve 447 
noticed in Mike. Yet, if you didn’t highlight them, you thought, “Well, then no one can 448 
help him with them”, you know. Sometimes I felt bad because I thought, I don’t, I feel like 449 
I’m going against him, do you know what I mean? For Mike, he didn’t really recognise the 450 
changes, unless we highlighted them and obviously sometimes if he was speaking too 451 
loudly and that I’d be like, shall I tell him? I didn’t know whether to highlight it with him 452 
or just let him, it was quite difficult. He’s quite accepting of when we highlight things to 453 
you but then, because I didn’t want to worry him. Didn’t want him to overthink, you know, 454 
so yes. No, it’s all gone good hasn’t it, really? 455 
Mike: I think so, yes. I’m glad to be sitting here, telling you about it. I know I’m lucky. 456 
 
Donna negotiates this telling in Mike’s presence, presenting the difficulties she and her 
daughter had faced in an act that separated them from each other and from Mike (line 
442). Her reporting of changes in Mike might help him, but also “feel like I’m going against 
him” (line 450). In addition, she negotiates whether letting him know of changes, to 
“highlight it with him”, would be the best thing to do, as he “didn’t really recognise the 
changes” himself (line 450-451). Mike does not contribute a specific view to this episode 
of telling, yet he resolves the tension that circles through Donna’s presentation of these 
dilemmas. He moves her concerns aside as he says, “I’m glad to be sitting here, telling you 
about it” (line 456).  
 
By the second interview, there is a shift in their shared narrative about changes in Mike’s 
communication: 
 
Six months later… 
Donna: They [therapists] were trying to get Mike to maybe talk a bit more quietly, ‘cos 457 
you do tend sometimes to talk a bit louder. But then, as I say, he used to do that before, 458 
so whether that is because it has been highlighted now, we are more aware of it  459 
Mike: Yeah, the turn-taking and talking too much, the girls [therapists] turned round and 460 
said, “We don’t want to change the way you are”. So, they was quite happy with it, weren’t 461 
they? 462 
Donna: Yeah, like I say 463 
Mike: So, don’t take it personally if I butt in today [laughs] 464 
 
Donna now positions her own view separately from the professionals, who brought 
forward the focus of change. Mike co-constructs the story this time, integrating the 
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potential discrepancy between clinicians’ assessment of changes in his speech, and a 
narrative that normalises his “louder” speech with Donna’s observation that “he used to 
do that before” (line 458). A shift has occurred from Donna’s talk about needing to report 
on changes she notices in Mike, as otherwise “no one can help him with them” (line 448), 
to instead an attribution of noticing it as change “because it has been highlighted” by the 
neurorehabilitation team (line 459). Mike resolves this tension and resignifies the 
narrative, invoking therapists’ endorsement to him in saying, “We don’t want to change 
the way you are” and “They was quite happy with it” (line 461).  
 
Here, change and consistency are working together (Bamberg and Demuth, 2016). This 
co-construction permits the family to talk, without the dilemma of whether to “highlight” 
that he is speaking in a way that would be suggestive of change from his pre-TBI self. 
Donna enacts a form of “procedural commitment…in the way that joint activities progress” 
(Hydén, 2017, p. 121)(italics in original). If Mike had trouble hearing, Donna might be 
talking more loudly. Instead, with “the turn-taking and talking too much” (line 460), 
Donna makes an anal0gous adjustment. She fulfils her procedural commitment to their 
shared intention, where neither wants to “change” him. Mike reinforces this shift in 
meaning-making about his speech, by using humour to pre-empt any occurrences of him 
“butting in” during our discussion (line 464). He includes me in their experience of change 
as part of the “new normal” (Hydén, 2017, p. 123). 
 
Chloe (introduced earlier, with her parents) talks about assessments and tasks given by 
community neurorehabilitation clinicians, which “felt like homework and were not 
enjoyable”. Talking about her interests more broadly in the second interview, she shares 
her recent learning about theatre “that has moved away from traditional text”: 
 
Chloe: The audience technically become part of the performance, because there’s no 465 
longer this separation of having a traditional stage and a world that is so separate from the 466 
world the audience are in.  There’s now sort of like, because the texts have been broken 467 
down and the characters have been broken down, so sometimes the performers aren’t even 468 
necessarily named characters, they’re just bodies on stage.  I think that creates less 469 
separation between performers and the audience because everyone seems to be in 470 
technically the same space and the same world, so it is that interesting thing. Where I 471 
think it is now, it is very much like a tennis match kind of thing where, a performance 472 
obviously is all, predominantly, what is happening on stage, but I do think what makes it 473 




Chloe’s analysis perhaps offers a dramaturgical metaphor for a shift in healthcare (or 
qualitative interviewing) normative scaffolds of interaction. Instead of ‘performers’ 
(clinicians) and ‘audience’ (patients), Chloe’s metaphor reframes us all as “just bodies on 
stage” (line 469). Here, equality in positioning removes the epistemic privilege that is 
rehearsed in the ‘back region’ by performers (clinicians) if there is a shift to a shared 
normative script in the ‘front region’ (Goffman, 1959; Joseph, 1990).  
 
In our discussions in the second interview, Chloe’s own analysis further disrupts my own 
‘researcher’ performativity by moving us into “technically the same space” (line 471) in 
thinking with Butler: 
 
Chloe: I’ve definitely always struggled with distinct differences between, you know, 475 
gender norms because I haven’t, since I was younger, I was never like a traditionally 476 
female-female, if that makes sense.  So, I could never quite understand why boys would 477 
get certain toys and girls would get…For me, things like that, I just didn’t quite get it.  Then 478 
reading into, it was Judith Butler and theory, queer theory. And it was all about this idea, 479 
we make these performative utterances.  So, when a baby’s born we say it’s a boy or it’s a 480 
girl, and just naturally through their upbringing, we are constantly giving them signs of 481 
how we think they should behave, based on how we’ve been brought up thinking we 482 
should behave. I think in terms of how we present ourselves, or how we think of what we 483 
should do, or how we interact, is very much like social conditioning, I think.   484 
Petra: So it’s this expectation from others about how you’re going to behave, and what 485 
the interaction will be? 486 
Chloe: Definitely, I think in a sense you can look at any area and say there’s a pre-existing 487 
expectations of how, what sort of person you should be. 488 
 
In this moment, Chloe undoes my assumptions about our interaction through her own 
introduction of Butler’s theorising. My “pre-existing expectations” shift and a new scaffold 
of shared meaning-making becomes visible to me in our intersubjective space: an 






CHAPTER 7: Discussion 
 
Introduction 
My intention in this thesis has been to explore the ways people living with TBI and their 
significant others construct stories about managing in everyday life, after discharge from 
hospital. The analysis in Chapter 6 demonstrates negotiations of sense of self within 
interactions across time points, where people are ‘hailed’ to identities marked out as ‘you 
are a person with brain injury’.  The focus on fleeting moments of interaction has 
demonstrated how talk about events is used as a resource in navigation of the self ‘now’ 
but also ‘then’, as a character in the telling. Positioning of the self, and by others, recreates 
versions of the self that resist the hail ‘person with brain injury’ and resignify meanings 
that diminish the self ‘now’ in comparison with ‘before’. Navigation of the everyday occurs 
through reiterations of kinship interactional practices, and versions of the self that are 
brought to the fore according to constraints (or affordances) of the situation. Finally, talk 
about encounters with healthcare professionals demonstrates how norms and 
expectations further position the self as ‘changed’. These encounters themselves become 
storytelling resources, in recrafting a desired sense of self. 
 
 
Building on these findings, my intention in this chapter is to set out an overarching model, 
seeking to conceptualise the navigation of sense of self following TBI as a co-constructed 
achievement.  I illustrate the model by drawing on examples from participants’ talk, shared 
in Chapter 6. I contextualise these findings within the literature on biographical disruption 
(Bury, 1982), loss of self (Charmaz, 1983; Nochi, 1998), and narrative reconstruction 
(Gareth Williams, 1984) that I introduced in Chapter 2. I then consider the potential 
applicability of this model for thinking about clinical interactions that intend support for 
self-management for people following TBI. Further, I argue that the model holds potential 
for application in thinking about support for self-management for people living with long 
term conditions more broadly, thereby challenging the “seemingly unanimous discourses 
and practices” of the dominant, biomedical focus of supported self-management, 
introduced in Chapter 2 (Taguchi and Palmer, 2013, p. 672). I consider how the normative 
scaffolding of clinical interaction may itself be co-constitutive in a sense of disrupted self, 
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and explore how the model presented in this chapter may inform alternative 
constructions. 
 
Toward a conceptual model 
In this section, I consider how participants are dealing with experiences following TBI 
through their everyday processes of talk-in-interaction. I bring together theoretical 
insights from the analytic framework I described in Chapter 5:  (1) Bamberg’s positioning, 
as outlined in Table 4 (Bamberg, 1997); and (2) the constructs of normativity, citationality  
(introducing something different through repetition), and signification, from Butler’s 
work on performativity (Butler, 1999). I consider a series of shifts in version-making of the 
self, through an application of the concept of scaffolding in interaction between 
conversation participants  (Hydén, 2017, 2011).  
 
When used in developmental psychology, scaffolding describes mechanisms through 
which ‘experts’ support ‘novices’ to perform actions on their own to “achieve a goal which 
would be beyond [their] unassisted efforts” (Wood et al., 1976, p. 90). Similarly, the term 
social scaffolding has been applied to the practicalities of social support (e.g., from family, 
friends) after TBI: “like scaffolding around them, propping them up” (Snell et al., 2017, p. 
21). When applied to storytelling, the metaphor of scaffolding moves away from this 
original context of instruction - one person supporting another – and instead conveys  a 
sense of productive “mutual support” (Hydén, 2017, p. 125) (italics in original). For example, 
when considering interaction between couples where one partner is living with dementia, 
the concept of scaffolding becomes a mutually dependent practice of collaboration in the 
creation of shared meaning and in sustaining storytelling as a shared activity between the 
couple (Hydén, 2017) . 
 
The understanding of narrative scaffolding as a mutual activity suggests that coherence is 
not an objective feature of storytelling, but instead is something that is jointly produced 
in the interaction.  The implication, then,  is that such narrative scaffolding may act to 
enhance or challenge coherence (Hyvärinen, 2010). The collaboration may encompass 
many practices that perhaps intend support, and yet intentions and experiences of such 
support do not necessarily coincide.  For example, assistance may become undesirable for 
someone who perceives that they have capabilities to remain independent without this 
assistance, which then instead becomes interference. Alternatively, narratives of 





The conceptual model I present below derives from talk-in-interaction with people living 
with TBI and their significant others (presented in Chapter 6), analysed through the 
theoretical constructs that I outlined in Chapter 5. My intention is to derive a broader 
understanding of processes of self-crafting, where the self is “that which keeps on telling 
and retelling, putting the pieces together in slightly different patterns and occasionally 
generating what seems like a new pattern” (Frank, 2018, p. 115). I build a model of self-
crafting in talk-in-interaction, underpinned by the concept of narrative scaffolding as a 
mutual activity (Hydén, 2017, 2011).  
 
In my application of the narrative scaffolding concept, my focus is not on a “renegotiation 
of the division of interactional work”, as conceived when a person without cognitive 
impairment assumes more responsibility for organising the interaction (for example, 
setting up narrative tasks such that a person with cognitive impairment can take part) 
(Hydén, 2017, p. 125). Instead, I consider the negotiation of mutual positions through 
scaffolds of meaning-making. Bamberg’s domains of positioning analysis (2004a, 1997) 
(Table 4, Chapter 5) provide an expansion of types of challenge to sense of self, through 
narratives of difference between the self and the other, change in the self across time, and 
the self as an active agent in relation to the world or passive recipient. I am interested in 
exploring ways that stories are mutually ‘scaffolded’ despite tensions between versions of 
oneself, interacting with versions of others, and being positioned as the other.  
 
The project of selfhood - “the desire to persist in one’s own social being” (Butler, 2005, p. 
44) – becomes challenged by conventions, when normative expectations become visible 
and “silence the question of who counts as a ‘who’” (Butler, 2009, p. 163). Forms of 
performative affordances that constitute the self can variably overcome - or further embed 
- the varied challenges to positioning of the desired self. As identification with normative 
limits is not fixed (Butler, 1990), performative affordances can be derived from “revisable 
criteria of intelligibility" (Butler, 1993, p. 14). In this understanding, conditions arise for 
agency at times when our lives are constrained.  
 
In this study, constraint arises in the interpellation ‘a person with brain injury’; and, I 
argue, also in other interpellations to subject positions, including the hail to ‘a clinician’. 
Norms are consolidated or change through reiterations (Butler, 1999).  If norms are 
consolidated in interaction, then scaffolds have served to re-affirm or reproduce prevailing 
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norms. However, Butler proposes that version-making of the self occurs through “a series 
of shifts” within fragile norms that are transformable (Butler, 2009, p. 169). My intention 
is to apply this concept within the model of narrative scaffolding, enabling versions of self-
crafting when presented with challenges of positioning by others (for example, when 
change is implied by families or within healthcare encounters).  
 
I propose narrative scaffolding that is (re)constructed as positioning of the self (that is 
constraining or enabling) interacts with performativity (expectations of constancy or 
space for change), thereby modulating agency to reinstate a desired sense of self. I 












A typology of narrative scaffolds 
To further consider the relationship between positioning challenges and performative 
affordances, through narrative scaffolding (Figure 4, above), I proceed by considering a 
typology that is generated through application of the respective theoretical constructs, 
shown in Figure 5 (below). I present these types as a way of thinking with the interlinked 
concepts and longitudinal data, but my intention is not to propose that these types are 
rigid and discrete. 
 
Positioning challenges to sense of self may arise at the level of difference between the self 
and others, according to others’ normative expectations. A scaffold might shift meaning 
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making through re-creating a normative expectation, which then aligns with a desired 
sense of self. Secondly, a positioning challenge may arise at the level of difference in the 
self over time (for example when positioning diminishes the self ‘now’ compared with 
‘then’, through the hail to ‘a person with brain injury’ who has ‘changed’). Here, re-
iterations of what has gone before - citations that are not exactly the same each time – 
allow narrative scaffolding that re-works the meaning of talk that contains the implied 
change over time. Finally, the desired self may be challenged through positioning as 
passive in relation to the world (Bamberg, 2004a). This positioning relies upon the 
significance, or signification, of talk that renders a character into the position of ‘victim’. 
Narrative scaffolds that re-appropriate the significance of meanings (take ownership of 
them) allow a re-alignment to prioritised values for the desired self, enabling a claim for a 
significance as an active agent in the story. The narrative scaffolds that are represented 
within this model are always provisional, situated, and achieved through the co-
construction of meaning within talk-in-interaction.  
 









This typology of shifting narrative scaffolds (re-creating, re-working, re-appropriating) is 
defined further, in Table 5 below. Although presented as discrete elements, these narrative 
shifts are, of course, overlapping and inter-linked within talk-in-interaction. I suggest this 
conceptualisation to offer orientations for thinking that is connected to particular 
problems (without which it lacks meaning). In presenting this conceptualisation, I 
respond to my initial research objectives: exploring changes in narratives of TBI over time, 
seeking understanding of co-construction of narratives of challenges and tensions 
following TBI, and providing a nuanced account of sense of self and agency following TBI 
to understand potential approaches in supporting self-management. I argue that the 
connection of the typology of narrative scaffolds, with the problems outlined in these 
objectives, potentially enables new lines of thought (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994; Mazzei, 
2017). 
 
In the following section, I illustrate an application of this typology of narrative scaffolds 
by drawing on extracts from interviews shared in Chapter 6. I seek to bring attention to 
an understanding of agency that might be relevant when considering clinicians’ 
approaches to support for self-management for people living with TBI.  
 
Table 5 - Typology of narrative scaffolds that achieve shifts in shared meaning-
making 




Introducing a new expectation, which becomes 
routine in interaction  
Re-working 
Adapting taken-for-granted notions by 
reconfiguring meanings in talk-in-interaction 
Re-appropriating 
Claiming active ownership of a position by 






Before applying the model to examples of challenges to the positioning of the self after 
TBI, I briefly reconsider the construct of citationality within Butler’s theory of 
performativity (Butler, 1999; Nakassis, 2013). Citationality is central to my integrated 
model (Figure 5 above), particularly when considering the question of constancy or change 
in the self over time, which is important when situating this analysis in the established 
literature on biographical disruption  (Bury, 1982) and the notion of loss of self after TBI 
(Medved and Brockmeier, 2008; Nochi, 1998, 1997).  
 
Sense of self may seem to derive from our own unique mental creations and yet, following 
Butler, it is instead seen to arise through conditions that have gone before us. Butler 
asserts that: 
“speaking is always in some ways the speaking of a stranger through and as oneself, 
the melancholic reiteration of a language that one never chose, that one does not 
find as an instrument to be used, but that one is, as it were, used by, expropriated in, 
as the unstable and continuing condition of the “one” and the “we”, the ambivalent 
condition of the power that binds”  
(Butler, 1993, p. 242). 
 
In the proposed typology of shifts in narrative scaffolds (Table 5), I emphasise the prefix 
‘re-‘ each time (re-creating, re-working, re-appropriating), thereby recognising reiterations 
(citations) of what has gone before. A fictional example, from Daphne du Maurier’s novel 
Rebecca (1938), might be useful to illustrate this point further: 
“…the nameless narrator shocks her husband by turning up at a party in an identical 
dress to that worn by his dead wife [Rebecca] on a similar occasion. In preparation 
for the party, the narrator, assisted by the malign Mrs. Danvers, believes that she is 
choosing her costume and thereby creating herself, whereas it turns out that Mrs. 
Danvers is in fact recreating the narrator as Rebecca.  
(Salih, 2002, p. 56) 
 
du Maurier’s story provides an example of the way that identities, rather than being chosen 
or created by an individual agent, instead precede and constitute those subjects, “just as 
Rebecca literally precedes the narrator” (Salih, 2002, p. 56). However, through small shifts 
across time and context, repeated reiterations then allow “a play of sameness and 
difference, identity and alterity [that] can open up new horizons of possibility, 
signification, and performative power” (Nakassis, 2013, p. 51). Importantly, the 
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signification of these shifts "harbors within itself what the epistemological discourse refers 
to as 'agency"' (Butler, 1999, p. 185). Small scale reorganisations can encourage new ways 
of doing identity, through formations that are not fully constrained in advance, producing 
“agency as resignification” (Butler, 1995, p.135).  I proceed to illustrate how agency may 
arise through the types of narrative scaffold described above. I draw on interview extracts 
presented in Chapter 6. 
 
Re-appropriating  
When Brenda and I comply with Derek’s talk of gendered expectations (lines 278; 308) we 
re-affirm his normative narrative scaffold. I apparently become complicit with his 
interventions, as he structures our interaction quite explicitly through re-arranging 
seating, and more implicitly in talk about normative expectations of “a woman’s job in life” 
(line 290). In my compliance, I “enact[ed] what cannot be narrated” (Butler, 2005, p. 54), 
complying with the expectation Derek set out, perhaps in solidarity with Brenda’s way of 
being within this interactional space. However, at other times when Derek is not present, 
Brenda reveals her alternative narrative scaffolds that seemingly operate alongside her 
compliance with Derek’s dominant normative scaffolding in their shared “narrative 
environment” (Hydén, 2017, p. 116). Through my facilitation - by offering encouragement 
for Brenda’s telling of her asides - I come to recognise and share her sense of vigour when 
telling them, for example her telling of when she would “clear off to the coast or clear off 
somewhere else” (lines 287-288). Brenda reveals to me a secret scaffolding of a more 
thrilling life that is independent of Derek, in which objects (her car) and relations (with 
fellow residents in the sheltered accommodation) take on an alternate signification.  
 
When Brenda and Derek talk together about mealtimes, Derek brings to the fore his active 
role in undertaking the cooking tasks which he considers Brenda is no longer able to 
complete, positioning her in a passive role that contrasts with her own sense of always 
having been the one in control of household responsibilities.  However, when Brenda talks 
with me, aside from Derek, she re-appropriates the significance of activities through which 
Derek has rendered her passive or incapable. When Derek is not present in the interaction, 
she re-appropriates mealtimes as a space for her social mastery, in which she becomes an 
active and skilled contributor as a member of the friendship group (in their sheltered 
accommodation): the one who approaches newcomers and is a trusted judge of character. 
She counters the challenge of passive positioning by Derek and re-appropriates the focus 
of the story, which no longer centring on her (in)capabilities in fulfilling “a woman’s job 
in life”. Instead, she foregrounds her desired self by reinforcing her thrills from driving, as 
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a symbol of choice and independence, and her achievements in making new friends in the 
restaurant.  
 
I do not aim to reveal Brenda’s ‘real’ identity here, but I propose that we are hailed to 
different subjectivities when telling and listening in conjunction with Derek and when he 
is not present. These subjectivities are enabled through mutual scaffolds that re-
appropriate meanings. They are co-constructed and situated in our particular interaction. 
 
By way of a further example - Andy talked of his reluctance to attend the brain injury 
centre and fatigue clinic but agreed to have occupational therapy (OT) visits to his home. 
In telling a story of a cooking task set for him as ‘the patient’ by ‘the expert’ (the OT), a 
scaffold of re-appropriation enables him to claim an agentive sense of self: he tells of his 
own choice, his urge, to bake a cake. Andy now ‘owns’ what was otherwise a therapy task 
that positioned him in a passive role as someone in need of brain injury rehabilitation 
therapy. Instead, he foregrounds baking as his lifelong passion, a talent endorsed and 
valued by his partner. 
 
Re-creating  
If the subject is re-iteratively constituted across time through the continuing action of 
norms in a social context, then the possibility for change derives from a shift in norms of 
expectation. Subjects formed within a system of norms that are recognisable by the other 
(‘a person with brain injury’, ‘with dysphasia’) risk foreclosure in sense of self. However, 
space remains for norms of expectation to be redefined (Butler, 1993). Scaffolds that re-
create meaning involve the undoing and re-forming of norms.  
 
Walter, positioned in interaction with Ruby as a child whose actions she controls and 
contains, confronts her expectation that he will always be clean-shaven. This is a norm 
that he has consistently complied with throughout their married life: Ruby’s normative 
expectation that he must “enact—and must perpetually re-enact” (Frank, 2018, p. 114) the 
daily task of shaving. When Walter tells of his care with his newly grown beard and 
moustache (second interview), his talk of shaving now presents it as an act that is not 
“natural”. This re-creating of a norm of expectation is also a citation of his younger, 
bachelor self. He opens the possibility of self-crafting while extending a sense of 
continuity, as he tells of his bearded self that pre-existed his marriage, saying “I had [a 
beard] years ago”. This performative affordance then counters the position of 
infantalisation by Ruby, through re-creation of a narrative scaffold in which he re-creates 
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the expectation of shaving and, in his talk of his beard and moustache, he clearly 
distinguishes himself as ‘adult’ not ‘child’. Walter recreates himself as person – an adult - 
beyond the more controlled parts of his life with Ruby, which he cannot recreate.  
 
The scaffold of re-creation becomes routine and spreads among others in the interactive 
network, if the modification is to become collectively accepted. Walter seeks to 
demonstrate scope for [masculine] ratification beyond Ruby and beyond me, as he 
commends me to “go home and tell your husband!”.  
 
Re-working  
Through reiterative talk about their cars, Brenda and Derek’s narrative co-constructions 
demonstrate performative gender, where Derek talks of his car as “the big one”, in contrast 
to Brenda’s “little one, just to run about in”, thereby invoking a “gendering of the car” 
(Lumsden, 2010, p. 13). By adopting ‘compliant’ routines such as deferring to Derek, using 
a low amplitude voice, and suggesting that she withdraws when Derek takes charge, 
Brenda complies with normative expectations (enforced by Derek) of the submissive 
woman. The performative routines “index womanliness” (Meyerhoff, 2015). Normatively 
gendered language routines between them are affordances that appear to reaffirm the 
structure of their “joint life project or ‘couplehood’” as a shared commitment to their 
relationship (Hydén, 2017, p. 121). 
 
Derek seeks positioning of strength and power aligned with masculinity (Stepney et al., 
2018; Wetherell and Edley, 1999) in an interaction where this might be somewhat 
challenged by the stories that convey him as changed, and passive - he no longer has a car, 
and Brenda has been the one driving them, until her injury, in her car. The normative 
scaffolding, demonstrated through his talk of cars and driving, has been threatened as part 
of a larger story of changes in his life. Though he had previously surrendered some of his 
own independence in these ways he reworks the story of driving - firstly by emphasising 
that he did not like driving Brenda’s “little” car, and then proceeding to narratively rework 
their current life without cars as a consequence of Brenda’s brain injury. Through this re-
working, Derek’s words “exercise a certain power” (Butler, 2002a, p. 63). He reworks the 
story to draw on a performative positioning in the face of his own increasing fragilities 
that pre-exist Brenda’s injury (his physical frailty as well as the loss of his own car, and 
earlier reliance on Brenda as driver). Derek reworking of the narrative foregrounds 





Claire avoids positioning of change from her pre-injury self that is suggested by healthcare 
professionals and her family, during stories about her speech. Instead, she attributes her 
particular style of using language to a unique and valued sense of self: that she has always 
been “like Mary Poppins, making up my own, like I had swallowed a dictionary, and 
making up own phrases, and words and stuff”. She re-works this scaffold of meaning that 
she and her sister previously used in describing a friend’s admired characteristics. 
Reworking the Mary Poppins story generates a sense of consistency for Claire when she 
has been positioned as ‘changed’, and by using the magical characteristic of being 
“califragilistic” she illustrates how: 
 “the very possibility of linguistic agency is derived from the situation in which one 
finds oneself addressed by a language one never chose”  
(Butler, 2005, p. 53) 
 
Telling of the same story or extract can be a way to represent important aspects of the self 
(Hydén, 2018). The considerations above demonstrate how re-tellings can become part 
fleeting self-craftings according to the norms of a situation.  I have proposed that meaning-
making occurs through the telling and re-telling within interactions, rather than through 
the content, or ‘facts’, of the story shared. By contrast, the dominant approach in a clinical 
interaction points out and categorises inconsistencies in talk. In the example above, a 
clinician might suggest that Claire’s ‘alternative story’ about her speech demonstrates a 
‘lack of insight’ into cognitive and communicative impairments (Le et al., 2014; Prigatano 
and Schacter, 1991). Focusing exclusively on deficits after TBI disregards “the more 







Narrative scaffolds provide a platform for a sense of self that is “always journeying” 
(Latham and Faulkner, 2019, p. n/p) and requires navigation. As conventions are reinstated 
time and time again, bonds and constraints are created, and recreated (Butler, 2002a). Our 
project of selfhood seeks to uphold a desired sense of who we are, who we have been, who 
we hope to be (Medved and Brockmeier, 2008). Here, co-narration fulfils an interpersonal 
purpose where  issues such as  memory impairment are beside the point, in contrast with 
assertions that memory and narrative are “identity's twin supporting structures” (Eakin, 
2004, p. 121) and the Western insistence that selfhood depends on cognition (Kontos, 
2004). I propose that agency is demonstrated through re-creating, re-appropriating and re-
working of narrative scaffolds to actively extend and maintain a desired sense of self in the 
face of constraint - not only from functional consequences of TBI, but from attendant 
challenges of being positioned ‘as a person with brain injury’ within a social interaction. 
 
The scaffolding of these stories demonstrates the negotiation of “epistemic primacy” 
(Meschitti, 2018, p.17) in kinship relations. For Claire, failure to co-construct a “personal 
platform” in a clinical encounter loses an opportunity for each party to extend their 
epistemic possibilities through co-construction. Although derived from my qualitative 
data relating to people living with TBI, I argue that this analysis becomes applicable when 
conceptualising support for self-management in long term conditions more broadly (as I 
discuss further in Chapter 8). Narrative scaffolding becomes the mediator between 
challenges to a desired (hoped for) self and affordances in generating an agentive response: 
a co-construction that has the capacity to change all involved in the interaction. Figure 6 
















When outlining the typology of scaffolding and the conceptual model, I am aware that 
“…one person’s operationalisation is another’s subversion of a complex phenomenon” 
(Scambler, 2009, p. 447). However, I seek to use this operationalisation in the context of 
the literature introduced in Chapter 2, as I reconsider conceptualisations of biographical 
disruption (Bury, 1982) and loss of self after TBI (Charmaz, 1983; Medved and Brockmeier, 
2008; Nochi, 1998, 1997) in light of the discussion above. I then continue with analytic 





Reconsidering ‘biographical disruption’ 
The analysis brings into focus co-constructed narration with people following brain injury 
who are dealing with “a culture emphasising the view that ‘you are your brain’ rather than 
‘you have a brain’”, and expectations that damage to the brain will damage personhood 
(Krahn, 2015, p. 1515) (emphasis mine). The analysis demonstrates often precarious 
negotiations of sense of self within normative expectations and when future outcomes, 
once taken for granted, are opened to doubt. 
 
Bury’s concept of biographical disruption takes a central role in ‘big story’ (‘life story’) 
research where the implication is of a need for narrative reconstruction following a 
disruptive event (Bury, 1982; Gareth Williams, 1984; Williams, 2000). TBI has been 
conceived as a disruptive event that severs “the continuity of who the person is” and 
encompasses a sense of transition through “mourning” of the past identity and 
“construction” of the new self (Moldover et al., 2004, p. 151). The injured person who is in 
this transitional phase is conceived to be living with two images of the self: “who I am now” 
and “who I was before” (Cantor et al., 2005, p. 531). The concept of liminality (Turner, 1975, 
1967) has been applied to this space: “in limbo” between the former and future states 
(Muenchberger et al., 2008, p. 990). The challenge to sense of self within this space of 
liminal uncertainty has been described by Langellier as “a site of negotiation and struggle” 
(1999, p. 138), and has been considered intrinsic within a dynamic construction of identity 
(Piazza, 2019). 
 
In dominant neurorehabilitation discourse, a finite conceptualisation of liminality can be 
inferred as clinicians routinely convey expectations about recovery periods following TBI 
- for example, “following mild TBI, most people are back to normal by 6 months” 
(Canterbury District Health Board, 2012, p. 4). These prognostications are accompanied 
by various scales and models intended to “reliably predict recovery” (Rizoli et al., 2016, p. 
2).  Normative expectations then anticipate a chronologically linear trajectory of recovery 
following TBI that can be understood through the “application of reason, and the exercise 
of science and of ‘expert’ knowledge” (Fisher and Goodley, 2007, p. 66). These clinical 
processes suggest that there will be a particular period of time after which recovery from 
TBI will have taken place, implicitly define a period of ‘biographical disruption’ 




As discussed in Chapter 2, this state of liminality after TBI has further been described as a 
“void” in understanding of the self after TBI, which potentially threatens one’s “sense of 
agency”  (Nochi, 1997, p. 533). An individual’s ‘void’ in past memories is seen to act as a 
barrier to self-understanding, or even to present a “‘tragedy’ that one’s former self is gone” 
(Weicht, 2010, p. 211). The interpellation ‘person with brain injury’ further provides the 
possibility for an identity to become signified through narratives of neuroscience that 
“increasingly entrap all aspects of human experience within a single gaze” (Cohn, 2010, p. 
70), and the creation of  “kinds of people that did not exist before” (Hacking, 2007, p. 293). 
The creation of a new reality through narratives of neuroscience is illustrated by Claire, 
who talks of neurorehabilitation interventions that deliver education about brain injury 
which is then “all that is going to be in your head”. 
 
Previous research has also suggested that, for people living with TBI “without clear 
recollection of events, [they] were less able to “own” their experience, constructing a 
position of disempowerment”(Cloute et al., 2008, p. 664) (p. 664), and that others can 
become keepers of an injured person’s identity at times when the person is unable to fully 
express it themselves (Whiffin et al., 2017, p. 6; Williams, 2000). These implications raise 
the question posed by Charmaz: “What happens then when images of self, reflected to ill 
persons by others, are inconsistent with their core self-concepts?” (1983, p.170). The 
integrated model outlined in the section above, informed through by concepts of 
scaffolding, positioning and performativity, suggests a fluidity that opposes the notion of 
a ‘tragic’, ‘diminished’ or ‘lost’ self which are inconsistent with people’s desired sense of 
self. The interpellated subject (‘person with brain injury’) is incomplete, with an agentive 
gap to do something differently within normative constraints of the situation and 
expectations: possibilities to reaffirm a desired sense of self when positioned as ‘changed’.  
 
When exploring narrative structures used by family members to understand change after 
TBI, authors suggest that concepts of biographical disruption, biographical continuity and 
biographical reconstruction underpin their understandings of change (e.g. Whiffin et al., 
2017).  I propose that the analysis of talk-in-interaction co-constructed with people living 
with TBI in this study extends these conceptualisations beyond the biographical 
disruption and finite liminality paradigm to include consistency and change that continue 
to work together. In the navigation of a sense of sameness, changes are taking place on a 
fleeting, ‘micro’ level - not generally changes of the major ‘biographical’ kind where  “we 





Analytic reflections  
Much of what is said in an interview may appear to be nothing new, as researchers’ and 
participants’ positions are produced within the discursive practices that render what is 
said possible (Mäkelä, 2017). Further, the analytic dogma of coding practices (Mazzei, 
2014) risks predictable interpretation, which may appear to add ‘nothing new’ or to equate 
to ‘common sense’. By way of example, in a recent qualitative study on the experiences of 
significant others whose relatives were admitted to a brain injury rehabilitation unit,  the 
authors’ inductive thematic analysis identified: “trauma; grief and loss; journey; and 
uncertainty”, and concluded that “the whole experience for the significant other is 
traumatic as they try to understand changes to both their loved ones and their own roles”; 
also that the significant other may need time to talk about their experiences with health 
professionals (Checklin et al., 2018, n/p). When considering application of this thematic 
analysis to conceptualise experience, or to inform practice, it could be argued that such 
findings replicate the existing framework of normative understanding and do not 
necessarily move us forward in determining, for example, how talking with health 
professional staff may, or may not, be helpful within people’s experiences. 
 
By using theoretical insights, I have instead sought to see these issues in alternative ways, 
“to produce different knowledge and produce knowledge differently” (St Pierre and Pillow, 
2002, p. 27). Despite the awkwardness in applying performativity to issues of identity and 
agency after TBI, it has enabled me to explore how taken-for-granted identities (for 
example, ‘patient’, ‘clinician’, ‘person with TBI’) could be destabilised. I started with brief 
extracts of talk-in-interaction and used positioning analysis with Butler’s performativity 
as sensitising devices. Through the use of multiple theoretical insights within the 
development of my interpretations, I sought to “move qualitative analysis away from 
habitual normative readings” (Mazzei, 2014, p. 742). I did not seek definite accounts but 
instead I have suggested one interpretation among many plausible ones. My intention was 
to seek entry points for a relational understanding of supporting self-management. By 
interviewing pairs of participants instead of individuals, the context was already relational.  
 
Instead of a view of narratives as a performance, where “the entire bodily presence and 
identity of the narrator are staged” (Hydén and Brockmeier, 2008, p. 10), I have considered 
how performativity shapes its intersubjective co-construction. The potential for change is 
realised through narrative scaffolds that subtly rework, re-appropriate and recreate 
meanings and norms of expectation. In particular, I have explored ways that the content 
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of stories may be adapted according to the context and co-narrators in the telling. This 
process is a joint accomplishment within the interaction, forming and reforming a sense 
of who we are as a continuous process.  
 
I proceed to consider aspects of reflexivity as a process between my approach to interviews 
and my analysis, particularly seeking to explore the “emotional, embodied, and performed 
dimensions” (Ezzy, 2010, p. 163). I commence by reflecting on my approach to interview 
contexts before considering the analytic significance of  ‘emotional overlaps’ (Feldman and 
Mandache, 2019) with participants during interviews. 
 
Reflexivity  
Approach to interviews  
When meeting with people for research interviews, my intention was to talk about what 
they wanted to say, instead of pursuing preconceived assumptions about what might be 
important to include. However, “all interpretations are provisional; they are made by 
positioned subjects who are prepared to know certain things and not others” (Rosaldo, 
1993, p. 8). Reflecting on my approach, I consider my spoken and unspoken framings of 
the interviews, and potential consequences. I explore ‘interruptions’ to these framings, 
illustrating with examples from one interview. 
 
Although I attempted to encourage participants’ own narration and avoid directive 
questioning (Jones, 2003), my initial open question, “How have things been since you were 
in hospital?” has normative expectations attached to it. The question assumes that the 
response will be orientated to particular aspects of experience, like improvement or lack 
thereof (Ryan, 2018). Thus, this opening question risked potential restriction of 
subjectivities within the space of our interaction: the ‘hail’ to a subject position which itself 
requires navigation. Through iterative processes of data generation and analysis, I became 
increasingly aware of the identity categories implied by my opening question (positioning 
participants as ‘a patient discharged from hospital’, ‘a person with brain injury’), which 
could potentially complicate the subjective (in)coherence that I sought to explore.  
 
Moments of interruption in interviews can unsettle the ‘researcher-participant’ framing of 
the relationship (Ryan and Ziebland, 2015). For example, Walter (introduced with his wife 
Ruby on p. 113) ‘undid’ my organisation of the research interview, as he nimbly and 
repeatedly attempted to position me as other than a researcher within our interactions. 
Instead, he attempted to produce a ‘host-guest’ relationship. In accepting his invitations 
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to show me his treasured belongings, we moved to other parts of his home or garden, 
disrupting the typically seated and stationary arrangement of a research interview. Walter 
offered to show me his book collection in the study upstairs (his “library”), then brought 
our attention to certain books, and ultimately insisted that I have two of these books as 
gifts to take home. These ‘interruptions’ challenged my assumptions and expectations; for 
instance, that I would contain our interaction, and maintain my identity as researcher. In 
walking and talking together around his home, he revised the narrative of his experiences 
“since being in hospital”, which I had framed in my opening question. Further, he created 
a new dyad, as he freed us from moments of tension and potential constraint in interaction 
that included his wife Ruby, who remained downstairs. Importantly, during these 
‘interruptions’, he created a context that brought to the fore our less formal homebody 
and entertaining sense of selves, which were not readily available in my (unspoken) formal 
‘rules’ of interviewing practice. 
 
This reflection has raised an area of interest for me around ‘mobile methods’ – for example, 
the use of walking as a method for doing social research (O’Neill, 2018). I am curious about 
the relational aspects that happen when walking with someone and talking, disrupting 
researcher-participant constraints that generally characterise the normative ‘fixing’ of 
interactional spaces in research interviews. 
 
Emotional overlaps 
The conventions of research practice require that we, ‘as researchers’, should exclude our 
emotional responses, through conscious denial or being subsumed as part of habitual 
practice (Law, 2016). Researchers reflecting on emotional entanglement when undertaking 
qualitative interviews have pointed to the significance of the central values of their 
previous professional training. For example, the teacher-researcher entanglement was 
considered to bring a pedagogical approach towards interviewees, leading the authors to 
reflect that  personal subjectivity and biography should be an integrated component 
within analysis (Holtan et al., 2014).  This ‘professional background conscious’ approach 
to analysis is also evident from the suggested need for clinicians to “turn the lantern of 
inquiry to oneself…if we cannot see ourselves in our explanations, perhaps we should 
pause before proffering these explanations to the [medical] profession’’ (Hendricks, 2008, 
p. 113). 
 
Undertaking this research from a professional background ‘as a clinician’, with people 
whom I have hailed (for participation in this research) ‘as patients with brain injury’ 
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invokes specific ethical considerations. I negotiated various identities during the 
fieldwork, which did not completely displace each other, as I shifted between the “pre-
established discourse” of my professional clinical background (Magnus, 2006, p. 99) and 
my qualitative researcher role. These dual positions presented ethical considerations, such 
as my sense of exploiting people’s experiences for the purposes of the research rather than 
offering personal ‘help’ for the challenging circumstances confronting them. I consider 
this in further detail relating to a particular example, below. 
 
In considering the emotion in my selection of data for detailed analysis, my emphasis has 
been on small moments of interaction - not overtly emotionally charged words or 
exchanges. I have highlighted small scale, fleeting emotions that may allow a reimagining 
of “a person’s relation to his or her vocational activity” (Rosiek and Snyder, 2018, p. 8).  
Moments of emotion that start as a vague feeling (for example, discomfort, connection, 
intimacy, irritation or concern), occur in both clinical and research interactions. Bringing 
attention to these fleeting moments might contribute to critical opening within the 
interaction, through exploration of my “emotional overlap” with participants (p. 227), as 
discussed in Chapter 5. This epistemological reflection offers a shift in the potential 
distancing that is normatively maintained through power asymmetry in clinical and 
research encounters.  I consider three examples from moments of interaction shared in 
Chapter 6. 
 
Firstly, I experienced ‘symbolic violence’ as a feeling of being controlled, in the interactions 
with Derek (Brenda’s partner), which appeared to be reproduced in  
everyday interactions with Brenda and had come to appear ‘natural’ in their narrative 
environment (Thapar-Björkert et al., 2016). I was aware of my reluctant compliance with 
his gendered narrative scaffolding. Perhaps I mirrored Brenda’s compliance, in the version 
of self that she co-constructed with Derek, which was dependent on these normative 
expectations.  However, reflecting on my emotions that were triggered by the sense of 
being controlled in these interactions with Derek (frustration and at times even anger), I 
ultimately became more aware of the fragility of our mutual subject positions. Derek, the 
main support person for Brenda since her injury, was struggling to maintain a position as 
the powerful agent, in control, at the same time as visibly struggling to stand from his 
chair in his home. Becoming complicit with his gendered normative expectations in 
interaction, I perhaps contributed to possibilities for a recreation of his desired position 
of strength. The potential power of my own positioning, ‘as a researcher’, ‘as a clinician’, 
was subsumed by his asserted positioning of me (and Brenda) ‘as a woman’, which we each 
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complied with. In doing so, and processing these moments of interaction subsequently, I 
began to appreciate the emotionally-driven complexities that scaffold Brenda and Derek’s 
narrative activities of the everyday. 
 
A further example of moments of emotional overlap during interviews related to feelings 
of emotional tension sensed between Andy and Danielle, which I shared, and feared I may 
have brought to the surface. Danielle questioned whether Andy had been attempting to 
hide his anxieties from her in the way he suggested he has been doing with his parents. In 
several moments of silence that we shared during this part of the interaction, it seemed as 
if a new, generative space for collaborative reflection and fluidity had opened up between 
the three of us, a depth of connection that had not been present until these shared silences, 
and an emotional awareness I had infrequently experienced in structured interactions 
from my distanced subject position ‘as a clinician’. Yet, in the intersubjective space of 
clinical encounter, subjective experiences are central to experience of care and ultimately 
to outcomes (Wong et al., 2018).   
 
As I discussed in Chapter 5, the traditional expectation for professionals is the 
performance of a dispassionate, distanced, and ‘objective’ manner for professionals, where 
‘professionalism’ becomes the “discursive and rhetorical practical compass for navigating 
interpersonal complexity” (Wong et al., 2018, p. 2) and is  integral to Menzies-Lyth’s notion 
of a social defence against anxiety (1970). A focus on the emotions of patients, rather than 
those relationally generated between clinician and patient, means they can be separated 
as ‘clinical products’ that then require professional assessment and intervention, or fixing, 
in a largely technical exchange that negates the critical intersubjectivity of these 
encounters. (Wong et al., 2018). For the clinician, emotions are to be managed within a 
performance of professional competency that includes affective control as well as 
technical competence. This stance is reflected through the medico-normative framework 
of do’s and don’ts that operate within the “hidden curriculum” of medicine, where the 
workspace is defined by “professionalism” and yet “no one talks about [this constraint] 
much” (Coulehan and Williams, 2001, p. 7). However, it includes the avoidance of 
expression or acknowledgement of own emotions, despite the complex intersubjective 
experiences that invariably constitute ‘the workspace’. 
 
Ewa was the only participant with whom I did not meet for a second interview, and is the 
interaction that feels most emotionally complex to explain, from this series of 
longitudinally organised research encounters. I was confronted by the sorts of difficulties 
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that perhaps maintain the suppression of emotional reflection in clinical and research 
practice - a sense of failure of intersubjective connection with Ewa, where I perhaps 
perpetuated the positioning portrayed in her stories about clinical interactions where she 
had felt disregarded, and as if she was not worthy of more considered and tailored 
attention. For Ewa, I sensed that the research interview may have recreated this, raising a 
question of whether I failed in an ethical obligation to her. After all, in this research 
interview, I too was offering nothing other than “a few questions, and that was it” (line 
470) as she had told of in the healthcare encounters where she felt dismissed. However, as 
noted by Twigg, “power relations are not unilateral”  (2011, p. 175). Ewa exercised her 
(perhaps unacknowledged) power, as the “one queried refus[ed] the one who queries” 
(Butler, 2005, p. 12): she had disengaged from clinical follow-ups, and I was unable to 
contact her again regarding the follow-up research interview. Although these observations 
may be explained in alternative ways (for example, Ewa may have returned to her family 
overseas meanwhile), I suggest the significance of this reflection lies in the intersubjective 
processing of what went on here, in contrast to the norms of a clinical encounter in which 
the next step would generally call for application of a ‘depression questionnaire’ (NICE, 
2018). In Ewa’s situation, lack of a sense of intersubjective connection could further risk 




Strengths and limitations 
A distinctive feature of this study has been inclusion of people who have experienced 
cognitive and communication consequences of TBI and might be excluded from a 
biographical narrative inquiry approach that anticipates a particular type of telling ‘big 
stories’. Further, the longitudinal approach to interview and analysis was possible due to 
a high ‘retention’ of participants in the study, achieving follow-up interviewing over the 
course of a year for each of nine out of the total of ten dyads. The dyadic approach to 
interviewing with family members and partners allowed the inclusion of family interaction 
as a unique source of understanding for how people position themselves in the 
adjustments following the experience of brain injury (Medved, 2014).  
 
Although I consider that dyadic research is a strength of this study, I acknowledge some 
critiques of this method. It is frequently suggested that people may feel inhibited from 
sharing their individual experience in the presence of a family member partner (Taylor 
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and De Vocht, 2011), or participants may comply with what they think is acceptable to 
their partner, or aligns with their partner’s assumed position (Zipp and Toth, 2002). 
However, my analysis explored joint negotiations and constructions of  brief extracts of 
narrative, rather than seeking to “tease out the individual experiences” (Taylor and De 
Vocht, 2011, p. 1577). I did not assume that there would be a single truth - one that is 
‘correct’ - which participants would openly talk about in the interview and I would then 
extract from the transcript, or that it would emerge from the data (Heidegger, 1998). In 
contrast to seeking the participants’ ‘true’ experiences or individual perspectives, my 
analysis instead acknowledges the “experience in the telling and its reception” (Frank, 
1997, p. 22) and attends to issues of negotiation in joint telling, particularly its fluidity 
across time, within my methodological approach of dyadic, longitudinal interviewing.  
 
Although follow-up interviews introduced a temporal component to the analysis, the 
practicalities of undertaking the project limited these to one additional time point over 
the course of a year after the first interview with each dyad. Further, the current study was 
restricted to people within the first few years following TBI. Looking at a longer time 
period could expand understanding of shifts in narrative scaffolds.  To analyse co-
constructions further, additional interviews may have allowed strengthening of the 
conceptual model developed from the theoretically guided analysis of empirical findings 
(Figures 5 and 6).  However, participants introduce nuanced temporal connections within 
each interview, and so my analysis in relation to time has not strictly depended upon 
interviewing at different time-points. Instead, my focus has been on the use of time within 
meaning-making in narration, for example through bringing attention to participants’ 
(and my own) positioning of the self in the ‘there and then’ of the story or the ‘here and 
now’ of the telling. By focusing on the brief moments of interaction, I consider navigation 
of sense of self as an ongoing process that is constantly taking place in mundane situations 
of the everyday, including the past, the present, and imagined futures. Bamberg argues: 
“if we take the notion of ‘life as a continuous process’ seriously, we may have to 
rethink qualitative methods, and narratives methods in particular, in terms of how 
they capture and do justice to the constant changes that take place” 
(Bamberg, 2008, p. check). 
 
A further consideration is that these interviews should be viewed as triadic instead of 
dyadic, in view of my own contribution to their co-construction, thereby maintaining 
awareness of positioning ‘as a researcher’ with its associated power asymmetries that may 
influence the trajectory of conversations. The analysis of positioning, using Bamberg’s 
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domains (Table 5), in combination with Butler’s theoretical constructs from 
performativity, enabled an opening up of my understandings of ‘agency’ and issues of 
power within narrative co-construction, by attending to how people position themselves, 
are positioned by others, and navigate between normative expectations, in maintaining a 
desired sense of self. Approaching sense of self as a “performative struggle over the 
meanings of experience” (Langellier et al., 2001, p. 3) allows analytic possibilities that may 
be overlooked  through static conceptions that assume unity of a singular, inner self tied 
to a particular position, such as that ‘as a researcher’. 
 
By invoking the dichotomy of ‘brain injury / no brain injury’ in my purposive sampling for 
this research study (i.e., inviting people on the basis of a diagnosis of TBI), I have inevitably 
reproduced the discourse that I critique: the totalising identity of ‘a person with brain 
injury’.  The alternative view of the subject, which I have attempted to develop through 
the analysis, highlights relational and embedded understandings of the self, and which, I 
propose, transcends this dichotomy. Further, the demographics of those included in the 
interviews represent subjects whom Henrich et al (2010) refer to as WEIRD: Western, 
Educated, Industrialised, Rich, and Democratic. Despite this, I argue that the analysis 
sheds light on co-construction of interactions that might be of relevance beyond these 
demographics, and beyond the geographical location of study (in the south of England).  
As I discussed in Chapter 5, my sampling intentions evolved from this type of fixed identity 
attribution, instead attending to a fluid, storied approach to sampling that attended to 
complex, changing social circumstances. Claims about idealised sampling, derived from 
assumptions based upon configurations of identity from demographic labels, risks an 
oversimplification of complex human spaces, potentially making invisible more subtle 
forms of human self-presentation (Horton and Horton, 2018). 
 
Although the extracts in Chapter 6 were not co-constructed in a clinical context, 
participants’ talk about clinical interactions demonstrated their meaning-making about 
professionals’ interventions and approaches to interaction that intended support after TBI. 
In Chapter 8, I contextualise these findings within my research objectives by exploring 
implications for approaches to support for self-management. I consider interviews with 
professionals to be beyond the scope of the current study.  
 
A common caveat in theoretically-guided analysis is that “every theory provides both a 
way of seeing and a way of not seeing” (Ray, 1996, p. 674) (italics in original). Through 
these narrative analytic methods, I do not intend to generate research generalisability - 
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that is, I do not propose that these experiences apply to all those after TBI, whose meaning-
making is situated in local social contexts. I have presented a conceptual model derived 
from theoretically-guided analysis of empirical data. Moving forward, this will require 
further research to elaborate and explore its potential for contribution to understandings 
of approaches in supporting for self-management after TBI, and for people living with long 
term conditions more broadly. I discuss these applications further in Chapter 8.   
 
Summary 
The stories told and re-told across two time points, presented in Chapter 6, demonstrate 
tensions between constancy and change for people living with TBI and significant others.  
Through analysis of these stories, I sought insights into self-management after TBI as a 
“construction process in situ” (Bamberg and Demuth, 2016, p. 18). In this chapter, I have 
returned to the concept of narrative scaffolding where meaning-making is a shared 
achievement, underpinned by “activities and interpretations of other persons” (Hydén, 
2017, p. 107). I also elaborated on negotiation of the interpellative hail that operates as an 
implicit binary (for example, participant-researcher, patient-clinician, dependent-
independent) and produces a labelling that has power to break up subjectivity – through 
an “alienation” from one’s own subjective life (Kitwood, 1997, p. 10).  
 
As we display a sense of who we are, we are affirmed or confronted, and we react. We turn 
these interactional practices into “rituals of identity work, that become metaphorically 
speaking ‘us’” (Bamberg and Demuth, 2016, p. 21). I have considered not only how narrative 
is co-constructed, but how it can be productive of new possible realities. Narrative 
scaffolding mediates between subject positions that are claimed, accepted, exploited or 
resisted, through reiterative shifts that maintain a platform for agency under conditions 








In this thesis, I have sought insights into the construct of supported self-management, a 
core component of patient-centred care in the NHS in England (de Silva, 2011a; NHS 
England, 2019). To date, supported self-management has infrequently been considered as 
an intervention framework for people living with traumatic brain injury (Mäkelä et al., 
2019; Muenchberger et al., 2011). I argue that exploration of narratives of TBI after hospital 
discharge can contribute to a broader conceptualisation of self-management, constituted 
by social relations that are characterised by norms and (potentially) diverging agendas or 
expectations. In proposing a relational understanding of  support for self-management, 
my framework contrasts with dominant approaches where the focus is typically on 
individual concerns, like biomedical constructions of health, as well as patients’ 
confidence with carrying out health-related tasks (Entwistle et al., 2018; Morgan et al., 
2017; Owens et al., 2017).   
 
Normative and individualised expectations of support for self-management are evident 
within documents that highlight, for example,  “a patient-oriented guide to educate 
patients about various aspects of self-management and to help them monitor their self-
management activities” (Schulman-Green et al., 2012, p. 144). Technologies such as 
standardised tools may intend to deliver patient-centred care, yet they also focus 
professional attention on a particular type of interaction, embedded within health systems’ 
expectations of proof that what clinicians do ‘works’, and works quickly, and can be 
measured (Turner-Stokes et al., 2005).  These kinds of nudges, toward a neoliberal 
construct of the self, obfuscate aspirations for a shift in power relations between 
healthcare professionals, patients and significant others, which could be facilitated 
through a new kind of self-management paradigm (Brahim, 2019; Carel and Kidd, 2014; 
Kennedy et al., 2013).  
 
I argue that dominant approaches to supported self-management (1) neglect the deeply 
complex and social nature of the relational support required, including the central role of 
the ‘patient-practitioner’ interaction itself; and (2) comprise underdeveloped notions of 
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self and identity, that rarely extend to intersubjective understandings. In this study, my 
focus on narratives of TBI and self-management is situated within a ‘disrupted identity’ 
approach (Bury, 1982; Corbin and Strauss, 1988; Krahn, 2015) and the accompanying 
expectation that support will help to ‘fix’ this disruption. Through analysis of co-
constructed stories with people living with TBI and a family member or partner, across 
two time points, I highlight a “crisis of positioning” (Horton and Horton, 2018, p. 1) for the 
person whose life is assumed to have been disrupted. In this research, stories of the hail to 
‘a person with brain injury’ positioned people as diminished (for example, through clinical 
assessments), thereby challenging a desired sense of self. Clinicians’ power, constructed 
through an ability to deeply ‘know’ about the nature of the disruption, paradoxically risks 
“violation to patients’ sense of self” (Kocman et al., 2019, p. 13) (italics mine).  
 
I argue that, if clinical interactions are to form the central ‘how’ of healthcare professionals’ 
support for self-management (Sheridan et al., 2018), then a nuanced understanding of  
meaning-making through talk-in-interaction is required. Support for self-management, as 
a mutual achievement through reiterations of shared meaning-making, calls for attention 
to the norms and expectations that surround the interaction asking what is left out, and 
what else might usefully be accommodated. 
 
In this chapter, I consider my analysis in relation to healthcare policy in the NHS in 
England. I then explore potential implications for healthcare interactions that intend to 
support self-management in clinical practice. I briefly describe a practice model for 
supported self-management in which stories told by people living with TBI form a central 
resource in shifting norms of professionals’ interactions, developed in a separate project 
through collaboration with Bridges Self-Management social enterprise (Makela et al., 2015; 
Mäkelä et al., 2019). Finally, I consider implications of my findings in relation to existing 
research and I discuss ideas for extending it. 
 
Policy 
Contemporary healthcare policy creates:  
“a difference between those needing help and those providing it… The provision of 
care has always been viewed as something done by one part of the population for 
another part…This allows for an emotional distancing, and a self-protective response 
that treats anyone in need of any sort of help as automatically ‘other’ and ‘different’”. 




When considering how the findings in this study might relate to healthcare policy, I 
consider its relevance at the level of understanding the context of supported self-
management, and its potential for contribution to the development of models for practice 
(Shaxson et al., 2012).  Policy intentions for self‐management support typically centre on 
the provision of education for patients to gain skills, with the aim of somehow empowering 
them (Wyatt et al., 2010). Here, patients are positioned as initially deficient, the ‘other’, 
and are assumed to be in need of help from the professional. As I discussed in Chapter 2, 
a traditional individualistic view of autonomy - that anticipates that the patient will be 
independent, rational and self‐governing - dominates self‐management-related policy, 
neglecting emotional and social contexts and arguably reinforcing inequities, within a 
neoliberal framing (Brahim, 2019; Vassilev et al., 2017). A policy agenda that structures 
support for self-management according to biomedical priorities fails to recognise the kinds 
of harm that can be caused when pursuing exclusively biomedical goals, with insufficient 
attention to people’s values and (socially shaped) capabilities (Entwistle et al., 2016). If 
self-management policies fail to recognise tensions that people experience as they navigate 
consequences of a condition within their social roles and identities, then support will lack 
meaning and relevance. Professional and patient behaviours may then constitute no more 
than transactional practices (Henwood et al., 2003; Horton and Horton, 2018), and remain 
bounded by distinct positions where a distanced professional stance deflects attention to 
the “pathological other”, legitimising the “expert” role within the interaction (Flick, 2019, 
p. 85).  
 
When considering policy aspirations of putting people at the centre of their care, 
‘personhood’, ‘selfhood’ and ‘identity’ are key concepts, and yet remain poorly 
conceptualised in this context (Horton and Horton, 2018). I propose that understandings 
of self and identity can be re-framed within co-constructed interactions. ‘Patient’ and 
‘professional’ subject positions are then considered relational within the ‘here and now’ of 
the clinical encounter and yet extend beyond it, thereby acknowledging social 
embeddedness and complexities of the everyday, where the health condition is only one 
factor. I proceed to consider implications of my findings in relation to current clinical 
practice (as introduced in Chapter 2), before introducing a practice model for supported 







“Tread softly because you tread on my dreams” 
(Yeats, 1899) 
 
Although support for self-management in clinical practice is typically presumed to involve 
“collaborative activity between patient and healthcare practitioner” (Rijken et al., 2008, p. 
117), substantial shortfalls have been identified in studies of its implementation 
internationally (Elissen et al., 2013, p. 6). Understanding of what comprises a collaborative 
interaction, or how it might be achieved, remains limited (Franklin et al., 2019; Jones et 
al., 2013; Morgan et al., 2017; Thille et al., 2014). Further, the self-management paradigm 
typically focusses on  patient-related behaviours and (dis)engagement, (Potter et al., 2018), 
without attention to professionals’ approaches to interactions and how they might 
influence the intended collaboration  (Bright et al., 2017). Recommendations for 
professionals’ practice suggest they should “support the active role of a patient” in the 
interaction (Alanko et al., 2019, p. 2280) and yet do not offer understandings or 
conceptualisations of how to achieve this type of support through the interaction.  
 
Big stories of ‘real’ events shape the healthcare language of interventions for people with 
long term conditions, including TBI. The “biographical gaze” expects the person to have a 
coherent biography and a life plan (Flick, 2019, p. 87). For example, clinical guidance 
recommends the inclusion of a summary of the patient’s “life story” in care plan 
documentation for older people as an attempt to deliver person-centred care (NICE, 2015, 
p. 6). When conducted as formal task by professionals, the implication is that a fixed, 
coherent and temporally ordered story can be identified and documented by the clinician 
and will be meaningful for the person. Further, life story resources and formats 
recommended for this purpose by professionals have: 
“the potential to be reduced to a rigid clinical encounter if the individual delivering 
the activity feels they must fill in each box in a prescribed order…the difference 
between performing a clinical test and facilitating life story work…may lie solely in 
the communication skills of the worker.”  
(Kindell et al., 2014, p. 7).  
 
In a further example, interactions such as goal-setting in self-management support may 
remain fixated on the represented contents of a biography, to conclude how the teller 
reflects on the self, disregarding relational constructedness of interaction (Meschitti, 
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2018). These practices turn peoples’ stories into a standalone product that can be acted 
upon by the professionals  - the ‘experts’ (Brockmeier and Meretoja, 2014, p. 20).  Studies 
have shown that goal-setting interactions for people who have experienced brain injury 
are likely professionally-determined: healthcare professionals name the things that will be 
attended to in the interaction, and frame the context in which professionals will attend to 
them with patients (Jones et al., 2016b).  
 
When considering self-management following TBI, issues of self, identity and relational 
support are  brought to the fore differently to other long term conditions, for example self-
management for diabetes mellitus (Hinder and Greenhalgh, 2012), where clinical 
surveillance and monitoring against biomedical targets predominate, rather than social 
and emotional aspects (Entwistle et al., 2018). Neurorehabilitation professionals attend to 
an assumed altered sense of self after TBI, which is typically attributed to cognitive and 
communicative impairments and situated within broader cultural understandings that 
‘you are your brain’ (Eagleman, 2015; Krahn, 2015).  In addition, a focus on supported self-
management for people who are living with TBI disrupts expectations of “an ‘ideal patient’ 
who operates in ‘activated’ and ‘motivated’ ways” to self-manage (Franklin et al., 2019, p. 
4). 
 
Conditions of constraint are typically attributed to neuropathological consequences of 
TBI. On the other hand, I propose that the notion of constraint also applies to healthcare 
professional/patient subjectivities, within increasingly target-driven healthcare cultures. 
Normative frames - “assumptions, values, and beliefs, by which individuals and 
organizations provide meaning to their daily activity, organize time and space, and 
reproduce their lives and experiences”  (Thornton et al., 2012, p. 2) - regulate the subject 
positions of ‘patient’ and ‘clinician’. Although these tensions are not widely spoken of 
among practitioners (Entwistle et al., 2018; Jones et al., 2013; Morgan et al., 2017; Sheridan 
et al., 2018), research into professionals’ experiences of supporting self-management do 
allude to them through discourses such as :  
“working hard to change their communication style to one that allowed or 
encouraged the patient the opportunity to talk and express how they felt, in order to 
avoid making assumptions about the feelings, needs and preferences of patients.” 
(Mudge et al., 2015, p. 8) 
 
Charon advocates a form of deep listening in which healthcare professionals “will, between 
the lines of listening, recognize what the teller is revealing about the self” (Charon, 2008, 
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p. 66). I propose that, instead of simply listening to recognise what patients are “revealing” 
about the self, healthcare professionals and patients (and family members or others) 
instead could become more aware of the mutual co-construction of feelings and social 
realities, through scaffolds of interaction that constrain or generate what is possible to 
know. By problematising ‘individual voice’ as the unit of focus in supported self-
management interactions, I propose a relational understanding of supporting self-
management and a focus at the ‘micro’ level of interactions where healthcare staff 
potentially miss, suppress or inspire patients through the positions they take up in their 
interactions. The practice model introduced below illustrates one way of moving toward 
such interactional co-construction. 
 
In the current study, participants frequently identified a ‘professional stance’ where 
clinicians had interacted with them as if  in “a field of objects from which one remains 
strangely distanced and toward which one acts instrumentally” (Butler, 2008, p. 98). For 
example, Claire describes the medical discourse that overshadows her own priorities in 
encounters with professionals intending to support her recovery. She identifies this failed 
collaboration as potentially detrimental not only to her progress, but also for those 
positioned ‘as a clinician’ in interaction with her as a person living with TBI. Claire explains 
her metaphor of a “personal platform” in clinical interactions, in contrast to a focus that is 
“solely medical, ‘You’ve got that, that is going to be like that, you are going to get these 
drugs, and it can have these side effects, but that will be all right’”. She explains that a 
more reciprocal exchange could “in turn, help those people [clinicians] be more educated, 
or have more knowledge”. The creation of opportunities for “listening and understanding 
in new and often surprising ways” (Hydén, 2018, p. 49), brings attention to the 
intersubjective space and its generative potential, instead of  a technical transaction or 
constrained ‘protocol’ for self-management support. 
 
The notion of relationships as the core of service design and delivery is not well established 
in Western healthcare in general (Wise, 2019), though applications are described in mental 
health contexts. Literature on relational psychoanalysis has emphasised “the mutual 
construction of meaning in the analytic relationship” (DeYoung, 2014, p. 28), and 
advocates for a relational recovery approach to mental health (in contrast to an 
individualistic approach) propose that there is a need to “properly acknowledge the 
irreducibly relational nature of recovery” (Price-Robertson et al., 2017, p. 108). Models of 
‘family recovery’ promote a perspective of processes that are distributed throughout a 




Challenges remain in how professionals might co-construct support within the established 
norms and cultures that structure their relationship with patients and families. 
Conceptualising self-management as mutual construction raises questions about the 
scaffolding that might be achievable between the ‘patient-as-person’ and the ‘clinician-as-
person’. The idea of ‘doctor-as-person’ was described almost two decades ago, when its 
integral place in patient-centred care was proposed (Mead and Bower, 2000), yet this idea 
remains underdeveloped in contemporary interpretations of patient-centeredness (Beach 
and Inui, 2006). The clinician-as-person idea calls for the capacity for self-awareness in 
relational interactions that challenges the positioning of ‘clinician-as-expert’. I propose 
that consideration of the intersubjective – the interaction as a co-construction - can 
generate opportunities to relate not only to the person at the time of the interaction, but 
also by allowing renegotiation of selves, acknowledging “identities as contextual, and 
draft-like processes” (Bamberg, 1997, p. 7). This intersubjective space opens opportunities 
for sharing stories as a resource, where the telling may relate to recollections (whether 
‘real memories’ or not) and to future imaginaries (which may be ‘achievable’ or not), and 
would otherwise be clinically closed down by categorisation as deficit (‘lack of insight’) by 
the clinician-as-expert. Instead, it requires an expansiveness beyond norms and 
expectations, "a risking of [selves], a moving out and a moving towards"(Kitwood, 1997, p. 
4). 
 
How supported self-management can be (co)produced through talk requires a radical shift 
from the dominant literature on supported self-management, which retains the expert 
position of the healthcare professional (Jones et al., 2013; Owens et al., 2017), whose 
training and professionalisation, in turn, instil a tacit expectation of taking control of 
patients’ problems (Elissen et al., 2013). Shifts in norms are necessary “to weaken 
understandings, structures and practices that sustain established ways of 
working…[through] disrupting activities that encourage professionals to question and 
reflect on elements of their established way of working” (Huq and Woiceshyn, 2019, p. 2). 
These practices are formed within dominant discourses that continually evolve (Crowther, 
2000). Thus, reiterations can bring to the fore possibilities of disruption, including 
possibilities for a re-working of the identity ‘clinician-as-expert’.  
 
There is much overlap between approaches to supporting self-management and for the 
implementation of shared decision-making in healthcare.  In each model, professionals 
and patients are anticipated to achieve collaboration and shared goals in interaction.  
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‘Shared decision-making’ has become well recognised within person-centred care 
practices  internationally, intending more positive interpersonal encounters in health care 
settings that might enhance agency and meaning-making (Carney, 2014; Knight et al., 
2018).  In the NHS in England, it is manifest in the rhetoric of ‘no decision about me 
without me’. However, many  differences of opinion surround shared decision-making and 
knowledge is limited about the best strategies for its implementation, as it “does not 
happen with the ease implied by current models” (de Silva, 2012, p. 29). Behaviours and 
beliefs of healthcare professionals remain central to the realisation of reciprocal 
relationships in conversational activities underpinning supported self-management or 
shared decision making intentions. For example, professionals may hold normative beliefs 
that it is “not possible to respect a patient’s autonomy while still delivering high-quality 
evidence-based care”  (de Silva, 2012, p. 29). 
 
Healthcare professionals seeking to support self-management might reconsider their 
positioning in  clinical interactions through reflexive abilities, acknowledging that “even 
if positioning is a joint process, participants in a conversation can consciously work on it” 
(Meschitti, 2018, p. 5). Others have prop0sed that healthcare professionals might 
“recognise and develop an awareness of the potential implications of the 
narratives/discourses we adapt in our dealings with others” (Burr, 1998, p. 147). In this way, 
the promotion of “positions in discourses which are less personally damaging” (p. 151) 
might start with an awareness of the potential impacts of the clinical interaction itself, 
including clinical predictions about recovery trajectories and outcomes (Kulnik et al., 
2017). This shift toward prioritisation of interpersonal capabilities (instead of clinical, 
‘rational’ ones) calls for: 
 “an epistemology of practice implicit in the artistic, intuitive processes which some 
practitioners do bring to situations of uncertainty, instability, uniqueness, and value 
conflict”  
(Schön, 1983, p. 49). 
 
To summarise, instead of seeing narrative as yet another therapeutic ‘tool’ to be applied 
by the clinician-as-expert in support of interaction, I instead bring to the fore the 
“intersubjective dynamics in relationship between teller and listener” (Hydén and 
Brockmeier, 2008, p. 7). A greater emphasis on the intersubjective space offers 
transformative potential that contrasts with normative, standardised practices that risk  
violation of “the mystery of the other…reducing his or her consciousness or freedom to 




In the following section, I describe an example of a practice model that intends to shift 
norms of clinical interactions in supporting people living with TBI and their families, 
within a service improvement project using principles of coproduction, through a 
collaboration with ‘Bridges Self-Management’ social enterprise. 
 
Practice model 
Coproduction is considered to represent one mechanism through which power relations 
within healthcare services can be challenged (as discussed in Chapter 1).  ‘Coproduction’ 
is an elastic term (Verscheure et al, 2012; Palumbo, 2016) but is underpinned by the 
principle that “you start from the people themselves and find out what they think works 
well, and what needs to be addressed” (SCIE, 2009, p. 4).  This approach contests the 
traditional biomedical model of healthcare services and the maintenance of control by 
healthcare professionals (Palumbo, 2016). Coproduction may ultimately be compatible 
with broader interpretations and implementation of a relational understanding of self-
management. 
 
In conjunction with colleagues in the brain injury team at King’s College Hospital NHS 
Foundation Trust, I collaborated with Bridges Self-Management in an empirical study that 
is closely related to (but distinct from) my research in this thesis. After securing funding 
for a service innovation project from the Health Foundation UK, we collaborated with 
people living with TBI, their families, and multidisciplinary professionals working in acute 
trauma and rehabilitation settings, to co-design a novel self-management support 
intervention. This was informed by Bridges’ established model for people living with 
stroke (Jones et al., 2016a). A key component in the development of the intervention 
centred on stories told by people living with TBI and their family members and friends. 
These stories offer a rich resource for healthcare professionals that shift the interaction 
from professionals’ priorities to people’s own priorities and ways of talking about 
managing the everyday, for example, their stories about ‘things that make me…me’. The 
stories are presented in people’s own words within two complementary books, one for 
people with TBI and one for family and friends. Staff training introduces ways of 
implementing these resources within interactions and, importantly, emphasis is place on 
the intervention not simply being “a book” to be “given out”, without interactional 
support. We have reported elsewhere on these co-design activities, and the feasibility of 
implementation of this supported self-management approach (Mäkelä et al., 2019). This 
work offers a practice framework for supporting self-management after TBI: a map of what 
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can be done, a tangible, co-designed format that helps practitioners to make sense of 
collaborative principles in clinical interactions (Connolly, 2013).   
 
Research  
Contributions of this thesis include empirical insights into families’ adjustments following 
an experience of TBI; theoretical application of combined concepts from performativity, 
positioning, and narrative scaffolding; and methodological extension through dyadic, 
longitudinal narrative interviewing, which has been infrequently used within 
neurorehabilitation research. Qualitative longitudinal research is “relatively unknown 
within the field of rehabilitation” yet ideal for research that aims to understand health-
related challenges that unfold over time (Solomon et al., 2019, p. 1). Similarly, there has 
been little direct research seeking understandings of the role of storytelling within  TBI 
rehabilitation (Weatherhead and Todd, 2013). However, in recent years, research interest 
in narratives as a therapeutic approach after TBI has increased, for example intending to 
address “how brain damage disrupts survivors’ narratives about who they are, as well as 
their spontaneous efforts to cope with these changes via the generation of alternative 
narratives” (Salas and Prigatano, 2018, p.25). This research direction assumes that the 
narration will involve ‘big stories’ and does not elaborate on the central question of how 
this may or may not be helpful in co-creating collaboration in interactions between 
professionals and people living with TBI. 
 
Through the current research, I have focused on understanding what might be 
accomplished through ‘small’, fleeting storytelling and re-tellings. Extending this work to 
consider its implications for research requires consideration of practices that are tied to 
specific subjectivities, arising unpredictably within clinical interactions and requiring the 
negotiation of power. I propose that understandings of subjective effects of labelling – the 
positions to which people are interpellated or ‘hailed’ – provides one way of raising 
awareness over “the labels which patients are given [that] may be detrimental  in 
healthcare interactions”(Gershater and Forbes, 2013, p. 78). I have demonstrated the work 
of navigating sense of self when confronted by a hail to a position that challenges the 
desired self and expects “a particular patient voice” in the interaction (Gardner and Cribb, 
2016, p. 1052).  
 
The theory of performativity has been critiqued in terms of difficulties in its empirical 
application (Riach et al, 2016). In common with a wide variety of research endeavours 
(from exploring nursing home staff-resident-family interactions in England (Mäkelä, 2018) 
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to performative practices that produce donkeys’ marginalised status in Botswana (Geiger 
and Hovorka, 2015)), I consider that concepts from Butler’s performativity have helped me 
to open up new ways of thinking, for example, about ways that meanings are co-created, 
repeated and re-created. Critics have suggested that Butler's performativity creates a 
distancing from our everyday ways of thinking about the self (Fraser, 2013). By contrast, 
my application of constructs  (particularly normativity, citationality and signification, as 
discussed in Chapter 7 (Butler, 2005; Nakassis, 2013), in conjunction with positioning 
analysis to consider challenges to sense of self (Bamberg, 2004a), has rendered certain 
things more visible and offered disruptive openings in my interpretations.   
 
Although I have focused here on narrative construction with people living with TBI,  the 
analytic approach and conceptual model may hold applicability to research on long term 
conditions more broadly, particularly those that involve positioning in “dominant 
power/knowledge hierarchies” (Bantjes and Swartz, 2019, p. 3) and where professionals 
may be “enabled in and constrained by mechanisms and institutions that they very much 
take for granted” (Gardner, 2001, p. 192). The framing of narratives as co-constructed, 
within inherently collaborative interactional processes, may be applicable for research 
particularly into conditions where people may be ‘othered’, or where there are associations 
to ‘hidden’ challenges to the sense of self (for example, narratives of people living with 
substance dependence, self-injury, depression, or people who are classified as ‘frail’), 
rather than over-emphasising first-person ‘life story’ accounts. 
 
Future research 
In the course of undertaking this research, I have identified avenues of further inquiry that 
lie beyond the practical scope of this thesis.  Beyond further elaboration of the positioning-
performative analytic framework that I have applied, and the conceptual model outlined 
(Figure 6), I would particularly like to explore additional research openings that include: 
(1) metaphor in narration; (2) pets within narrative interviews, (3) emotion in research and 
clinical interaction; and (4) talk-in-interaction about supporting self-management, co-
constructed with healthcare professionals. I consider each of these four areas briefly below 
and, in each case, I include a possible question as an initial prompt for further research. 
 
Metaphor 
Much social science research focuses upon the effect of recurring metaphors in framing 
the social world (Checkland et al., 2019). Metaphors represent an important narrative 
form, communicating complex concepts using analogy and inference that may indicate 
180 
 
underlying norms and expectations (Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005; Turner, 1975). 
Metaphors were often by the participants in this study, for example, Andy described his 
partner, Danielle, and their dog, Titan, as “my two rocks” (line 228), and Monte talked of 
going back to his family home as a place to “just drop my gloves” (line 209), and not need 
“my warrior voice” (line 218).  Further, in giving my account of this study, I have relied on 
the metaphor of ‘scaffolding’ to represent an underpinning concept of mutual self-crafting, 
where I propose the tailoring of something that already exists. By contrast, metaphors of 
‘loss’ of self or ‘void’ in the self after TBI (Nochi, 1998, 1997) invoke total devastation, as if 
“one’s old self has died” (Brown et al., 1997, p. 21); the need to start again. 
 
Metaphor has generative potential to develop ideas in novel ways while also being 
embedded in the conventional language of daily life (Latham and Faulkner, 2019). In future 
research (or a secondary analysis of these data), a focus on metaphors could lead to 
additional insights in narrative analysis, or allow further consideration of their use within 
clinical interactions that intend to support self-management.  
 
Question: How is metaphor used to convey normative expectations or as a resource in 
shifting narrative scaffolds after TBI? 
 
Pets 
I am interested in exploring literature on pets in qualitative research into long term 
conditions, for example, “how pets feature in people’s narrative accounts of their 
experiences” (Ryan and Ziebland, 2015, p. 67). I am particularly interested in analysis that 
brings attention to pets as characters in relation to self-crafting after TBI. Positioning of 
people in relation to pets was frequently apparent in these interviews, including 
participants’ talk about the pets’ views of subjects within narration. By way of brief 
example, I present two extracts where pets were brought into focus by participants 
introduced in Chapter 6.  After Brenda had shared fond stories of their (now deceased) 
dog, of whom there were many photos around the home, Derek (her partner) went on to 
comment: 
“He was Brenda’s dog, and he loved her dearly [laughs], and as soon as I came home, 
he didn’t want to know her [laughs]”  
(Brenda’s partner Derek, Interview 1) 
 
By contrast, when a dog and cat joined us in the room where Toby, his mother Susan and 
I were talking during the first interview at their home, Susan’s storytelling first positioned 
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the cat as a significant character for the family, by explaining that the cat was older than 
Toby, before going on to emphasise, in Toby’s presence: 
"The dog and cat get jealous for Toby’s attention, him more than anyone else in the 
family” 
(Toby’s mother Susan, Interview 1) 
 
In earlier chapters, I discussed Derek’s reworking of narrative scaffolds in claiming a 
desired sense of self when facing physical fragility and altered ‘male’ positioning, and 
Susan’s positioning of her son Toby as capable, in contrast with his stories of healthcare 
professionals’ insistence on highlighting cognitive deficits. Further analysis of these 
interviews, attending to the many times that pets were present and physically contributed, 
or emotions and perspectives were attributed to them, or they were talked about as 
characters of strength in stories, would allow consideration of performative relationality 
with pets that is central in reiterations of kinship, home and everyday life for many, 
recognising the production and reproduction of selves “in specific contexts of human/ 
non-human interaction’’ (Barad, 2007; Birke et al., 2004, p. 169). 
 
Question: How does relationality with pets constitute a performative affordance in 
storytelling, when facing challenges to self after TBI? 
 
Emotion 
I am interested in further exploring emotion in the stories shared in these interviews, in 
two particular ways.  Firstly, to analyse the power of emotion through the co-constructed 
story to which it is attached: “deep feelings are linked to a deep story” (Hochschild, 2019, 
p. 12), where a ‘deep story’ is one evoking a range of emotions. Here, deep storytelling may 
reaffirm kinship relationships and signal resolution of differences around inchoate 
emotional forces.  
 
Secondly, attention to moments of heightened emotional awareness within my analysis 
has raised a question for me about the significance of contrasting moments: those where 
emotion seems to be absent or somehow does not register as emotion. Silent emotion - 
that is not explicitly expressed or attended to - may shape the interaction by becoming an 
entrée for  “busywork”, that is, technocratic and time-consuming distraction activities 
(Madden and Speed, 2017, p. 1). A seemingly non-emotive interaction may then take the 
place of a potentially emotion-laden exchange. Through reiterative practice, this may 
become the recurring norm or the taken-for-granted behaviour as “repeated practices that 
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cultivate certain emotions over others and certain ways of experiencing them over an array 
of options” (Cantó-Milà, 2016, p. 1). 
 
I consider the ‘problematic of silence’ in qualitative research (Mazzei, 2007, 2003), and 
Morison and Macleod’s work on “taken-for-granted normative frameworks in veiled 
silences” (2014, p. 694), as potentially useful starting points in the development of this line 
of narrative inquiry. Here, ‘veiling’ refers to the masking of a speakers’ silence on a 
particular issue. Extending this concept, I am interested in what can be learned from 
moments where absence-of-emotion (instead of absence-of-voice) is masked within co-
constructed narration. The masking may take the form of unemotive talk, or 
inauthenticity that marks out “absent present” emotion (Mazzei, 2017, p. 677). This type 
of analysis may identify otherwise unrecognised emotion that signals a positioning 
challenge to sense of self. For example, anxiety may have been the ‘absent-present’ 
emotion in Chloe’s father Aaron’s narration, for example when saying: “My advice is to 
ignore all advice and enjoy student life!” (Chloe’s father Aaron, Interview 1).  
 
Question: How can understandings of co-constructed emotion in narration inform 
interactions that intend to support self-management? 
 
Healthcare professionals 
Extending this research, there is scope to explore how healthcare professionals navigate 
agency within conditions of constraint through the hail to a professional identity, and 
within the normative expectations of a healthcare institution. The analytic framework I 
have described (combining positioning, performativity and narrative scaffolding) could be 
explored and extended in analysis of healthcare professionals’ talk. One line of inquiry 
could explore talk that is situated within entanglements with elements that are “both 
material and discursive—objects, signs, physical acts, utterances, bodies” (Mazzei, 2017, p. 
679), for example objects such as clinical ‘tools’ that are routinely used to structure 
interactions.  
 
The conceptual model could be applied to analysis of interactions in which 
multidisciplinary rehabilitation professionals implement the co-designed supported self-
management intervention for people living with TBI outlined above (Mäkelä et al., 2019). 
I would consider whether “normative restructuring” occurs – that is, changes to norms, 
rules and resources in professionals’ interactions with people living with TBI and families 
(May et al., 2016, p. 5) where “interactional asymmetry” may occur (Myrberg et al., 2018, p. 
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418) The co-designed resources, including stories from other people living with TBI, and 
their families, in managing everyday life and ‘being me’, might enable a shift in 
interactional norms of self-management support, opening up an intersubjective space. 
 
Question: How can norms of clinical interaction shift to create useful inter-subjectivities 







“Good patient-professional communication” is identified as a central component of self-
management support, to enable patients to feel “in control” (Pearce et al., 2015, p. 1). 
However, healthcare encounters may paradoxically constrain agency. In this thesis, I have 
explored the co-construction of stories about managing in everyday life with people living 
with TBI and their significant others. I have highlighted under-explored issues of how 
families sustain, or readjust, their narrative environments after TBI, and suggest 
implications that involve complex relationships of mutual interdependence and support. 
I have considered challenges of positioning, where new sources of adversity can arise not 
only through TBI impairments but through the dominant expectation: ‘you have changed’. 
 
A focus on managing the everyday following TBI has brought to the fore issues of self, 
identity, and agency, within a culture where you are your brain (Krahn, 2015), and a 
dominant dichotomy of understanding the self as being defined ‘before’ and ‘after’ onset 
of a heath  condition (Power et al., 2018). Despite the centrality of ‘personhood’ and the 
‘self’ within the contemporary health system constructs of person-centred care and self-
management, these concepts remain poorly understood within clinicians’ approaches and 
interventions (Entwistle et al., 2018). The experience of TBI, and onset of long term 
conditions more generally, is viewed as biographically disruptive (Bury, 1982) or is 
alternatively conceptualised within narrative achievements of continuity in an inner self 
(Gelech et al., 2017) or as biographical flow (Faircloth et al., 2004). By contrast, the 
narratives in this study demonstrate navigation of consistency and change, aligning with 
emergent research suggesting that implications a person's narrative will be dominated by 
either disruption or flow are an over-simplification (Meijering et al., 2018).  
 
The focus on brief moments of talk-in-interaction has allowed a different way of looking 
at illness narratives in this research, which I have interpreted through iterative 
applications of positioning analysis (Bamberg, 2004a) and performativity (Butler, 1993), 
brought together through an elaboration of the concept of narrative scaffolding (Hydén, 
2011). I propose a need for attention to co-constructed narrative scaffolds as a collaborative 
activity in interaction, offering generative potential in recrafting sense of desired self in 
the face of positions of constraint. Potential for shifts in norms of clinical interaction 
require further exploration, to understand how a focus on the intersubjective interaction, 
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beyond the norms of the ‘social script’ of the patient-professional encounter, might 
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1: Literature review resources 
 
These literature review resources were initially developed in the DProf assignment FHSS804: ‘A 
scoping review on self-management after traumatic brain injury’ 
 
Appendix 1a)  
Sample MEDLINE Search Strategy: 
 
1     exp Brain Injuries/ (52443) 
2     "brain injury".ti,ab. (37988) 
3     exp Craniocerebral Trauma/ (127017) 
4     "head injury".ti,ab. (15068) 
5     1 or 2 or 3 or 4 (145533) 
6     exp Self Care/ (43160) 
7     exp Self Efficacy/ (13190) 
8     "expert patient".ti,ab. (95) 
9     "self care".ti,ab. (11029) 
10    "self management".ti,ab. (9258) 
11   6 or 7 or 8 or 9 or 10 (65005) 
12   5 and 11 (272) 















Table: Inclusion and exclusion criteria applied to abstracts in literature review of self-
management support after TBI 
Inclusion criteria Exclusion criteria 
Relating to self-management following 
brain injury  
Diagnosis of acquired brain injury of any 
cause but traumatic brain injury 
represented in sample 
Healthcare professionals supporting 
self-management for people after brain 
injury 
Interventions to support self-
management after brain injury 
Development of outcome measures for 
supported self-management after brain 
injury 
Solely on pathophysiology, prevention, 
assessment, treatment or other 
unrelated aspects of clinical 
management 
No representation of traumatic brain 
injury within sample diagnoses 
Self-management in non-brain injury 
contexts 
Reported in a language other than 
English 















Table: Breakdown of numbers of articles identified phases of literature search  
 Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 
Medline 262 33 12 
CINAHL 166 25 6 
PsychINFO 55 15 2 
EMBASE 45 4 0 
AMED 34 5 0 
Cochrane 17 4 0 
ProQuest   11 4 0 
























Figure: Literature selection process 
Total number of abstracts
in Phase 2
n = 90













Summary table of articles included in literature review (Chapter 2) 
 
 
Papers relating to self-management support interventions 
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Papers relating to self-efficacy after brain injury 
 
 Ref Title Study type Summary of 
purpose 
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Selected papers using qualitative approach 
 
 Ref Title Study type Summary of 
purpose 
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2: Initial sampling frame  
 
NB: sampling moved away from these initial categories as the research project progressed  
(sampling changes are described in Chapter 5) 
 
 Younger age group 
(18 - 25) 
Mid-range age 
group 
(25 - 65) 




X X X 
Employed/studying 
pre-TBI 
X X X 
More severe TBI: 
requiring initial 
management in 
Intensive Care Unit 
X X X 
Less severe TBI:  
Not requiring 
initial management 
in Intensive Care 
Unit  
X X X 
 
 Participation sample size: 8 -12 people after TBI (If two age range categories used (<40 or 
>40) then sample size of 8. If the three categories above used, then sample size of 12) 
 In addition, one relative or significant as identified by each individual after TBI invited to 
join dyadic interview 
 The variable of requiring/not requiring initial management in the Intensive Care Unit 
intended sampling of a range of TBI severity of that could be clearly established at 
recruitment (Bulger et al, 2002), avoiding practical obstacles of inconsistent recording of 













Participant information sheet 
 
A project to understand how people manage in their daily lives  
following a traumatic brain injury 
 
 
Full title: A narrative inquiry into how people with traumatic brain 
injury ‘self-manage’ after discharge from hospital 
 
What is the purpose of this project?  
After traumatic brain injury (TBI), people often experience problems 
that may include a change in their mood, difficulties with memory or 
concentration, and challenges managing everyday activities. We know 
that some of the problems can persist after the initial brain injury and 
can have an impact on aspects of everyday life for the person with TBI 
and their family.  
 
Many problems experienced by people after TBI are not fully 
acknowledged by all healthcare professionals or within society in 
general. At present, people may receive little support for getting on 
with their lives, and options for help are limited.  
 
After discharge from hospital following TBI, people work out their own 
ways to manage challenges within their daily lives, often with support 
of family and friends. This project is intended to find out from people 
after TBI themselves, and family members or significant others, how 
they manage, what helps, and what would be important for healthcare 
professionals to know about in supporting other people to manage. 
 
What will happen? 
The researcher will discuss the project with you, either when you/ your 
family member or significant other is ready to leave the hospital, or 
when you have outpatient clinic follow-up.  
 
You will be asked whether you would be willing for your General 
Practitioner to be informed that you are participating in the study, and 
for them to be provided with information, by the researcher, about 




You will be given a chance to ask questions and, if you agree to 
participate, you will be asked to sign a consent form. 
 
The researcher will discuss with you when and where would be 
convenient to meet with you for an interview. This could be in your 
own home if you prefer, or at another location. It is important that the 
location is quiet and that interruptions will be minimised. Although 
‘interview’ sounds very formal, it will be conducted as a relaxed 
conversation and you will be able to have breaks as you wish. The 
interview will last around one hour but this will depend on the individual 
and how much they would like to say. The interviews will be recorded 
with a digital recorder and will later be transcribed into a written 
version. 
 
What if I change my mind? 
You will be free to withdraw your consent to participate in the study at 
any time and without giving any reason. There will be no change in, or 
effects on, your (or your relative’s) usual care.  
 
Will my expenses be covered? 
Yes. You will be reimbursed for your travel expenses and you will be 
given a grocery store voucher in recognition of your time and input.  
 
What will happen after the project is finished?  
The interviews will be analysed to find out what people have said about 
how they (or their relative) manage in their daily lives after TBI. This 
information will be used to increase understanding of what can help 
other people after TBI, and how healthcare professionals can best 
support them. 
 
Who is carrying out the project? 
The project is being undertaken by a Consultant in Rehabilitation 
Medicine based at King’s College Hospital, who is undertaking this 
study as part of a professional doctorate degree that is academically 
supervised by the University of Westminster, London.   
 
If you have any concerns: 
If you are unhappy about anything to do with this reseach study and 
you wish to complain formally, you can do this by contacting the Patient 
Advice and Liaison Service (PALS) at King’s College Hospital: 
Email kch-tr.PALS@nhs.net or telephone: 020 32993601. 
 
Further information and contact details: 











Information sheet for family member or ‘significant other’ 
 
A project to understand how people manage in their daily lives  
following a traumatic brain injury 
 
Full title: A narrative inquiry into how people with traumatic brain 
injury ‘self-manage’ after discharge from hospital 
 
You are being invited to participate in a research study. This 
information sheet explains why the research is being done and what 
would happen if you agree to be involved. Please ask the researcher if 
you would like additional information or have any questions - contact 
details are available at the bottom of this sheet. 
 
What is the purpose of this project? 
After traumatic brain injury (TBI), people often experience problems 
that may include a change in their mood, difficulties with memory or 
concentration, and challenges managing everyday activities. We know 
that some of the problems can persist after the initial brain injury and 
can have an impact on aspects of everyday life for the person with TBI 
and their family. 
 
Many problems of these experienced by people after TBI are not fully 
acknowledged by all healthcare professionals or within society in 
general. After discharge from hospital following TBI, people work out 
their own ways to manage challenges within their daily lives, often with 
support of family and friends. 
 
This project is intended to find out from people after TBI themselves, 
and their family members or significant others, how they manage, what 
helps, and what would be important for healthcare professionals to 
know about in supporting other people to manage. 
 
What will happen? 
Each person with TBI who has agreed to take part in this study will be 
asked to identity one person who is close to them, to participate as 
well. This may be a family member or someone who is considered to 
be their ‘significant other’, in terms of support provided to them. 
 
You will be given a chance to ask questions and, if you agree to 
participate, you will be asked to sign a consent form. The researcher 
will discuss with you when and where would be convenient to meet 
with you for an interview. This could be in your own home if you prefer, 
or at another location. It is important that the location is quiet and that 
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interruptions will be minimised.  
 
Although ‘interview’ sounds very formal, it will be conducted as a 
relaxed conversation and you will be able to have breaks as you wish. 
The interview will last around one hour but this will depend on each 
person and how much they would like to say. The interviews will be 
recorded with a digital recorder and will later be transcribed into a 
written version.  
 
You will be asked to participate in a similar, follow-on interview 
approximately six months later, again at a time and location 
convenient for you. Any information you provide will be anonymous. 
Information used in the research study will not include details that 
identify you personally. 
 
Why have I been chosen? 
You have been asked to participate as someone identified by a person 
who has experienced TBI from whom they receive support, as you may 
be able to share insights for others, about how you manage this. 
 
What if I change my mind? 
You will be free to withdraw your consent to participate in the study at 
any time and without giving any reason. There will be no change in, or 
effects on, your relative’s usual care or any support that you would be 
offered as part of usual services. 
 
Will my expenses be covered? 
Yes. You will be reimbursed for any travel expenses incurred for the 
study, and you will be given a grocery store voucher in recognition of 
your time and input, for each of the two interviews. 
 
What will happen after the project is finished? 
All interviews will be analysed to find out what people have said about 
how they manage in their daily lives, after their or their relative’s TBI. 
This information will be used to increase understanding of what can 
help other people after TBI, their families and significant others, and 
how healthcare professionals can best support them. Information will 
also be made available to health care professionals and other 
researchers, though articles published in medical journals. 
 
Who is carrying out the project? 
The study is being undertaken by a Consultant in Rehabilitation 
Medicine based at King’s College Hospital, who is undertaking this 
study as part of a professional doctorate degree that is academically 







If you have any concerns: 
If you are unhappy about anything to do with this research study and 
you wish to complain formally, you can do this by contacting the Patient 
Advice and Liaison Service (PALS) at King’s College Hospital: 
Email kch-tr.PALS@nhs.net or telephone: 020 32993601. 
 
 
Further information and contact details: 











Information sheet for General Practitioners  
 
A project to understand how people manage in their daily lives  
following a traumatic brain injury 
 
Full title: A narrative inquiry into how people with traumatic brain 
injury ‘self-manage’ after discharge from hospital 
This sheet provides information about a research study in which a 
patient under your care has agreed to participate. 
 
What is the purpose of this project?  
After traumatic brain injury (TBI), people often experience problems 
that may include a change in their mood, difficulties with memory or 
concentration, and challenges managing everyday activities. We know 
that some of the problems can persist after the initial brain injury and 
can have an impact on aspects of everyday life for the person with TBI 
and their family.  
 
After discharge from hospital following TBI, people often work out their 
own ways to manage challenges within their daily lives, with support 
of family and friends. This study is intended to find out from people 
after TBI themselves, and their family members or significant others, 
how they manage, what helps, and what would be important for 





This is a non-interventional, qualitative study, based upon interviews 
with people who have been discharged from hospital after TBI. In 
addition, each person with TBI who has agreed to take part in this 
study will be asked to identity one person who is close to them, to 
participate in interviews as well. This may be a family member or 
someone who is considered to be their ‘significant other’, in terms of 
support provided to them.  
 
Interviews will be conducted by the researcher at a time and place 
identified as convenient by the participants. Each interview will last 
around one hour but this will depend on each person and how much 
they would like to say. The interviews will be recorded with a digital 
recorder and will later be transcribed into a written version. Participants 
will be asked to participate in a similar, follow-on interview 
approximately six months later. Information used in the research study 




Participants are free to withdraw consent to participate in the study at 
any time and without giving any reason.  
 
There will be no change in, or effects on, usual care or support offered 




What will happen after the project is finished?  
All interviews will be analysed to find out what people have said about 
how they manage in their daily lives, after their or their relative’s TBI. 
This information will be used to increase understanding of what can 
help other people after TBI, their families and significant others, and 
how healthcare professionals can best support them. Information will 
also be made available to health care professionals and other 
researchers, though articles published in medical journals. 
 
 
Who is carrying out the project? 
The study is being undertaken by a Consultant in Rehabilitation 
Medicine based at King’s College Hospital, who is undertaking this 
study as part of a professional doctorate degree that is academically 
supervised by the University of Westminster, London.   
 
Further information and contact details 
For further information about this study, please contact the researcher: 
 




















A project to understand how people manage in their daily lives  
following a traumatic brain injury 
 
Full title: A narrative inquiry into how people with traumatic brain injury ‘self-
manage’ after discharge from hospital 
 
Thank you for reading the Participant Information Sheet about this project. If you 
would like to take part, please read and sign this form. 
 
 
Name:_____________________________ Date of Birth:________________________ 
 
1. I have read and understand the project information sheet in the Information 
Sheet dated April 2015, and have had the opportunity to ask questions. 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at 
any time, without giving any reason. 
3. I agree that my General Practitioner be informed by the researcher that I am 
participating in this study. 
4. I understand the interview session will be audio-recorded, and that it will be 
stored by the researcher for a period of 5 years from project completion.  
5. I understand that the audio-recording will not be used for anything but the 
intended purpose of this project. 
      I agree to take part in the above project: 
 












Department of Neurosciences 









Department of Neurosciences 








FOR FAMILY MEMBER OR SIGNIFICANT OTHER 
 
A project to understand how people manage in their daily lives 
following a traumatic brain injury 
 
Full title: A narrative inquiry into how people with traumatic brain injury ‘self-
manage’ after discharge from hospital 
 
Thank you for reading the ‘Information Sheet for family member or significant other’ 





Name:__________________________ Date of birth:__________________ 
 
1. I have read and understand the Information Sheet dated April 2015, and 
have had the opportunity to ask questions. 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to 
withdraw at any time, without giving any reason. 
3. I understand the interview session will be audio-recorded, and that it will 
be stored by the researcher for a period of 5 years from project completion. 
4. I understand that the audio-recording will not be used for anything but the 
intended purpose of this project. 
 
I agree to my taking part in the above project: 
 















5: Ethical approval letters 
 




















PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL  
Petra Makela 
and  
Damien Ridge  
 15 July 2015 
 
Dear Petra and Damien   
 
App. No. External IRAS: 15/LO/0525 
Name:  Petra Makela  
Faculty: Science and Technology   
Mode: Doctoral Researcher (Professional Doctorate)  
Supervisor: Damien Ridge  
 
Project Title: A narrative inquiry into the experiences of people with 
traumatic brain injury and family members in ‘self-managing’ over the first 
two years following discharge from hospital  
 
I am writing to inform you that the University Research Ethics Committee 
considered and noted the favourable opinion from NRES Committee London – City 
and East, REF Reference 15/LO.0525 and IRAS project ID 168036. The proposal 
was approved.  
 
In the meantime if your proposal changes significantly, please contact the 







Secretary, University Research Ethics Committee 
 
cc.     Chair, University Research Ethics Committee 
   Chair, Faculty Research Ethics Committee 
    Faculty Research Director 
    Supervisor  












Sent: 16 November 2016 15:07 
To: MAKELA, Petra (KING'S COLLEGE HOSPITAL NHS FOUNDATION TRUST) 
Subject: IRAS ID: 168036 
  
Dear Dr Petra Makela 
 
Study Title: A narrative inquiry into the experiences of people with traumatic 
brain injury and family members in “self-managing” over the first two years 
following discharge from hospital 
DOCUMAS NO: 16HH3380 
IRAS ID: 168036 
 
I can confirm that Imperial College London/Imperial College Healthcare NHS Trust 
(ICHT) have the capacity and capability to host this research and confirm 
organisational readiness for this study 
This means the project may now start at Imperial College/Imperial College 
Healthcare NHS Trust sites. Before you commence your research, please note that 
you must be aware of your obligations to comply with the minimum requirements 
for compliance with the Research Governance indicators 17 (Data Protection); 25 
(Health and Safety) and 22 (Financial Probity). Details of the requirements to be 
met can be found in the Research Governance Framework available on 
www.dh.gov.uk  
Under the Research Governance regulations, Serious Adverse Event Reports and 
amendments to the protocol or other supporting documents must be forwarded 
to the Joint Research Compliance Office. 
In accordance with the Research Governance Framework, research projects 
carried out in the Trust will be randomly chosen by the Joint Research Compliance 
Office for auditing. Please see the attached checklist for documentation that will 
be required during the audit. 
I wish you well in your research  
  
Becky Ward, Research Governance Manager 
Joint Research Compliance Office 
Imperial College London and Imperial College Healthcare NHS Trust 
Room 215, Level 2, Medical School Building 
Norfolk Place 
London, W2 1PG 




6: Interview schedule 
 
Overall approach 
The researcher will follow the participants’ narration and will generate questions in response to 
the participant’s own flow of topics. The structure of the interview will be broadly guided by the 
‘aide memoir’ below.  This will be used flexibly, rather than as a pre-specified wording and 






 “Thank you for agreeing to take part in this study. I would like to find out how people cope 
after leaving hospital following a head injury”.  
 “Have you had a read of the information sheet? Would you like to discuss anything further, 
or ask any questions?” 
 Talk through information regarding recording and transcribing of the interview and why 
this will be done.  
 Explain about confidentiality and anonymity. 
 Explain that an information sheet will be sent to General Practitioner (GP), to let the GP 
know about involvement in the study. 
 Explain that participants are free to withdraw from the study at any stage if they wish, 
without any effect on their usual care or follow-up plans. 
 Ask participants to read the consent form, give them opportunity to consider the content, 
ask them if they have any questions.  
 After any additional issues have been addressed, ask participant if they are willing to sign 
to indicate their consent (respectively for each participant, if interviewing together as a 
dyad), then add researcher signature. 
 Ask for mobile phones to be set to silent, ask if any interruptions are expected within the 
timeframe and, if so, discuss how these can be managed within the interview processes. 
 Brief initial ‘warm-up’, rapport-building conversation not directly related to interview 
topic. 
 
Body of interview 
Can you tell me something about how things have been since your discharge from hospital? 
[Follow-on questions*, according to participant’s narrative] 
 
*Examples of follow-on questions: 
 
Asking for more details: 
 Can you tell me more about that? 
 How do you do that? 
 How did others respond to that? 
 What did you do then? 
 What felt helpful in doing that? 
 
Exploring thoughts and feelings: 
 Why did that matter to you? 
 What felt important about that? 





 Would you mind explaining that again? I’m not sure I understood correctly. 
 
Closing 
 Is there something else you would like to add? 
 Would like to ask me anything else about this study? 
 At interview 1: discuss what to expect for future plans regarding the follow-on interview, 
after an interval of around 6 -12 months 
 Give store voucher as per protocol, in acknowledgement of time and contribution, and 
thank participants. 
 Leave sheet with participants as described in ‘sensitivity protocol’. 
 
 
Follow-on interview  
NB: The overall interview process will be developed iteratively, on the basis of reflection on 
successive interviews. This outline represents an early-stage guide. 
 
Opening 
 Reminder of intention of study: to explore how people cope after head injury, and that this 
2nd interview is to find out about coping over a longer period of time since discharge from 
hospital. 
 Review consent form signed prior to interview 1; give opportunity for questions, ask if 
participants are willing to proceed with next interview. 
 Explain that participants are free to withdraw from the study at any stage if they wish, 
without any effect on their usual care or follow-up plans. 
 Remind that the interview will be recorded and transcribed, and explain about 
confidentiality and anonymity. 
 Ask for mobile phones to be put onto silent, check if any disruptions anticipated. 
 
Body of interview 
Can you tell me something about how things have been since the last interview (or since you 
left hospital, if unable to recall initial interview) 
 
Follow-on questions as for initial interview 
 
Any ‘closed question’ information (if not already gathered from clinical notes and/or at 
interview 1), for example information relating to each patient/significant other dyad; the 




 Is there something else you would like to add? 
 Would like to ask me anything else about this study? 
 Give store voucher, in acknowledgement of time and contribution. 
 Thank participants. 







7: Honorary research contract  














Presentation title Institution Date 
Broken Narrative and the 
Lived Body 
‘I knew it wasn’t me but I was 
told it was’ ‐ the broken self 







BSA 48th MedSoc Annual 
Conference  
Narratives of traumatic brain 
injury and self-management 






British Association for 
Applied Linguists Health 
and Science 
Communication SIG 
‘Experiences of illness and 
death: learning from the 
discourses of realities and 
fictions’ 
 
From ‘cocoon to the real world’ 
after traumatic brain injury: a 




hosted at Open 
University 
28.11.16 
Nuffield Department of 
Primary Health Care 
Sciences ‘Too Much 
Medicine’ Conference 
 
Collective performativity in 









Can Butler’s theory of 
performativity be applied to 
(re)construction of identity 







17th Biennial European 







Through Narratives of 






BSA 51st Medical Sociology 
Annual Conference  
 
 
Packaging and unwrapping of 
emotion in narratives of 









10: Overview of participants  
10a) Initial admission and interview details 
 
Pseudonym Age and 
gender 
Occupation at 

























Brenda 80 F Retired clerk Fall 13 Yes No 6 months 8 months Partner 




9 No but neuro-
intensive care 
Yes 11 months 9 months Mother 
Mike 52 M Company 
owner/director  
Fall 3 Yes Yes 6 months 7 months Wife 





13 No Yes 7 months 7 months Sister 
Ewa 39 F Single parent Pedestrian 
hit by 
vehicle 
3 Yes Yes 14 months No 
response  
Brother  
Claire 28 F Legal 
professional 
Fall 3 Yes  Yes 18 months 8 months Sister 
Walter 73 M Retired teacher  Fall Not 
recorded 
Yes No 3 years 7 months Wife 
Andy 33 M Construction 
work 
Assault 3 Yes  No 12 months 6 months Partner 
Chloe 19 M Student Fall 3 No but neuro-
intensive care 
No 2 years 8 months Parents 
Raminta 43 F Shop assistant Fall 4 Yes  No 2 years 
10 months 






10b) Categorisation of individuals’ impairments from traumatic brain injury (at first research interview) * 




Brenda was experiencing difficulties with sustaining her attention and concentrating on 
information, for example when reading or taking part in conversation. Combined with memory 
problems and reduced efficiency in processing complicated information, this meant that her 
fluency could be impacted within communication. This was worsened by anxiety when noticing 
her errors and by fatigue, which she described as an overwhelming feeling of tiredness that was 
not relieved by sleep. 
 
Toby Cognitive impairment; 
fatigue 
Toby was experiencing some reduction in his ability to sustain his attention and to concentrate, 
with reduction in the ease with which he could remember and mentally manipulate information. 
His fatigue worsened these difficulties, leading to frustration with himself, and a tendency to 
become irritable with others more easily than before his injury. 
 
Mike Dysexecutive syndrome; 
dysphasia 
‘Dysexecutive syndrome’ refers to disruption to a collection of thinking processes considered 
necessary for selecting and monitoring actions towards intended goals. Impairments impact on 
ways of coping with everyday life, work and relationships. Mike experienced a change (reported 
to him by others more than his own awareness) in regulating his contribution to conversation, 
with impulsivity and reduced flexibility in shifting his focus. ‘Dysphasia’ refers to speech and 
language disorders, where there is impairment of expression by speech or writing, and/or 
impairment of comprehension. Mike had difficulties in expressing himself fluently and 
understanding more complicated information.  
 
Monte Cognitive impairment; 
fatigue 
Monte experienced reduced ability to sustain attention when engaged in tasks, to process 
complicated information quickly, and to remember events since his injury. He described 
difficulties in initiating tasks, linked with a profound feeling of loss of energy. 
 




Ewa was experiencing problems with day to day learning, organising and remembering new 
information. Her problem-solving skills were affected by reduced flexibility when planning and 
evaluating her actions. She could become impulsive, frustrated and irritable, especially when 
tired or when attempting to deal with more than one task at a time. 
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Claire Dysphasia (expressive 
more than receptive); post-
traumatic epilepsy; fatigue 
Claire was experiencing word-finding difficulties and needed to take her time to comprehend 
more complex sentences. This was associated with anxiety and reduced confidence in her 
communication skills. She also experienced epileptic seizures (fits), the medication for which 
caused side effects that exacerbated her fatigue. 
 
Walter Dysexecutive syndrome; 
global dysphasia; fatigue; 
short term memory 
impairment; post-
traumatic epilepsy 
Walter was experiencing reduction in problem-solving skills associated with a tendency toward 
more concrete thinking. He had difficulties with day-to-day learning and remembering new 
information since his injury. At times, he had difficulties expressing himself and in following 
more complicated information, particularly when communicating in the presence of background 
distractions. He experienced fatigue, exacerbated by sedative side effects of his medication for 
epilepsy, but remained very motivated to maintain his activity levels.  
 
Andy Fatigue; anterograde 
memory impairment 
Andy was experiencing fatigue as an overwhelming, profound tiredness and described reduced 
motivation, which made everyday activities seem challenging to initiate and complete. His 
memory difficulties particularly related to problems with remembering new information since 
his injury. 
 
Chloe Mild cognitive impairment; 
low frequency anomic 
aphasia; hearing 
impairment 
Chloe was experiencing some problems with her ‘working memory’: the short-term storage and 
use of information. She had relatively fluent speech and good comprehension abilities, but she 
experienced difficulty in word finding, particularly for words not used frequently in conversation, 
which worsened when anxious. She also experienced deafness in the left ear.  
 




Raminta experienced problems with her speed of processing for more complicated information, 
had reduced attention, and difficulties remembering new information since the injury. She could 
be impulsive when wanting to get her point across within communication, and could become 
distracted if attending to more than one task at a time. 
 
 
* I have included these descriptions to provide some clinical contextualisation of the research participants. However, my intention within this thesis has 
been to explore issues that people bring up themselves, and navigate within social interactions. Further, these impairments and their degree of impact 






Agency can be viewed in contrasting ways:  it is either a subject position determined by 
dominant narratives or it represents the ‘self-creating’ subject (Bamberg, 2004b). In this thesis, 
agency is understood in the context of iterability of identity positions that are continually 
reiterated and resignified. Agency arises through not accepting or adopting expected norms, 
thereby resignifying meanings and destabilising an identity position (Applebaum, 2010). 
 
Assemblage refers to a whole entity that is characterisied by relationships with external bodies 
and flows of affect (Feely, 2019). A component of a whole may be taken out and plugged into 
another assemblage, where its interactions will be different (DeLanda, 2019). 
 
Citationality is a concept developed by Derrida (1978) in which the conjuring of something 
different comes about through repetition of what has gone before. By being “not quite” as 
before, the citation opens new possibilities for ways of being (Nakassis, 2013, p. 76). 
 
Interpellation seeks to introduce a reality. It is an act of hailing where individuals acknowledge 
and respond to ideologies and then recognise themselves as particular subjects (Althusser, 1971; 
Butler, 1993). 
 
Identity in this thesis refers to a continuous process of reiterating and resignifying one’s position 
within and across discourses (Butler, 1990). 
 
Hail to an identity - see ‘interpellation’ - for example, the hail “Hey you!” - to which we turn and 
respond, thereby recognising a subject position. 
 
Neoliberalism within healthcare contexts refers to expectations that patients will take 
responsibility for their conditions or behaviours, framed as “outcomes” that can be measured. 
Patients are expected to manage and show improvement in these outcomes, away from 
healthcare services’ resources.   
 
Performativity refers to Butler’s theory that there is no core identity, and that the subject is 
always involved in processes of acquiring identity through the reiteration of social norms. 
Performativity is “an understanding of continuous subjectivity, an understanding of the way in 
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which a subject is produced and acts within and through various conditions, and degrees of 
coercion”  (Butler, 1993, p. 234). 
 
Positioning in this thesis refers to processes by which positions are interactively selected, 
resisted and revisited in social interactions. Speakers are seen to assume positions in both the 
‘told’ world of the story and the ‘here and now’ world of the telling. Positioning refers to the 
characters in relation to each other another in storytelling, and how the teller crafts the story in 
order to specify a ‘social location’ for the self in the act of telling (Bamberg, 2004a, 2004b). 
 
Poststructural theories focus on the meanings people make in their socio-cultural-historical 
contexts and the way subjects become through discourse. Poststructuralism opens up 
opportunities for thinking differently about what we do, disrupting old certainties, replacing 
stereotypical thinking and opening possibilities in generation of something new (Davies, 2000). 
 
Rehabilitation services in the NHS in England use similar processes to medical services more 
generally: assessing, diagnosing and treating. The key differences are that (1) medical services 
focus on the disease or condition, while rehabilitation focus on the consequences (disabilities’); 
and (2) the ‘treatment’ in rehabilitation involves iterative intervention from multidisciplinary 
professionals and assumes that the patient will be ‘engaged’ with activities determined through 
professionals’ expertise. 
 
Self in poststructural understandings is constructed through language and action. The ‘relational 
self’ is understood as a social account, where a notion of ‘self and other’ replaces a ‘singular self’ 
(Frewin, 2002). 
 
Supported self-management refers to a spectrum of healthcare intentions from broadly 
enabling people to live well with long term conditions, to a focus on their own responsibility for 
disease-control (Morgan et al., 2017) 
 
Subject in poststructural theory is an effect of discourse: a subject is constituted in and through 
discourses but not fully determined by them. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
